在銀行的所有者與高階經理人間存在信息不對稱的背景下，本文第一部份將探討以一個綫性組合為激勵契約的策略性變數，在銀行與高階經理人間的策略互動效果。給定高階經理人的策略性誘因契約為依據銀行利潤、放款數量及壞帳數量的綫性組合，本文證明，最適的策略性誘因契約為單獨以銀行利潤為因子的激勵合約，能使高階經理人做出最適努力水準分配，並能確保銀行利潤極大化目標達成。第二部分以獨占性競爭市場為背景，假設市場由兩家不同類型銀行所組成。其中一家銀行為穩健保守型，並以利潤極大化為目標，所設計之策略性誘因契約亦僅針對達到銀行利潤為獎勵標準。另一家銀行的策略性誘因契約不是以利潤最大為目標，例如以銀行放款數量為績效指標等。本文證明穩健類型的“老銀行”，雖然在放款數量的成長速度及放存款利差的收取上，均不及積極型的“新銀行”，但在淨利潤上卻有勝過“新銀行”的表現。同時也隱含了“授信風險控管”為獲利高低與競爭成敗的關鍵。

Under the information inconsistency between the owners and the chief managers of the bank, in the first part, I am going to discuss the effect of a strategic variable to the bank in a monopolistic competition market, which is a linear combination used as a incentive schemes As giving the chief managers the strategic inducement contract according to the linear combination of profit, the amount of loan and bad debt. In the thesis, I prove that the best strategic inducement contract is the contract which is based on the bank profit alone. It encourages the chief managers to make the best out of their effort, and it ensures the goal of benefit maximization of the bank can be achieved. In the second part of the discussion, I assume the market consists of two different types of bank. One is the stable and conservative type of bank, which set the main goal to maximize the profit. The designate strategic inducement contract is only aim to reward those who achieve the bank profit. Another bank has the strategic inducement contract not taking the profit as its main goal, for as it may take the amount of loan as reference. In the latter part of thesis, proving that although the conservative old school type bank is not comparable to the aggressive new bank in the growth rate of loan and spread, the net profit is clearly outperform the new bank. This also implies that the control of credit risk is the key to the amount of the profit to be made and the success in competition.

目 錄
內 容 頁次

第一章 緒綸……………………………………………… 1
第一節 研究動機與研究目的…………………………… 1
第二節 研究方法與研究架構…………………………… 3

第二章 單一銀行與單一高階經理人模型……………… 4
第一節 前言…………………………………………… 4
第二節 銀行及高階經理人之完美信息動態賽局……… 4
第三節 最適策略性誘因契約…………………………… 9
第四節 子賽局精煉均衡與柏拉圖最適契約…………… 15
第五節 結論……………………………………………… 16

第三章 二家銀行(委託人)與二家高階經理人(代理人)單期模型17
第一節 前言…………………………………………………… 17
第二節 二家銀行與二家高階經理人不完全信息動態賽局… 18
第三節 Nash子賽局精煉均衡………………………………… 21
第四節 銀行及高階經理人最適化策略討論………………… 23
第五節 策略性誘因契約與銀行利潤之相關命題…………… 27
第六節 結論…………… ………………………………… 31

第四章 結論與建議………………………………………… 32
第一節 結論………………………………………………… 32
第二節 建議………………………………………………… 34

參考文獻…………………………………………………………… 35

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