本學位論文包括與公司治理議題相關的三篇論文集。第一篇論文的題目是”經理人持股的多元目的”，主要探討經理人持股和公司績效的關聯性。有別於以往大多數的研究多探討經理人持股對公司績效的影響，我們考慮公司績效也有可能對經理人持股產生反向的影響。透過聯立方程式及考慮經理人可能有多元的持股目的，我們發現經理人持股與公司績效有複雜的相互影響存在。在經理人持股比率較低的樣本中(0-13%)，公司績效對經理人持股比率有正向的影響，顯示經理人可能以投資為目的而擁有公司的股票，而這種以投資為目的之持股動機在以前的相關研究則被忽略了。在經理人持股比率為中等範圍時(13%-50%)，我們發現經理人持股比率對公司績效有正向的影響，但無顯著的反向關係存在，這個結果與利益收斂假說相符。另在經理人持股比率很高的範圍時(>50%)，我們發現經理人持股比率與公司績效有顯著的負向相互影響存在。這個結果除了與鞏固利益假說相符，也同時提醒其他投資人應注意高持股的經理人是否對公司有不利的行為發生。
第二篇論文的題目是”電子資訊產業與非電子資訊產業之研究發展支出、股權結構與公司績效之關聯性研究”，主要是探討研究發展支出，經理人持股和公司績效的關聯性在電子資訊產業與非電子資訊產業是否有所不同。台灣電子業高配股的獎酬制度、高研發費用及高績效等三大特色使得我們考慮研究發展支出，經理人持股和公司績效的關聯性在電子資訊業是否會比在非電子資訊業更為顯著。實證結果發現不論在電子資訊業與非電子資訊業，好的公司績效皆會對經理人持股有正向的影響。而另一個有趣的現象是電子業不論其績效好壞，皆有穩定及較高平均值的研究發展支出；但相形之下，非電子業在公司績效好時才願意投入研究發展。
第三篇論文的題目是”經理人持股的變動及原因”。本篇主要是驗證與經理人持股相關的均衡理論現象是否存在。均衡理論主張經理人會不斷的視環境改變而調整持股，使公司績效保持最佳的狀態。我們以動態的模型來觀察公司內的股權變動，結果發現經理人的持股比率變動很小且有顯著回復的現象(mean reversion)。我們也同時發現績效較差的公司會以較大的幅度來調整其持股至預期值。另外實證結果顯示公司的特質如負債比率、研究發展支出及營業收益並不會對經理人持股比率的變動有顯著的影響，反而是外在的因素如重選董事成員，股票週轉率及經理人的持股高低對經理人持股比率的變動有顯著的影響。
有別於傳統偏重經理人持股對公司績效單向的影響，本論文考慮公司績效可能會反向得影響內部人持股，並發現投資目的亦是經理人持股的動機之一。而股權變動的分析結果，則說明了董監事股權的變動情況及可能影響股權變動的外在環境因素。這些結果除了幫助我們瞭解新興市場，如台灣，高階經理人的持股狀況。引申的管理義涵則為投資人若僅依賴高階經理人員的自發力量來改善代理問題，可能未瑧理想。應加強企業外部的監督力量，例如落實獨立董監事的選任及功能，發揮機構投資人的影響力及加速公司治理評鑑機制等，多方面來強化公司治理。

