一般而言，探討景氣循環的議題可分為短期的景氣循環波動和長期的經濟成長。而本文所要探討的是：在短期時，國家之間景氣循環波動的相互關係，究竟會受到何種衝擊因子的影響？許多的實證分析皆指出，造成跨國間景氣循環波動的短期因素，其實主要是來自於經濟層面中的傳遞因子，也就是所謂的「傳導機制」。
關於傳導機制，經濟學家通常以財貨市場、金融市場或是貨幣政策的緊密程度予以替代。但在進行實證分析時，若只用這些替代變數來解釋兩國之間景氣循環波動的趨勢，似乎太過於狹隘。針對這樣的情形，我們認為若能以非經濟變數的替代因子，來解釋彼此之間產出的循環波動，或許可以彌補其不足之處？所以本文轉從政治面的角度去尋找新的解釋因子(也就是一般所謂的PBC)，並結合上述的傳導機制，期望能從兩個完全不同面向的投入變數，來了解G7各國間景氣循環的依存關係 (BCCs)。
我們進一步分析此研究背後的經濟意涵，可以總結出五點結論：
第(一)、雙邊貿易量的提高，對於1980年至2002年G7各國間BCCs的波動變化具有正面的助益。但是由於單一國家的實證結果並不顯著，所以我們利用兩階段估計法，先將 這個內生變數加以外生化，並使用Panel的分析方法，擴大其樣本數，最後改善了原本統計效果不顯著的實證估計值。換言之，兩國是否有相同的語言、邊界以及相對距離的遠近，都是影響兩國貿易總量的重要變數，所以要探討財貨市場與BCCs的相關性時，必須要考慮距離、語言、邊界等外生因子，才能有更周延的實證結果。
第(二)、金融市場的結合度 雖然可以提高兩國間BCCs的相關性，但統計效果卻不夠顯著。關於這個實證結果，我們或許可以從Kose et al. (2003)及Imbs (2004)的研究中得到合理的解釋，文中指出金融市場因為受到全球化的影響而有過度緊密結合的現象發生，這將造成工業國家之間的專業分工情況加劇，最後導致彼此景氣循環的依存關係下降。換句話說，國際的專業分工將會降低金融市場對於BCCs的正面助益效果
第(三)、在單一國家的實證研究中，本文用來替代貨幣政策共通性的三個經濟變數，除了和歐盟成員國彼此之間的BCCs有較明顯的負向趨勢外，普遍看來和其他各國之間的BCCs並無一致性的對應關係。針對這個情形，我們認為，可能是因為在ERM制度下的會員國受到馬斯垂克條約的規範所致。換言之，由於此條約的規範，各國的貨幣政策會逐漸地趨於一致，進而導致相互之間的BCCs呈現出明顯的正向趨勢。
第(四)、在模型中，兩國之間通貨膨脹率的差距 ( )和BCCs的關係並不顯著，所以無法看出彼此之間的對應關係。而係數符號和我們所預期的方向並不不同的原因，可能是因為忽略了政策面的因素對此變數所造成的影響。因此，我們認為在探討此變數和BCCs的相關性時，若能先控制住政策面的因素對通貨膨脹率的相對效果，應該較能看出此替代變數對BCCs的真實影響。
第(五)、文中政黨變數 和BCCs之間的統計效果十分顯著。這也意味著，造成BCCs波動趨勢的諸多因素中，政治因子將扮演著極為重要的角色，換句話說，在探討BCCs這個議題時，若忽略了政治變數對BCCs的貢獻，將會發生所謂的遺漏變數偏誤，導致整個估計變得沒有效率；另外，藉由此解釋因子的投入，可以推論：若要維護一個經濟組織內各成員國的共同利益，則各國就必須由理念相同的政黨執政，否則將無法達到設立此機構的實質效果。
綜合上述的結論，我們可以發現1980年至2002年工業國家彼此之間BCCs的相關性，除了受到傳導機制的影響外，還會受到政黨因子的衝擊，因此，在探討此議題時，我們認為必須將政黨變數對BCCs的貢獻考量進去，才能使原本的理論模型更具解釋能力。而根據IMF的一份統計資料顯示，工業國家之間的BCCs正面臨逐年下滑的趨勢，因此，若要改善G7各國之間BCCs的依存關係，就必須先加強彼此的經貿合作，同時透過強化整合的貨幣政策，讓各國的執政黨達成共識，才能有實質面的效果產生。而這樣的例子，我們或許能從歐洲貨幣同盟的整合過程中，找到探討景氣循環依存關係的最佳實證。

