Responsive image
博碩士論文 etd-0512116-230934 詳細資訊
Title page for etd-0512116-230934
論文名稱
Title
高階經理人的跳槽與薪酬研究
Executive Job-hopping and Compensation
系所名稱
Department
畢業學年期
Year, semester
語文別
Language
學位類別
Degree
頁數
Number of pages
58
研究生
Author
指導教授
Advisor
召集委員
Convenor
口試委員
Advisory Committee
口試日期
Date of Exam
2016-06-02
繳交日期
Date of Submission
2016-06-14
關鍵字
Keywords
動機、管理能力、高階經理人、跳槽、薪酬
Executive, Compensation, Job-hopping, Managerial ability, Incentives
統計
Statistics
本論文已被瀏覽 5886 次,被下載 327
The thesis/dissertation has been browsed 5886 times, has been downloaded 327 times.
中文摘要
本文研究高階經理人跳槽之原因。我們發現:總薪酬大幅增加是高階經理人跳槽的主因,高階經理人並不因公司風險及董事會之關係連結影響其跳槽意願。高階經理人跳槽後,其薪酬中的股票報酬比例顯著上升,低風險報酬的比例顯著下降。跳槽後公司不會參考高階經理人管理能力來調整其薪酬。
Abstract
This research analyzes the incentives that induce the executives to hop to the other firms and serve as the Chief Executive Officers (CEOs). We find that the most critical incentives come from the increase in total pay after job-hopping, instead of firm risk or the connections to the board members of the firm the executive hops to. Job-hopping leads to an increase in the proportion of stock pay and a decrease in the proportion of less-risky pay. We do not find evidence that the increase in total pay is related to managerial ability.
目次 Table of Contents
國立中山大學研究生學位論文審定書………………………………………………………………………....................i
摘要…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………ii
Abstract……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………iii
1. Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………………………….......1
2. Selection of sample firms…………………………………………………………………………………..........4
3. Job-hopping and executives compensation………………………………………………………..................6
3.1. Descriptive statistics………………………………………………………………………………………….......6
3.2. Comparison of the compensation between post-hopping and pre-hopping firms …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………......8
3.3. Comparison of the compensation between predecessors and successors………...............................10
3.4. Difference-in-difference analysis of executive compensation…………………………...........................11
3.5. Impacts of stock price, risk, and board connections…………………………………………...................13
3.6. Regression analysis…………………………………………………………………………………………......16
4. Managerial ability and compensation after job-hopping…………………………………..........................19
4.1. Measurement of managerial ability…………………………………………………………………...............19
4.2. Regression analysis…………………………………………………………………………………………......21
5. Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………………………………...23
References……………………………………………………………………………………………………………....25
參考文獻 References
Albuquerque, A., De Franco, G., Verdi, R., 2013. Peer choice in CEO compensation. Journal of Financial Economics 108, 160-181.

Balsam, S., Miharjo, S., 2007. The effect of equity compensation on voluntary executive turnover. Journal of Accounting and Economics 43, 95-119.

Boyd, B. K., 1994. Board Control and CEO Compensation. Strategic Management Journal 15, 335-344.

Campbell, T.C., Gallmeyer, M., Johnson, S.A., Rutherford, J., Stanley, B.W., 2011. CEO optimism and forced turnover. Journal of Financial Economics 101, 695–712.

Custódio, C., Ferreira, M., Matos, P., 2013. Generalists vs. specialists: lifetime experience and CEO pay. Journal of Financial Economics 108, 471–492.

Elsaid, E., Davidson III, W. N., 2009. What happens to CEO compensation following turnover and succession? The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 49, 424-447.

Gabaix, X., Landier, A., 2008. Why Has CEO Pay Increased so Much? The Quarterly Journal of Economics 123, 49-100.

Gao, H., Harford, J., Li, K., 2012. CEO pay cuts and forced turnover: Their causes and consequences. Journal of Corporate Finance 18, 291-310.

Gao, H., Luo, J.; Tang, T., 2015. Effects of managerial labor market on executive compensation: Evidence from job-hopping. Journal of Accounting and Economics 59, 203-220.

Jenter, D., Kanaan, F., 2015. CEO turnover and relative performance evaluation. Journal of Finance 70, 2155-2184.

Malmendier, U., Tate, G., 2009. Superstar CEOs. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 124, 1593-1638.

Shen, W., Cannella, A. A., 2002. Revisiting the performance consequences of CEO succession: The impacts of successor type, post-succession senior executive turnover, and departing CEO tenure. Academy of Management Journal 45, 717-733.
電子全文 Fulltext
本電子全文僅授權使用者為學術研究之目的,進行個人非營利性質之檢索、閱讀、列印。請遵守中華民國著作權法之相關規定,切勿任意重製、散佈、改作、轉貼、播送,以免觸法。
論文使用權限 Thesis access permission:自定論文開放時間 user define
開放時間 Available:
校內 Campus: 已公開 available
校外 Off-campus: 已公開 available


紙本論文 Printed copies
紙本論文的公開資訊在102學年度以後相對較為完整。如果需要查詢101學年度以前的紙本論文公開資訊,請聯繫圖資處紙本論文服務櫃台。如有不便之處敬請見諒。
開放時間 available 已公開 available

QR Code