This dissertation consists of three essays in corporate governance. The first essay, titled “Control or Invest: Complex Interests of Managerial Stockholdings” examines the structural relation between managerial ownership and firm performance. By using simultaneous equation models and considering the complex interests of management, our results show that complicated mutual effects exist between managerial ownership and firm performance. In diffused ownership structure (0-13%), better firm performance may induce management to hold more stockholding, indicating possible investment purpose that is not addressed in previous studies. Management with mid-range of stockholdings (13%-50%), have positive effect on firm performance but not vice versa, which agrees with the “convergence-of-interest hypothesis”. For highly concentrated ownership structure (>50%), negative mutual effect exists, which agrees with the “entrenchment hypothesis”, giving notice to protect minority shareholders.
The second essay, titled “The Discrepancy of R&D Expenditure, Ownership Structure and Performance between Electronic and Non-electronic Industries” addresses on the mutual effects among R&D expenditure, ownership structure and firm performance in electronic industry. The characteristics of high research expenditure, high performance, and stock-based compensation plan of electronic industry may exaggerate the mutual effects between these three factors than companies in non-electronic industry. The empirical evidence first shows that better firm performance will result in higher managerial equity in both electronic and non-electronic industries. Another finding is that electronic industry has higher and more stable research expenditure, no matter firm’s performance; while non-electronic industry spends more in research only when the firm is doing well.
The third essay, “The Adjustment and Determination of Ownership Change”, is used to examine the equilibrium hypothesis regarding managerial ownership variation. The equilibrium hypothesis assumes that managers will continuously re-optimize their ownership to maximize firm’s value. In this essay, instead of studying the cross-sectional relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance, we use a dynamic setting to examine how managers adjust their ownership over time and what factors will determine the within firm variation. It is shown that there is small within firm variation in managerial ownership with strong mean-reversion adjustment the entire sample. The results also show that firm characteristics like debt ratio, R&D expenditure and operating income do not relate significantly to within firm variation, but firm performance and institutional parameters like the reselection of board members, stock turnover and ownership level do.
This thesis contributes to provide investment purpose as an alternative explanation for insiders’ stockholding, in addition to the expropriation activities that is major concern in prior studies. The change analysis further provides more understanding of within firm variation vertically that is still vague in the literature (HHP, 1999). These new findings add knowledge to managerial ownership in emerging market like Taiwan. The managerial implication is that investors may not fully depend on manager’s self-discipline to solve agency problem. Outside supervision, including independent board member and supervisor, institutional investors and corporate governance evaluation, could be emphasized to reinforce corporate governance.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 OVERVIEW
1.1 The Context of This Thesis 1
1.2 Structure of This Thesis 3

2 CONTROL OR INVEST: COMPLEX INTERESTS
OF MANAGERIAL STOCKHOLDINGS
2.1 Introduction 4
2.2 Conceptual Issues and Predictions 7
2.2.1 Structural relationship 7 2.2.2 Complex interests of managerial ownership 9
2.2.3 Hypothesis 10
2.3 Data and Variable Definition 12
2.3.1 Data 12
2.3.2 Control variables 14
2.4 Empirical Specification and Analysis 16
2.4.1 Simultaneous equations 16
2.4.2 Empirical results 18
2.4.3 Nonlinear relation 18
2.5 Mutual Effects in Subgroups 20
2.5.1 Low, middle and high groups 20
2.5.2 ROA as alternative firm performance 22
2.5.3 ROE as alternative firm performance 23
2.5.4 The effects of issuing ECB 24
2.6 Summary 25


3 The DISCREPANCY OF R&D EXPENDITURE,
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE
BETWEEN ELECTRONIC AND NON-ELECTRONIC
INDUSTRIES

3.1 Introduction 39
3.2 Literature Review 42
3.2.1 Ownership structure and performance 42
3.2.2 R&D expenditure and performance 42
3.3 Data Description and Variable Definition 45
3.3.1 Data 45
3.3.2 Model and variable definition 46
3.4 Electronic and Non-Electronic Industries 50
3.4.1 Descriptive summary 50
3.4.2 Discrepancy between electric and non-electric industries 51
3.5 Empirical Evidence 52
3.5.1 The results of pooled data 52
3.5.2 Results of electric and non-electric industries 52
3.5.3 Non-linear relation in electric industry 53
3.5.4 Other control variables 55
3.6 Summary 56


4 THE ADJUSTMENT AND DETERMINATION OF
OWNERSHIP CHANGE

4.1 Introduction 65
4.2 Conceptual Issues and Empirical Models 68
4.2.1 Partial adjustment model to observe ownership change 68
4.2.2 Empirical specification 69
4.2.3 Non-linear partial adjustment 73
4.3 Data and Results on Change Analysis 73
4.3.1 Data and descriptive statistics 73
4.3.2 Expected managerial equity 75 4.3.3 Regression on changes in director ownership 76
4.4 Difference between High and Low Performance Companies 77
4.4.1 Differential adjustment in director ownership 77
4.4.2 Comparing low and high performance companies 78
4.5 Determinants of Changes in Managerial Equity 85
4.5.1 Impact of changes in firm characteristics 79
4.5.2 Institutional factors to cause within firm variation 81
4.5.3 Regression results on institutional parameters 84
4.5.4 Year change analysis 86
4.5.5 ROA and ROE as alternative firm performance 87
4.6 Summary 87


5 CONCLUSION
5.1 Conclusion of Three Essays 102
5.2 Future Research Work 104


BIBLIOGRAPHY 105

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