在本文中，假設兩個潛在的接受授權者，在接受授權後獲得技術進步，使其成本降低。此設定可以幫助我們了解在外部授權者在擁有成本降低的技術時，應該如何設計授權費用，並分析競爭政策對社會福利的影響。在本文中，我們發現是否允許進行價格歧視會改變外部授權者的策略，也會對社會福利產生影響，但社會福利的升降將取決於潛在被授權者授權原先的技術水準。

In this paper, two potential licensees can reduce their costs after technology licensing. This setup can help us understand how an outside licensor designs the licensing contracts in the case of cost reduction and analyze the impact of competition policy on social welfare. We find that the optimal strategy of outside licensor and social welfare will be changed if price discrimination is allowed. However, the direction of the change of the social welfare depends on potential licensees’ original technology.

論文審定書+i
摘要+ii
Abstract+iii
目錄+iv
圖次+v
表次+vi
第一章 緒論+1
第一節 研究動機+1
第二節 文獻回顧+3
第二章 模型假設與求解+6
第一節 雙占市場的所有可能解+6
第二節 不可價格歧視下的最適授權費用+9
第三節 可以價格歧視下的最適授權費用+17
第四節 社會福利比較+22
第三章 結論+32
參考文獻+33

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