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博碩士論文 etd-1225106-105438 詳細資訊
Title page for etd-1225106-105438
How Corporate Governance Mitigates the Abuse of Earnings Management:The Perspective of Firm Performance
Year, semester
Number of pages
Wen-Chih Lee
Advisory Committee
高蘭芬, 周建新, 江明憲
Lanfeng Kao; Jian-Hsin Chou; Min-Hsien Chiang
Date of Exam
Date of Submission
Earnings management, Firm performance, Accounting discretion, Accounting accruals, Corporate governance
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Earnings management can be used to respond to a variable economics environment to improve firm performance under efficient contracting perspective but earnings management can also be abused to hurt a firm’s performance under opportunistic behavioral perspective. Investors, therefore, have difficulty to understand and know about the purpose of earnings management, especially for firms in Taiwan that are very likely to engage in earnings management due to poor governance. Although numerous literatures have shed light on managers’ incentives on earnings management and the effects of earnings management on firm performance, little attention has been devoted to disentangle the relation among corporate governance, earnings management and firm performance.
The purpose of this dissertation is to unravel manager’s intension on earnings management and to clarify whether proper governance can alleviate the abuse of earnings management and, therefore, enhance firm performance. Without distilling the effect of corporate governance on earnings management, the empirical results indicate that there is an inverse relation between earnings management and firm performance, implying that managers are more likely to exploit the latitude of earnings management to mislead investors and gain opportunistic profit. This dissertation further examines the relation between earnings management and the features of corporate governance including ownership structure and board characteristics. These results show that stronger corporate governance can effectively reduce the abuse of earnings management. Furthermore, this dissertation provides the evidence that the relation between earnings management and firm performance is improved when the use of earnings management is monitored under proper governance.
目次 Table of Contents
Table of Content
Acknowledgment i
Abstract ii
Table of Content iv
Lists of Figure and Tables vi
Chapter 1 Introduction 1
1.1 Background 1
1.2 Rationale 4
1.3 Structure 9
Chapter 2 Literature Review 10
2.1 Earnings Management Incentives 10
2.2 Earnings Management and Performance 18
2.3 Corporate Governance and Earnings Management 20
2.4 Remarks 31
Chapter 3 Data and Methodology 33
3.1 Data and Sample Selection 33
3.2 Variable Measurement 33
3.3 Data Description and Correlation Analysis 42
3.4 Research Design 45
Chapter 4 Earnings Management and Firm Performance 48
4.1 The Models 48
4.2 Empirical Results 52
4.3 Additional Test 53
Chapter 5 Corporate Governance and Earnings Management 55
5.1 The Model 55
5.2 Empirical Results 58
5.3 Additional Test 61
Chapter 6 Earnings Management under Governance and Firm Performance 62
6.1 The Models 62
6.2 Empirical Results 66
6.3 Additional Test 67
Chapter 7 Conclusions and Suggestions 72
7.1 Conclusions 72
7.2 Limitation of Research 74
7.3 Suggestion for Further Research 75
Reference 76
Figure and Tables 85

List of Figure and Tables
Figure 3-1 The Framework of Methodology 85
Table 3-1 Sample Selection process 86
Table 3-2 Variable Definitions 87
Table 3-3 Descriptive Statistics for Earnings Management, Governance Variables, Economics Determinants, and Performance Measures 88
Table 3-4 Descriptive Statistics for Earnings Management and Earnings Management under Governance 90
Table 3-5 Spearman Correlation for Abnormal Accrual, Governance Variables and Economics Variables 91
Table 4-1 Relation between Accounting Performance and Earnings Management 93
Table 4-2 Relation between Stock Performance and Earnings Management 94
Table 4-3 Association between Earnings Management and Subsequent Accounting Performance 95
Table 4-4 Association between Earnings Management and Subsequent Stock Performance 96
Table 5-1 Relation between Corporate Governance and Earnings Management 97
Table 6-1 Relation between Accounting Performance and Earnings Management under Governance 99
Table 6-2 Relation between Stock Performance and Earnings Management under Corporate Governance 100
Table 6-3 Association between Earnings Management under Governance and Subsequent Accounting Performance 101
Table 6-4 Association between Earnings Management under Governance and Subsequent Stock Performance 102
Table 6-5 Relation between Earnings Management under Governance and Abnormal Returns under Governance on Firm Performance 103
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