近年來，國內外財報舞弊的事件屢見不鮮，越突顯公司治理的重要性。本研究擬探討審計委員會和高階主管薪酬及員工權益誘因之間的關係。本研究利用複迴歸的方式，以台灣上市櫃的科技業公司為樣本，涵蓋2005至2010年間的資料。本研究發現，獨立董事人數占審計委員會人員總數的比例和高階主管薪酬呈現正向的關係；獨立董事亦是其他公司經理人占審計委員會人員總數比例和高階主管薪酬之間的關係不顯著；審計委員會財務會計專家人數占審計委員會人員總數比例和高階主管薪酬之間呈現負向的關係。員工權益誘因和獨立董事人數占審計委員會人員總數的比例、獨立董事亦是其他公司經理人占審計委員會人員總數比例及審計委員會財務會計專家人數占審計委員會人員總數比例皆呈現不顯著的關係。

Nowadays financial fraud scheme become more and more prevalent in public-traded companies in western and oriental countries. Many finance-related literatures realize and put stress on the importance of corporate governance. In this study, we would like to explore the relationship between audit committee and CEO compensation and equity incentives. We use multiple regression as methodology, take the public companies in technological field in Taiwan as sample from 2005 to 2010. We discover that, there is a positive relationship between the ratio of the number of independent directors divided by the audit committee members and the CEO compensation; there is no significant relationship between the ratio of the number of independent directors also serve as CEO directors in other firms divided by the audit committee members and the CEO compensation; there is a negative relationship between the ratio of the number of financial-accounting expertise divided by the audit committee members and the CEO compensation. And with regard to the equity incentives, there is no significant relationship between the ratio of the number of independent directors divided by the audit committee members, the ratio of the number of independent directors also serve as CEO directors in other firms divided by the audit committee members, the ratio of the number of financial-accounting expertise divided by the audit committee members and equity incentives.

第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 3
第三節 研究架構及流程 4
第二章 文獻探討 6
第一節 代理理論之相關研究 6
第二節 三階最適契約模型(Three-tier Optimal Contracting Model)之相關研究 9
第三節 管理職權模型(Managerial Power Model)之相關研究 13
第四節 高階主管薪酬之相關研究 17
第五節 審計委員會及公司治理相關研究 20
第三章 研究資料整理及研究假設 26
第一節 研究資料說明 26
第二節 變數定義 28
第三節 研究假說 31
第四節 研究模型 34
第四章 實證結果與分析 37
第一節 樣本敘述統計量分析 37
第二節 實證結果分析 40
之一 審計委員會獨立董事與高階主管薪酬及權益誘因之關係 40
之二 審計委員會獨立董事與高階主管薪酬及權益誘因之關係(加入年度作為控制變數) 47
之三 審計委員會獨立董事與高階主管薪酬及權益誘因之關係(將主要變數去除) 54
之四 審計委員會獨立董事與高階主管薪酬及權益誘因之關係(去除主要變數且加入年度)61
之五 審計委員會獨立董事與權益誘因之關係(以08年作分界分前後期)68
第三節 小結 74
第五章 研究結論及限制 78
第一節 研究結論 78
第二節 研究限制 83
參考文獻 84

Anderson, R., and J. Bizjak 2003. An empirical examination of the role of the CEO and the compensation committee in structuring executive pay. Journal of Banking and Finance, 27(7), 1323-1348
Antle, R.1982. The auditor as an economic agent. Journal of Accounting Research, 20,503-527
Antle, R., and B. Nalebuff (1991). Conservatism and Auditor-Client Negotiations. Journal of Accounting Research, 29, 31-54.
Baron, D., and R. Myerson (1982), Regulating a Monopolist with unknown costs, Econometrica, 50, 911-930
Bebchuk, L., J. Fried, and D. Walker. 2002. Managerial power and rent extraction in the design of executive composition. The University of Chicago Law Review, 69, 751-846.
Bebhcuk, L., A., and J. M. Fried. 2003. Executive compensation as an agency problem.National Bureau of Economic Research Cambridge, Mass., USA.
