作弊，自古以來就有的投機行為，本文不同於以往以社會成本最小的角度來看犯罪，以自利為出發點來看作弊行為，用賽局理論分析老師和學生之間的互動，本文的目的在於，如何有效地減少學生作弊的動機，以及降低學生採取作弊策略的機率，以及校方如何採用教師評鑑，達到老師與學生之間的互動達到最好的狀況，也就是老師付出高努力學生用功讀書。本文結果發現，(1)作弊被抓到的處罰輕重和老師付出高努力的機率，具有抵換的關係，如果處罰可以訂很嚴格，學生便不敢選擇作弊的策略，但礙於目前教育的方向，不能對學生進行太嚴厲的懲罰，會存在混合策略均衡。(2)在加入同儕壓力的情況下，老師付出高努力的機率要來的更高以預防作弊行為。(3)教師評鑑的獎勵制度，在混合策略均衡之下，可以有效地降低學生採取作弊策略的機率，在純粹策略均衡之下，可以達到校方追求的最佳師生互動的情況。(4)在師生之間的互動為動態賽局時，老師為先行動者，學生為後行動者，此時老師會具有先行動者的優勢，當老師付出努力達到某個程度以上，學生便不會採取作弊的策略，比靜態賽局更容易達到師生互動的最佳狀況。

Cheat, a kind of crime, happens in the classroom. This paper is purposed to find how to reduce the probability of cheating, how the policy can make an effect on teachers and students, and how to achieve the best interaction between them. The best interaction is that teachers put in high effort and students choose the strategy which is not to cheat. In the beginning, we assume the game is static. Under the mixed strategy equilibrium, the punishment to cheat has nothing to do with reducing the probability of cheating, but it has a trade-off relation with the probability of teachers to put in high effort. If we add peer pressure into the students’ utility, it will take more probability of teachers to put in high effort to avoid cheating. However, if the policy which is to reward teachers who put in high effort brings into effect, it helps not only reduce the probability of cheating but also achieve the best interaction.
After the mixed strategy equilibrium, I release two assumptions. One is to transform the game from static into dynamic, and the other is to make the effort function become continuous. Teachers then become first mover. At this moment, teachers have first-move advantage. When teachers put in some effort more than the level mentioned in the article, students do not have the incentive to cheat. In this case, it is easier to achieve the best reaction.

第一章、緒論………………………………………………………………………..…1
第一節、研究動機…………………………………………………………….…1
第二節、研究目的與方法…………………………………………………….…2
第二章、文獻回顧………………………………………………………………….….3
第一節、作弊和犯罪…………………………………………………………….3
第二節、同儕壓力……………………………………………………………….4
第三章、理論模型………………………………………………………………….….6
第一節、模型假設…………………………………………………………….…6
第二節、混合策略均衡………………………………………………………...11
第三節、同儕壓力……………………………………………………………...16
第四節、教師評鑑……………………………………………………………...20
第五節、動態賽局和連續型的努力函數……………………………………...21
第四章、結論與建議…………………………………………………………………25
第一節、結論…………………………………………………………………...25
第二節、未來研究建議………………………………………………………...26
參考文獻……………………………………………………………………………..27
附錄一………………………………………………………………………………..28
附錄二………………………………………………………………………………..28
附錄三………………………………………………………………………………..29
附錄四………………………………………………………………………………..31
附錄五………………………………………………………………………………..32
附錄六………………………………………………………………………………..33
表目錄
表一、策略式表述………………………………………………………………….10

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