東亞國家的上市公司有三分之二的公司為家族所控制，美國和西歐國家則分別有三分之ㄧ和44%屬於家族公司，由此可見各國上市公司普遍存在著家族企業的型態，而台灣也有近七成以上的上市公司屬於家族控制型態，許多研究也指出家族公司在世界的經濟活動上扮演著重要的角色。家族公司的股權結構和經營理念有別於一般公司，例如，家族成員握有決定性的股權且普遍位居董事與高階管理者，通常會將其公司視為祖傳資產而要傳承給下一代，而這些的差異對公司財務決策影響則為近來的研究潮流，過去有關家族公司的研究主要偏重在家族因素對公司績效的影響，本論文則是從負債融資決策和負債融資成本的角度來探討家族因素對負債決策的影響。
首先探討家族公司在負債融資決策上是否異於非家族公司，實證結果發現家族公司有較低的負債比率且負債成本較非家族公司低約0.2813%。進一步比較家族公司與非家族公司在負債決策因素的差異，結果發現家族公司和非家族公司對負債水準影響程度的差異主要是在折舊稅盾、營運風險和公司規模三方面，而負債融資成本方面，家族公司相較於非家族公司而言在公司規模、負債比率以及信用風險有較高的敏感程度。
過去從代理理論的觀點來探討負債決策主要偏重在負債代理問題，而較少從權益代理問題與負債代理問題的交互關係來討論權益代理問題對負債決策的影響，由於家族公司的權益代理問題包含管理者與股東間的傳統權益代理問題以及控制股東與外部股東間的核心權益代理問題，而家族所有權和管理權可以降低傳統權益代理問題，控制股東採用股權金字塔結構和交叉持股方式擴增控制權會提高核心權益代理問題，因此進一步從權益代理問題的角度，將家族因素區分為家族所有權、擴增控制權和管理權三個效果來探討對負債融資決策的影響。
在負債融資方面，實證結果發現家族所有權愈高時，公司價值與家族股東財富的關係愈密切，因而傾向少使用負債，以降低公司財務風險，維護家族股東本身的財富。控制權與所有權偏離程度與負債比率則呈正向關係，意味著偏離程度愈高時，家族股東與小股東的核心權益代理問題愈嚴重，公司會傾向採用負債融資取得長期資金。而家族管理權的負債比率的影響係數亦未達到顯著水準，所以CEO是否由家族成員擔任並不會影響到負債融資決策。而在控制持股的分析方面，當控制持股低的時候，公司會傾向採用負債融資，以減少股權稀釋影響控制權，而當控制持股高的時候，為避免負債的監控效果造成控制利益的損失，會傾向少用負債，因此就控制權與負債比率的關係應呈現倒U的關係。另外，對家族公司而言，維護控制權和風險控管是家族公司負債融資決策的重要考慮因素。
在負債成本方面，家族所有權可以降低負債融資成本。若考慮家族所有權的非線性關係，家族所有權對負債融資成本的影響是非線性且呈倒U形狀，最大值出現在8.64%，當家族所有權超過17.9%時，家族所有權對負債融資成本的影響為負，由於研究中已定義家族公司的家族所有權至少為10%，且樣本的家族平均所有權為21%，由此可知家族所有權愈高，負債融資成本愈低。與Anderson et al.(2003)的研究比較發現，雖然家族平均所有權對負債成本有負面的影響，但不同的是，美國家族公司的家族所有權提高對負債成本負面的影響會降低，而國內的家族所有權愈高對負債成本的負面影響則會提高。擴增控制權機制會提高核心權益代理問題而使得負債成本增加，且擴增控制權與負債成本不具有非線性關係。債權人認為由家族成員擔任CEO對其債權比較有保障，因此家族CEO可以降低負債融資成本。