Bebchuk, L., A., J. M. Fried, and I. Ebrary. 2004. Pay without performance: The unfulfilled promise of executive compensation. Vol. 15: Harvard University Press Cambridge, MA, USA.
Bebchuk, Lucian A., and Jesse M. Fried. 2006. Pay without Performance: Overview of the Issues. Academy of Management Perspectives 20:18-24.
Bergstresser, D., Philippon T., 2006. “CEO incentives and earnings management: evidence from the 1990s.” Journal of Financial Economics 80, 511-529.
Bertrand, M., and S. Mullainathan. 2001. Are CEOs rewarded for luck? The ones without principles are. Quarterly Journal of Economics 116(3): 901-932.
Blue Ribbon Committee (BRC), 1999. Report and recommendations of the blue ribbon committee on improving the effectiveness of corporate audit committees. New York, NY: New York Stock Exchange and National Association of Securities Dealers.
Brick, I.E., Chidambaran, N.K., 2010. “Board meetings, committee structure, and firm value.” Journal of Corporate Finance 16, 533-553.
Brickley, J., A., and C., M., James (1987). The takeover market, corporate board composition and ownership structure：The case of banking. Journal of Law and Economics, 30, 161-180.
Brown, L., D., Caylor, M., L., 2006. “Corporate governance and firm valuation.” Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 25,409-434.
Cheng, Q., Warfield, T.D., 2005. “Equity incentives and earnings management” Accounting Review 80, 441-476.
Choe C., and I. Park. 2003. Delegated contracting and corporate hierarchies. SSRN working paper.
Conyon M., and S.Peck. 1998. Board control, remuneration committee, and top management compensation. Academy of Management Journal, 41, 146-157.
Core, John E., Robert W. Holthausen, and David F. Larcker. 1999. Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance. Journal of Financial Economics 51(3):371-406.
Cornett, M.M., Marcus A.J., Tehranian H., 2008. “Corporate governance and pay-for- performance: the impact of earnings management.” Journal of Financial Economics 87, 357-373.
Craighead J., Magnan M., Throne L., 2004. The impact of mandated disclosure on performance-based CEO compensation. Contemporary Accounting Research 21(2)：369-398.
Dalton, D., Johnson J., Ellstrand, A., 1999. “Number of directors and financial performance : a meta-analysis.” Academy of Management Journal 42, 674-686.
DeFond, M., L., and J., Jiambalvo (1991). Incidence and Circumstances of accounting errors. The Accounting Review, 17, 634-655.
DeZoort, T., Salterio, S. E., 2001. “The effects of corporate governance experience and financial reporting and audit knowledge on audit committee member’s judgements.” Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 20, 31-47.
Dye, R., (1988). Earnings Management in an Overlapping Generation Model. Journal of Accounting Research, 26, 195-235.
Eisenberg, T., Sundgren, S., Wells, M., 1998. “Larger board size and decreasing firm value in small firms.” Journal of Financial Economics 48, 35-54.
Fama, E., F., (1980). Agency Problems and the Theory of the firm. Journal of Political Economy, 88(2), 289-307.
Fama, Eugene F., and Michael C. Jensen. 1983. Separation of Ownership and Control. Journal of Law and Economics 26(2):301-325.
Finkelstein, S. 1992. Power in top management teams: Dimensions, measurement, and validation. The Academy of Management Journal 35(3): 505-538.
Finkelstein, S., and D., Hambrick. 1989. Chief executive compensation：A study of the intersection of markets and political processes. Strategic Management Journal, 10：121-134.
Fredrickson J., Hambrick D., Baumrin S., 1988. A model of CEO dismissal. Academy of Management Review 13(2): 255-270.
Hall, B., and J., Liebman. 1998. Are CEOs really paid like bureaucrats? Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113：653-691.
Hambrick, D., C., and Finkelstein, S., 1995. The effects of ownership structure on conditions at the top：The case of CEO pay raises. Strategic Management Journal, 16：175-193.
Hoitash, U. and Hoitash R. 2009. Conflicting objectives within the board：Evidence from overlapping audit and compensation committee members. Accounting topics in Group Decision and Negociations. 18：57-73.
