本文沿用Chang, Lai, and Chang（1999）所發展之資本完全移動的「效率工資與就業談判」模型，深入探討「政策搭配」的議題，是否可以挽救Ramirez（1988）的缺失, 使得財政與匯率政策的搭配，可以達成其追求的政策目標。本文的分析得到以下的結論：
在固定匯率且資本完全移動的前提下，不論財政與貨幣政策如何搭配政策目標，經濟體系經過動態調整後，均可同時達到充分就業的產出之內在目標及理想水準的外匯存底之外在目標，其結論與Lai, Chang, and Chu（1990）的建議完全相同。但重要的是，財政與匯率政策的適當搭配，依然可以達到內在及外在目標，從而可以挽救Ramirez（1988）的缺失。因此，可以瞭解勞動市場的「效率工資與就業談判」理論，在政策工具與政策目標的適當搭配上，扮演了一個極重要的關鍵因素。
更進一步，本文將固定匯率制度的分析延伸於管理浮動匯率制度的探討，亦能得到政策工具與政策目標可以從事適當的搭配，從而，「效率工資與就業談判」理論的重要性再次得到更強而有力的印證。

Following Chang, Lai, and Chang(1999), this report discusses the policy assignment problem with efficient wage-employment bargaining under perfect capital mobility. Whether it can rescue the default of proposed by Ramirez (1988) that coordinate between fiscal and exchange rate policies to achieve given desirable targets. The conclusion of this report is as follows：
Under fixed exchange rates with perfect capital mobility, however, an appropriate mixture between monetary and fiscal policies can dynamically adjust to attain simultaneously the internal goal of desired output and the external goal of official foreign reserves. It's conclusion as the same as proposed by Lai, Chang, and Chu (1990). But more importantly, it can rescue the default of proposed by Ramirez (1988) that coordinate between fiscal and exchange rate policies to achieve given the internal and external goals. Accordingly, we can understand that efficient wage-employment bargaining in the labor market plays a curial role in assessing the assignment or policy instrument to targets.
Furthmore, this report extends the analysis results under fixed exchange rates shifting to the system of a managed floating regime. It can find that the policy assignment can still achieve given desirable target. Consequently, this report provides further evidence that the efficient wage-employment bargaining is very important for assignment problem.

第一章 緒論
第一節 研究動機及目的･･･････････････････1
第二節 本文架構･････････････････････････5
註釋･･･････････････････････････････････6
第二章 模型設定･････････････････････････8
註釋･･････････････････････････････････15
第三章 固定匯率制度之政策搭配
第一節 名目工資僵固性･･････････････････17
第二節 效率工資與就業談判･･･････････････23
註釋･･･････････････････････････････････31
第四章 管理浮動匯率之政策搭配･･･････････32
第五章 結論･････････････････････････････37
數學附錄･･･････････････････････････････39
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