Generally speaking, business cycle could be discussed as a short-term fluctuation of business cycle and long-term economic growth. In this research, we will confer what impact factors might have affected the business cycle of correlations (BCCs) across countries in a period of short time. Many empirical analysis have pointed out the temporary factors to the business cycle mainly come from the transferred factors of economic aspect. This is called “Transmission Mechanisms.”
What is “Transmission Mechanisms?” Economists often try to substitute it in good markets, financial markets, and the coordination of monetary policies. However, in this duration of the empirical analysis, using only these proxy variables to explain BCCs between two countries seems too limited. According to this situation, we believe if the BCCs can be explained by using proxy factors of non-economic variable, the result can be utilized by making up the defect. We attempt to find new factors in political approach and combine with the “Transmission Mechanisms” that we have introduced earlier. After that, we expect to comprehend the BCCs among G7 countries from the inputs of the two completed different variables.
To analyze further economic implication in our research, five conclusions have been summarized below:
Firstly, increasing bilateral trade has significantly provided positive effect to BCCs among G7 countries from 1980 to 2002. Because the empirical result of Single Country is insignificant, we then use a two-stage method. First, we estimate “Trade” from endogenous variable to exogenous one. Secondly, we use Panel method to expand its matrix. Finally, we improve the empirical estimators of insignificant statistics before. In other words, the important variables of the correlation of bilateral trade are whether or not the two countries speak the same language; the border problem, and the distance between the two are the same, etc. So, when we talk about the relations between BCCs and good and service markets, we must consider these exogenous factors. Eventually, we will receive more detailed results.
Secondly, although to trade in financial markets can increase the BCCs between two countries, the statistic report is insignificant -0.0019 (0.0012). About this empirical result, we can obtain reasonable explanations from the researches (for instance: Imbs, 2004 or Kose et al, 2003), they point out that financial markets are bound excessively by globalization. Therefore, this will aggravatingly make each country to focus on its specialization. Finally, this situation will make the BCCs getting collapsed among these countries. This also explains that the specialization among these countries will reduce the positive effect from the BBCs to financial markets.
Thirdly, in this empirical research of Single-Country, we use three proxy estimators of economics to substitute common properties of the monetary policy. At this point, there are no identical correlations of corresponding among other countries except some significantly negative trends shown to the member countries of European Union. According to this situation, we believe it may be the consequence to all the member countries under some ERM restrictions, which is Treaty of Maastricht. Also, because of the rules form this treaty, the monetary policies are getting to be accordant, and the BCCs among the countries will soon appear in obviously positive trend.
Fourthly, in the model, the difference of the inflation rate between two countries is not significant with BCCs; therefore, an identical correlation is hardly shown. Moreover, the coefficient symbol is not in our expecting direction, so we think maybe some policies are neglected to the influence of this variable. After all these, we believe if we can control some relative policy effect to inflation rate when discussing the relationship between this variable and the BCCs, we should be able to find out the real effect of this substitutive variable to BCCs
Lastly, in the research, the statistics effect of the party variables and business cycle of correlations are very significant. This also indicates the political factor will play an important role for many sources of the fluctuation tread of BCCs. In other words, when we discuss the issue of BCCs if miss the contribution of political factors to the BCCs. Then, this might cause the omitted variable biased, and finally cause the whole computation become inefficient. In addition, we can have further discussion by an input of a factor: to conserve the joint benefit of all the member countries in an economic organization, these countries need to be ruled by the same ideal political party. Otherwise, the institute will never reach its essential result.
Combining all the conclusions we have shown above, we can find out the BCCs among G7 countries from 1980-2002. Besides the influence of the “Transmission Mechanisms,” the result will be varied by the political factors. In conclusion, we need to consider the contribution of the political party variables to the BCCs when talking about this issue, therefore; the original theoretical model can be more persuasive. According to a statistics of IMF, the BCCs among those industrial countries are falling little by little in recent years. Therefore, consolidating trade cooperation is essential for what we believe to improve the BCCs among G7. At the same time, pass through a strong integrate monetary policy can move forward all the incumbent parties from all the countries to agree among themselves, and even reach more substantial effect. From the example like this, we might find evidence from BCCs issues by discussing the integration process in European Monetary Union.

目 錄
第一章 緒論……………………………………………………1
第二章 文獻回顧………………………………………………5
第一節 真實景氣循環………………………………………5
第二節 政治景氣循環………………………………………9
第三節 政黨意識形態的理論依據…………………………10
第四節 實證研究的文獻回顧………………………………11
第三章 模型設定與實證研究方法…………………………20
第一節 真實景氣循環的模型建構………………………20
第二節 實證研究方法說明………………………………32
第四章 實證結果之分析……………………………………42
第一節 資料來源及研究變數之選取……………………42
第二節 工業國家的實證結果……………………………46
第五章 結論…………………………………………………55
參考文獻…………………………………………………………57

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