Holmstrom B. 1979. Moral hazard and observability. Bell Journal of Economics 10(1) : 74-91.
Jensen, M. C. and W. H. Meckling. 1976, Theory of the firm: managerial behavior , agency costs and capital structure, Journal of Financial Economics,3,305-360
Jensen, M., and J. B. Warner. 1988. The distribution of power among corporate managers. Journal of Financial Economics, 20,3-24
Jensen, M., 1993. “The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems.” Journal of Finance 48, 831-880.
Kinney, W. R. and R. D. Martin (1994). Does auditing reduce the bias in financial reporting? A review of audit-related adjustment studies. Auditing：A Journal of Practice and Theory, 13(1), 149-156.
Klein, A. 2002. “Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings management.” Journal of Accounting and Economics 33, 375-400.
Kofman, A., and J. Lawarree, 1993. Collusion in hierarchical agency. Econometrica ,61,629-656.
Krishman, J., 2005. “Audit committee quality and internal control: An empirical analysis.” The Accounting Review 80, 649-678.
Laffont, J.-J., and J. Tirole (1986), Using cost observation to Regulate Firms, Journal of political economy, 94, 614-641
Lambert, R., A. 1993. The use of accounting and security price measures of performance in managerial compensation contracts: A discussion. Journal of Accounting and Economics 16(1-3): 101-123.
Maskin, E., and J. Riley (1984), Monopoly with incomplete information, Rand journal of economics, 15, 171-196
Mehran, H., 1995. “Executive compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance.” Journal of Financial Economics 38, 163-184.
Morgan, A., Poulsen, A., 2001. “Linking pay to performance－compensation proposals in the S&P 500.” Journal of Financial Economics 62, 489-523.
Nelson, M. W., J. A.Elliott and R. L. Tarpley. (2002). Evidence from Auditors about Managers’ and Auditors’ Earnings Management Decisions. The Accounting Review, 77, 175-202.
O’Reilly, C., B. Main, and G.Crystal. 1988. CEO compensation as tournament and social comparison. Administrative Science Quarterly, 33:257-274.
PricewaterhouseCoopers and Corporate Board Member, 2008: “What directors think annual survey.”
Rahman, R., A., Ali F., H., M., 2006. “Board, audit committee, culture and earnings management: Malaysian evidence.” Managerial Auditing Journal 21, 783-804.
Smith, C., Stulz, R., 1985. “The determinants of firms hedging policies” The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 20, 391-405.
Tirole, J. 1986. Hierarchies and bureaucracies: On the role of collusions in Organizations. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 2, 181-214
Vafeas, N., 2005. “Audit committees, boards, and the quality of reported earnings.” Contemporary Accounting Research 22, 1093-1122.
Vafeas, N., Waegelein, J. F., 2007. “The association between audit committee, compensation incentives, and corporate audit fees.” Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 28, 241-255.
Xie, B., Davidson, W.N. Ⅲ., DaDalt, P.J., 2003. “Earnings management and corporate governance :The role of the board and the audit committee.” Journal of Corporate Finance 9, 295-316.
Westphal, J., D., and Zajac, E., J., 1994. Who shall govern? CEO board power, demographic similarity, and new director selection. Administrative Science Quarterly, 39：367-390.
Westphal, J. D., and E., J. Zajac. 1997. Defections from the inner circle: Social exchange, reciprocity and the diffusion of board independence in U.S. corporations. Administrative Science Quarterly, 42:161-183.
Weir C., Liang D., and McKnight P. J. 2001. An empirical analysis of the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on the performance of UK firms. Social Science Research Network, 2, 1-38.
Yermack, D. 1996. Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors. Journal of Financial Economics, 40, 185-211.
J-L.W. Mitchell Van der Zahn, Harjinder Singh, Inderpal Singh. 2008. Association
between independent audit committee members’ human-resource features and
underpricing :The case of Singapore IPOs from 1997-2006. Journal of Human Resource Costing & Accounting, Vol. 12 Iss: 3. pp.179-212.
Zajac E., Westphal J., 1995. Accounting for the explanations of CEO compensation: substance and symbolism. Administrative Science Quarterly 40(2): 283-308.