本研究以三個獨立的資訊不對稱模型，分析銀行發行次順位債券所產生的金融規範效果，為次順位債券的金融規範功能提供理論的依據。
第一個部份建立一個有關銀行信用風險的逆選擇模型，探討銀行發行次順位債券的決策。結果顯示信用風險較低的銀行，其發行次順位債券的機率較高。因為在其發行後，債券市場反應的次順位債券孳息較低，一般存款戶依據較低的債券孳息，推論其為信用風險較低的銀行，便接受較低的存款利率。銀行便可降低其營運成本。因此研究模型說明發行次順位債券具間接金融監督效果。
第二個部份建立一個道德風險模型，說明銀行發行次順位債券可帶來直接規範效果以及間接規範效果，以降低銀行放款風險。直接金融規範效果是指專業債券投資人會評量銀行的放款風險，而根據銀行的放款風險要求適當的次順位債券孳息。銀行為了降低次順位債券成本，會設法降低放款風險。間接金融規範是指一般存款戶將次順位債券孳息，視為銀行對其放款風險程度所放射的訊號。若是一般存款戶察覺到銀行放款風險高，則會提前撤出存款。反之則會將存款繼續留在銀行。為了避免一般存款戶提前撤出存款，銀行會設法降低放款風險。在這個部份透過模型推導，證明發行次順位債券，會帶來這這兩種規範效果，更進一步證明，金融監督機關若能有效利用次順位債券的資訊，將更能達到金融監督的目的。
第三個部份則建立一個聲譽模型，說明銀行發行次順位債券後，會受到聲譽影響其行為。在不同情境之下會有所不同的聲譽效果，對銀行行為會有不同的影響。在好銀行放款回收機率很高的情形。考慮聲譽效果下，將使得本來不監督放款的壞銀行，也會開始監督放款。而當銀行持續回收放款成功，將使得銀行聲譽越來越高，銀行也就會花越多的成本去監督放款。在第二種情境下，假設壞銀行放款回收成功機率很低。此時考慮聲譽效果之下，使得本來不花成本監督放款的好銀行，也會額外監督放款。而隨著時間拉長，銀行回收放款成功帶來的聲譽價值也就越低，將使得好銀行監督放款的程度隨著時間遞增而遞減。

Three independent models are built based on information asymmetric to analysis discipline effects brought by banks` issuance of subordinated debts. The research results offer the theory of subordinated debts discipline effects.
First, an adverse selection model is built to examine banks’ policies when issuing subordinated debts based on the banks’ credit risks. The result shows that banks with lower credit risks are more likely to issue subordinated debts, since after the issuance, the yields of these debts are lower. When depositors observe the lower yields of the subordinated debts, they would presume that these banks have lower credit risks. As a result, banks with lower credit risks can decrease their operational costs by issuing subordinated debts. This model has demonstrated that the market can discipline banks indirectly through the issuance of subordinated debts.
Second, a moral hazard model to show that issuing of subordinated debts by banks can bring direct market discipline and indirect market discipline to make their loans less risky. The direct market discipline means that the risk level of bank will be evaluated by professional investors. The investors will require that the yields accord to the banks risk. For lowering the cost of issuing subordinated debts, banks will make their loans less risky. The indirect market discipline means that the depositors would take the yields of these debts as a significant signal indicating banks risk levels. The depositors will decide to withdraw their savings when the bank signals a higher risk, and keep their saving when the bank signals a lower risk. I prove that issuing of subordinated debts by banks can bring about these two kinds of market discipline. The model has also demonstrated that if the bank supervisor can utilize the information of issuing subordinated debts effectively, they will achieve higher supervisory goal.
Third, a reputation model is built to show that for reputation concerns, a bank would change its monitoring decisions if it issues subordinated debts. Reputation effect in banks is different in different scenarios. When the good banks probability of success is very high, reputation effect would induce the bad bank to start monitor it`s borrowers, and the efforts of bad banks monitoring would be increased by time. When the bad banks probability of success is very low, reputation effect would induce the good bank start monitoring its borrowers. and the efforts of bad banks monitoring would be decreases by time.

第壹章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機 1
第二節 研究目的 4
第三節 論文架構與內容 5
第貳章 文獻探討 7
第一節 次順位債券的簡介 7
第二節 推行次順位債券機制的步驟、有關法令及相關限制 13
第三節 次順位債券的規範效果 18
第四節 有關次順位債券的研究 20
第五節 台灣的銀行發行次順位債券情形 23
第參章、次順位債券與銀行的逆選擇問題 30
第一節 基本模型設定 30
第二節 銀行選擇不發行次順位債券 35
第三節 銀行選擇發行次順位債券的規範效果 38
第四節 本章結論 42
第肆章、次順位債券的直接規範效果與間接規範效果 44
第一節 銀行的道德風險問題 45
第二節 次順位債券的直接規範效果 49
第三節 次順位債券的直接規範與間接規範效果 55
第四節 金融監督機構與次順位債券的規範效果 64
第五節 本章結論 66
第伍章、聲譽模型與次順位債券的規範功能 67
第一節 銀行發行次順位債券與監督放款的決策 68
第二節 銀行的聲譽效果與監督放款決策 72
第三節 景氣好時的聲譽效果 79
第四節 景氣壞的聲譽效果 85
第五節 本章結論 89
第陸章 結論 91
第一節 研究結論 91
第二節 實證意涵 92
第三節 未來研究 95
參考文獻 97
附錄一 符號定義 102
附錄二 次順位債券發行資料 105
表目錄
表3.1：各銀行發行次順位債券數量（單位：百萬新台幣） 25
表3.2：各年度銀行發行次順位債券數量（單位：百萬新台幣） 27

圖目錄
圖1.1：論文架構圖 6
圖3.1：流程進行圖 32
圖4.1：次順位債券直接規範效果，對銀行的相關報償及機率關係圖 53
圖4.2：次順位債券直接與間接規範效果，對銀行的相關報償及機率關係圖 60

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