師生是教育活動中兩個重要的主體，而學生品質由師生努力的選擇共同決定。在少子化的趨勢下，家長格外關注子女的教育品質，順應近年來備受討論的教育績效責任的議題，本文遂以企業對於績效要求的概念應用到教育上對學生品質成效的追求。結果發現師生之間的努力投入除了受到本身的成本和效益的參數影響外，也被對方的成本和效益的參數影響。且在特定的模型設計下，師生面對是否要付出額外努力的抉擇，結果可能是全有全無的。
另外，本文還研究了師生互動模式的改變對學生品質的影響，特別適用於高中以下學生，非專業研究階段和技職體系的學習行為和活動。最後我們也根據模型的結果提出在實務上具體可行的建議。

Teachers and students are two important subjects in educational activities, and the quality of students is determined by the efforts of teachers and students. In the trend of a low birth rate, parents pay more attention to the educational quality of their children,which is accompanied by the much-discussed issue of the Educational accountability in recent years. The paper applies the concept of managing business performance to the educational quality of students. It was found that the efforts implemented by teachers and students are not only affected by the cost-benefit parameters themselves, but also they are affected by the cost-benefit parameters of other side. Moreover, in certain model, teachers and students face a choice whether or not to implement the extra effort, the result may be an all-or-nothing effort.
In addition, the paper also studies the effects of changing patterns of teacher-student interaction on the quality of students. Finally, we also propose the feasible opinion based on the results of the model.

第一章 緒論……………………………………………………………………….………….…1
第一節 研究緣起………………………………………………………………...……………1
第二節 研究方法與本文架構………………………………...……………….....…………..3
第二章 文獻回顧…………………………………….……………………………………..…..4
第三章 模型分析………………….………………………………………………………..…..8
第一節 學生品質為CES生產函數型態的一般模型…….…………………………………..8
第二節 學生品質為C-D效用函數型態的一般模型…...……………………………………13
第三節 師生間互動模式與學生品質分析………………………………………….……….17
第四章 結論與建議……………………………………………………………….……….…..26
參考文獻……...……………………………………………………………………...…….......30
附錄……………………………………………………………….…………………………….33

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