本文根據利益收斂與利益掠奪假說，以董監事、盈餘分配和控制兩權偏離程度來討論其對企業價值的影響。結果發現，在2003年到2008年台灣上市上櫃資訊服務產業相關公司，董監事持股比例、控制股東掌控之董監事席次比率與公司價值為負向關係。大股東持股比率與企業價值間呈正向關係；董監事持股比例高低，會產生利益掠奪及利益收斂的情況，對企業價值造成不同影響。控制股東擁有愈多現金流量請求權，其公司價值愈高。
而選定區間比例分類來進行股權透明度與企業價值之非線性關係探討則發現控制股權與現金流量權間的偏離程度與Proxy Q時，沒有非線性關係存在，而依變數為ROA和ROE時，則存在「W」型之非線性關係。這可以解釋公司治理機制的施行，對企業價值具有一定程度的影響力，只是產生的效果究竟是好是壞，會因為在企業擔任角色的不同而有所差異。

This research discussed the influence between directors and supervisors and the separation of ownership and control toward enterprise value according to the convergence of interest hypothesis and the entrenchment of interest hypothesis. The result indicated that, from 2003 to 2008, directors and supervisors’ shareholding ratio and chair ratio of Taiwanese listed information service corporations had a negative relation with enterprise value. The shareholding ratio of substantial shareholders had a positive relation with enterprise value – the shareholding ratio of directors and supervisors had the convergence and the entrenchment of interest effect on enterprise value. The more cash-flow rights the control shareholders owned, the higher the enterprise value was.
When we used specific percentage to discuss the nonlinear relation between equity transparency and enterprise value, we discovered that the nonlinear relation between Proxy Q and the separation of ownership and control did not exist. However, there existed a “W-shaped” nonlinear relation when the dependent variable was ROA or ROE. It can explain that the implementation of corporate governance on enterprise value has a certain degree of influence. Nonetheless, whether the effect is good or bad depends on what role one plays in the enterprise.

論文審定書 ……………………………………………………… i
誌謝 ……………………………………………………………… ii
中文摘要 ………………………………………………………….. iii
英文摘要 ………………………………………..………………… iv
第一章 緒論 …………………………………………………………1
第一節 研究背景與動機 ………………………………………1
第二節 研究目的 ………………………………………………5
第三節 研究流程 ………………………………………………6
第四節 論文架構 ………………………………………………7
第二章 文獻探討 ……………………………………………………8
第一節 公司治理 ………………………………………………9
第二節 關係人持股……………………………………………12
第三節 經營權與所有（控制）權……………………………14
第四節 治理機制與企業價值關聯性…………………………17
第三章 研究設計……………………………………………………19
第一節 研究假說………………………………………………20
第二節 研究模型與變數定義…………………………………24
第三節 資料來源與簡介………………………………………31
第四章 實證結果分析………………………………………………34
第一節 治理機制對企業價值之關聯性………………………34
第二節 控制持股與企業價值之非線性關係…………………43
第五章 結論與建議…………………………………………………46
第一節 研究結論………………………………………………46
第二節 研究限制………………………………………………49
第三節 研究建議………………………………………………50
參考文獻………………………………………………………………51

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