本文主旨為探究台灣新上市公司上市後內部股權結構變化情形。公司在上市之後，其股權由大眾所共有，內部股東只持有部分股權，在自身利益極大化的考量之下，內部股東在上市後的持股策略就會受到許多因素的影響而有所不同。以往文獻證實IPOs在上市後會出現內部股東股權不斷下降之情形，但多針對上市後經營績效與股權結構之變化做探討。而DeMarzo and Urosevic (2006)認為內部股權的變化主要是由於大股東對公司的監督誘因與分散風險的抵換關係而導致。 本文以1998年1月1日到2000年12月31日為止，初次於台灣證券交易所上市或於證券櫃臺買賣中心上櫃之公司為研究對象，探討公司價值、公司風險、投資人與內部大股東風險態度以及公司上市初期的股權結構對於內部股東之股權調整速度、長期持股均衡水準以及內外部大股東及散戶之長期持股差異影響程度。 研究發現，風險因素及監督誘因的確會影響內部股東之持股策略，上市初期股權結構、公司價值、公司風險、投資人與內部大股東風險態度，確實都會對新上市公司的內部股權結構有不同程度的影響。內部大股東的風險趨避程度愈高，其股權調整速度愈快，而內部股東在上市初期持股愈高，其股權調整速度則愈慢。內部股東之最終持股水準與公司價值呈正相關、與公司風險呈負相關、與投資人風險趨避程度則為正相關。投資人與內部股東之風險趨避程度也會影響不同身分之股東的持股變化。

This study examines the changes in the inside ownership structure of companies after undergoes initial public offering in Taiwan. After initial public offering, the company’s shares are in public possession while inside shareholders only possess part of its shares. To maximize their own interests, inside shareholders’ ownership policies may vary due to different factors. Literature review shows that after IPOs the inside shareholders’ share tends to be dropping but previous research focuses mostly on the changes in operating performance and ownership structure after IPOs. DeMarzo and Urosevic (2006) believe that the changes in inside ownership structure are due mainly to the trade-off between monitoring incentives and diversification. My study aims at companies which undergoes IPOs in Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation or at GreTai Securities Market between Jan. 1st 1998 and Dec. 31st 2000. The article investigates how such factors as, corporate value, corporate risks, inside/outside shareholders’ risk tolerance and the ownership structure of companies which undergoes IPOs, have effects on inside shareholders’ share-holding adjustment speed, long-term share holding equivalence level as well as the long-term share holding differences between inside/outside stockholders and little investors. My findings substantiate my assumption that risk factors and monitoring incentives do have effects on the shareholders’ ownership policies and that factors mentioned above do have different effects on the inside ownership structure of IPO companies. The more inside stockholders avert risks, the higher the share-holding adjustment speed becomes. In contrast, the more share inside shareholders possess during IPO, the lower the speed. Inside shareholders’ optimal ownership policies are positively relevant to the corporate value and negatively relevant to corporate risks. They are also positively relevant to the risk aversion of investors. The degree of risk aversion on the part of both investors and inside shareholders also influences ownership structures of various shareholders.

第一章 緒論 ---------------------------------------- 1
第一節 動機與目的--------------------------------- 1
第二節 研究流程----------------------------------- 4
第二章 文獻探討 ------------------------------------- 5
第一節 新上市公司之股權結構變化之相關文獻探討----- 5
第二節 股權結構與公司價值之相關文獻探討----------- 7
第三節 公司風險之相關文獻-------------------------- 12
第四節 內部股東與投資人風險態度之相關文獻---------- 13
第三章 模型建立與推導-------------------------------- 18
第一節 模型設定----------------------------------- 18
第二節 模型推導----------------------------------- 19
第三節 比較靜態分析------------------------------- 24
第四章 研究假說與實證方法---------------------------- 27
第一節 研究假說------------------------------------ 27
第二節 資料與樣本---------------------------------- 32
第三節 實證方法------------------------------------ 39
第五章 實證結果---------------------------------------- 41
第一節 敘述統計----------------------------------- 41
第二節 內部股權調整速度之實證分析----------------- 48
第三節 內部股東上市後最終均衡持股之實證分析------- 50
第四節 上市後股東前後期持股差異分析--------------- 52
第六章 結論與建議------------------------------------ 54
第一節 研究結論----------------------------------- 54
第二節 後續研究建議------------------------------- 57
參考文獻------------------------------------------- 58
英文文獻--------------------------------------- 58
中文文獻--------------------------------------- 62

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