摘要
在國際金融一體化及金融管制自由化下，放寬競爭限制規則及金融業開放加速，讓跨國銀行迅速對外擴張，並希望透過擴大營運規模、降低經營成本、提高競爭能力。當跨國銀行進入地主國時，信貸市場中必然產生之借貸雙方訊息不對稱，這是信貸市場的特色，也將決定銀行業策略的行為，對銀行之獲利更具舉足輕重的影響。
本文主要是以單期賽局模型探討在訊息不對稱下，國內銀行信貸市場完全開放，而且政府並未對外資銀行進入採取管制措施時，外資銀行所選擇進入國內市場的模式。我們假設市場中有多家國內銀行，和一個潛在進入的外資銀行。國內銀行對其內部客戶具有完全訊息，外資銀行則因籌資能力強而具有成本優勢。外資銀行之進入模式分為三個部份討論。第一部分為外資銀行以新設投資方式進入且有獲利時，所有國內銀行都將被逐出市場，但是低品質客戶將造成貸款之無效率。第二部分說明在新設投資有獲利下，外資銀行選擇併購時之併購價必不為負。而如果併購價為零，外資銀行併購進入之獲利必較直接投資進入為高。第三部份討論為當新設進入無獲利下，外資銀行所提出之併購價必為正。最後，擁有高品質客戶比例高之國內銀行將願意接受較低之併購價。

Abstract

Banks expanding to new markets is commonplace nowadays amid the financial deregulations and integrations. The expansion can reduce the operating costs of the banks due to the economy of scale and hence, the competitiveness of the banks is enhanced. However, when a bank enters a new market, it is not familiar with the new potential customers and so the information asymmetry between the lender and borrowers is presented. The article applies a static game theoretical model to discuss the banks’ entry decisions to a new market.
The potential entrant has a lower funding cost than the incumbent banks, but the incumbent banks are more informative regarding the customers. We separate the analysis into three parts and draw the following conclusions: first, when de novo entry is profitable, no incumbent banks are able to survive through the entry but some bad customers can receive loans from the entering bank. Second, when the de novo entry is profitable but merging an incumbent bank is the chosen entry method, the acquisition price is non-negative. If the acquisition price is zero, acquiring an incumbent bank is even more profitable than entering directly. Finally, if de novo entry is not profitable, acquisition price accepted by the targeted bank is strictly positive and an incumbent bank that has a larger proportion of high quality customers is offered a lower acquisition price.

目錄
論文審定書 ⅰ
誌謝 ⅱ
摘要 ⅲ
Abstract ⅳ
第一章 緒論 1
1.1研究動機與目的 1
1.2研究方法與本文架構 4
第二章 文獻回顧 6
2.1 訊息不對稱下外資銀行進入分析 6
2.2 訊息不對稱下的經營方式及影響 8
第三章：基本模型及無外資銀行之信貸市場 14
第四章：外資銀行進入國內信貸市場之模式分析 17
4.1 外資銀行以新設投資進入且有獲利 17
4.2 新設投資進入獲利下的併購 18
4.3 新設投資進入無獲利下的併購 25
4.4 小結 28
第五章：結論及建議 31
參考文獻 35

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