In East Asian economies, about 2/3 listed firms are controlled by family shareholders. In the US and West European, the proportions of family firms are about 33% and 44%, respectively. Thus, family-controlled listed firms are common in almost every nation. In Taiwan, nearly 70% of listed firms are family-controlled. Many previous studies have pointed out that family firms are playing an important role in global economic activities. The equity structures and management ideas of family firms are different from those of common firms. For instance, family members possess decisive equities and will usually take positions of directors or top managers. They may usually view their firms as an asset inherited from forefathers, and they should pass it on to their next generations. The impact of these differences on firm’s financial decisions has become a main research focus in recent years. Previous studies of family firms mainly placed the focus on the impact of family factors on corporate performance, but this study would attempt to investigate the impact of family factors on debt decisions from the perspectives of debt-financing decision and cost of debt-financing.
First of all, this study probed into whether family and non-family firms have differences debt-financing decisions. Empirical findings indicated that family firms have a lower debt ratio and a 0.2813% lower cost of debt than non-family firms. A further comparison on the factors of debt decisions showed that the difference in the impact of family and non-family firms on debt levels lies in mainly three aspects, including depreciation tax shield, operational risk, and firm size. In the aspect of cost of debt-financing, family firms are relatively more sensitive to firm size, debt ratio, and credit risk.
Previous studies that applied the agent theory to investigate debt decisions focused more on the problems of debt agency problem and seldom used the inter-relationship between equity agency problem and debt agency problem to discuss the impact of equity agency problem on debt decisions. The problems of equity agency of family firms encompass the traditional equity agency between the manager and shareholders and core equity agency between controlling shareholders and external shareholders. Besides, family ownership and management can reduce the problems of traditional equity agency, and controlling shareholders using the pyramid structure of equities and cross-holding to enhance control right will increase the problems of core equity agency. Thus, based on the problems of equity agency problem, the family factors can be divided into family ownership, enhancement of control, and family management to investigate the respective impact on debt-financing decisions.
In the aspect of debt-financing, it was empirically discovered that higher family ownership would lead to a closer relationship between firm value and the wealth of family shareholders. Debt financing would be avoided to reduce financial risks and maintain the wealth of family shareholders. A positive correlation existed between debt ratio and the difference between family control and family ownership, implying when the difference between family control and family ownership is higher, the problems of core equity agency between controlling shareholders and small shareholders will be more serious, and the company will be inclined to adopt debt-financing to acquire long-term capitals. The estimate coefficient of the effect of family management on debt ratio is not significance. Thus, whether the CEO is taken by a family member will not affect debt-financing decisions. In the analysis of control level, when the control level is low, firms are inclined to adopt debt-financing decisions to reduce the effect of equity dilution. On the contrary, when the control level is high, in order to avoid the loss of control benefit caused by debt monitoring, firms will be inclined to avoid debts. As a result, control and debt ratio are in an inverted U-shaped relationship. In addition, for family firms, the maintenance of control and risk control are important factors affecting their debt-financing decision.
In the aspect of cost of debt, family ownership can reduce the cost of debt-financing. If the non-linear relationship of family ownership is considered, the impact of family ownership on the cost of debt-financing is non-linear and in an inverted U shape. The maximum value is 8.64%. When the family ownership exceeds 17.9%, the effect of family ownership on the cost of debt financing is negative. As the minimum family ownership was defined as 10% in this study, and the average family ownership among the samples was 21%, it could be inferred that higher family ownership would lead to a lower cost of debt-financing. In a comparison with Anderson et al. (2003), it was discovered that the average family ownership has negative influence on the cost of debt, but for the family firms in the US, higher family ownership would reduce its negative influence on cost of debt, and for domestic family firms, higher family ownership would increase its negative influence on the cost of debt. The Control-enhancing mechanisms will increase core equity problem and cost of debt, and the relationship between control enhancement and cost of debt are not in a non-linear relationship. Creditors conceive that their mortgage will be more secured if family members take the position of CEO. Thus, family CEO can reduce the cost of debt-financing.

第壹章 緒論 5
第一節 研究動機 5
第二節 研究目的與貢獻 16
第三節 研究限制 17
第四節 論文架構與內容介紹 18
第貳章 文獻探討 19
第一節 代理理論 19
一、 股東與債權人的負債代理問題 19
二、管理者與股東的權益代理問題 20
三、控制股東與外部股東的權益代理問題 21
第二節 家族公司與負債融資決策 22
一、舉債與降低風險 23
二、舉債與集中控制權 23
第三節 家族公司權益代理問題與負債融資決策 25
一、家族所有權與負債融資決策 26
二、擴增控制權與負債融資決策 27
三、家族管理權與負債融資決策 28
第四節 家族公司與負債融資成本 31
第五節 家族公司權益代理問題與負債融資成本 31
一、家族所有權與負債融資成本 32
二、擴增控制權與負債融資成本 33
三、家族管理權與負債融資成本 34
第參章 資料描述與研究方法 37
第ㄧ節 資料來源 37
第二節 家族公司的負債融資決策 39
一、家族變數的衡量 40
二、控制變數的衡量 40
三、實證模型 42
第三節 家族公司權益代理問題與負債融資決策 44
第四節 家族公司與負債融資成本 51
一、控制變數的衡量 52
二、實證模型的建立 55
第五節 家族公司權益代理問題與負債融資成本 57
第肆章 實證結果分析 59
第一節 家族公司的負債融資決策 59
一、敘述統計 59
二、家族公司與負債融資決策 61
第二節 家族公司權益代理問題與負債融資決策 65
一、家族所有權、擴增控制權與管理權對負債融資決策的影響 65
二、控制權與負債融資決策 69
三、穩健性測試 77
第三節 家族公司與負債融資成本 87
一、樣本資料分析 87
二、家族公司的負債融資成本 89
三、比較家族與非家族公司之債券特性對負債融資成本的影響 90
第四節 家族公司權益代理問題與負債融資成本 93
第伍章 結論 97

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