製造商實施轉售價格維持(RPM)有許多原因。在傳統的模型設定下，當批發價固定時，若零售價越低，製造商利潤會越高。因為越低的零售價代表越高的銷售量。儘管經過許多學者的研究，關於製造商為何實施價格維持的動機依然存有爭議。認為零售價格維持有助於促進競爭的學派認為轉售價格維持可使通路體系更有效率。而認為轉售價格維持傷害競爭的學派卻認為轉售價格維持會降低零售商間的相互競爭。瞭解轉售價格維持的動機對學術及政策都存在著重要性，因為轉售價格維持是製造商對下游所做的垂直限制的各種手段中最常見也是最容易引發法律問題的一種措施，如台灣的公平交易法中對轉售價格維持亦有限制之規定。公平會對於此種垂直性的價格限制多半認為對市場競爭有所妨礙而認定為當然違法。
對轉售價格維持最常見的是特別服務假說，主要認為若沒有轉售價格維持，顧客將會被低價但未提供服務的零售商所吸引，而使高價但提供服務的商家無法維持營運。然而在實務上，使用轉售價格維持的產品面相當廣，但並非每種產品都需要所謂的特別服務。本研究中從風險的角度探討製造商實施轉售價格維持的動機和影響的因子，發現當零售價波動越大，銷售量波動越小以及零售價與銷售量相關係數越高時，製造商實施轉售價格維持的誘因越強。我們也發現轉售價格維持和廣告可呈現替代與互補的關係，並詳細探討廣告和轉售價格維持間的關聯。除了以上結果，本研究也發現轉售價格維持可減低消費者遞延消費的意願，而且當消費者的價格彈性越高，製造商越需要使用轉售價格維持。最後本研究實施實證研究以證明轉售價格維持確實能減少消費的遞延。

Manufacturers use resale price maintenance (RPM) for a variety of reasons. In a conventional market setting, when factory price is fixed, profit is maximized by ensuring the lowest possible retail price. The higher retail price ensured by RPM mean a lower quantity sold, since demand is downward sloping. The explanations of RPM remain controversial after many scholars’ investigations. Pro-competitive arguments view RPM as a marketing practice that ensures an efficient distribution system. Anticompetitive arguments contend that manufacturers use RPM to maintain cartel prices and reduce competition among retailers. Understanding the incentives to adopt RPM is critical both for marketing scholars and for antitrust policymakers because RPM, which is employed over the wide variety of products, is the most important vertical restraints, in terms of both the frequency of use and the number of legal cases generated. In Taiwan, the applicability of RPM is limited by Fair Trade Law. Fair Trade Commission considers that RPM is per se illegal as a vertical restraint against competition
The explanation for RPM often cited is the special services argument, which indicates the discounter will draw customers from the retailers that provide full services when RPM is not employed. However, in practices, RPM is used in a much wider variety of products than the special services argument would predict. In this research, we examine the RPM property from the risk perspectives and determine how the incentives for using RPM are affected by the changes of economic variables. We find that the imposition of RPM is appropriate in the circumstances where retail price variance is high, sales quantities variance is low and the correlation between two variables is positive. In addition, we find that RPM can be a substitute or complement for advertising, as is found in the existing literature. Our model clearly exhibits the relationship between advertising and RPM, which are both important marketing strategies. We also find that RPM can reduce consumers’ incentive to delay purchases. As the demand price elasticity increases, RPM is more strictly employed by manufactures who want to eliminate purchase delay caused by frequent markdowns. We also perform empirical tests to show that the motivation behind RPM is to reduce the negative externality of frequent markdowns on consumers’ purchase delay.

Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 Motivations of this research………………………………………………….. 1
1.2 The legal status of RPM…………..…………………………………….……..3
1.3 Literature review and comments………………………………………………5
1.4 The framework of this research………………………………………………..7
Chapter 2 Incentives for Resale Price Maintenance from a Risk Perspective: Using a Real Options Analysis
2.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………..12
2.2 Literature review……………………………………………………………..13
2.2 Research model………………………………………………………………16
2.3 Chapter conclusions…………………………………………………….........22
Chapter 3 The Effects of Advertising on Resale Price Maintenance

3.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………..24
3.2 Literature review……………………………………………………………..26
3.3 The model and its analysis…………………………………………………...28
3.4 Real options approach and its analysis………………………………………30
3.5 Chapter conclusions ...………………………….……………………… ....37
Chapter 4 Frequent Markdowns, Purchase Delay, and Resale Price Maintenance: Evidence from Taiwan
4.1 Introduction ………………………………………………………………....38
4.2 Literature review …………………………………………………………... 39
4.3 Hypothesis development………………………………………………….....42
4.4 Real options approach and its analysis………………………………………44
4.5 Numerical illustration………………………………………………………..47
4.6 LISREL analysis……………………………………………………………..50
4.7 The empirical findings……………………………………………………... 52
4.8 Chapter conclusions………………………………………………………...53
Chapter 5 Conclusions
5.1 Policy Implications ……………………………………………………….....56
5.2 Limitations and future research……………………… ……………….…….58

References………………………………………………………………………...….60
Appendix ………………………………………………………………………….....65

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