本文主要探討國家治理層級中，公司法制中有關股東權益的保障功能對於企業併購市場的影響，利用La Porta、Lopez-de-Silanes、Shleifer和Vishny 四位學者（以下簡稱LLSV）在Law and Finance論文中所設計的股東對抗董事會之異議權指標（anti-director rights index, ADRI）以及英國John Armour 等學者所設計的股東權益保障指標（SPI），作為對照實證之基礎。透過實證與比較法學分析，並以兩岸公司法之運作現況為例，探討購併與股東異議權各項指標的關連性及此關連性在法律上之價值，希冀能供吾人了解少數股東權利於併購活動下運作的實質效果與促進市場活絡之可能性。
本研究首先討論LLSV在公司法學上研究的特色─以實證方法評價各法系與國家的公司法制，以及此方法可能的缺失及所產生的影響能力進行回顧。其次，從指標的設計與探討中找出可比較的對象，利用股票市場與併購交易市場作為驗證。本文利用哈佛學者Spamann的修訂建議以及SPI編碼方法，進行大陸與台灣公司法的編碼，彌補國際上國家樣本數的缺乏，並可作為制度比較之基礎。
本研究特色乃結合實證及法律分析，結果發現小股東之權利保障對併購的影響不一，三項正相關、五項負相關、三項無顯著關連性、兩項不具討論價值。故可以看出法律規範量化的重要價值，值得主管機關參考及供後續深入探究。
最後，本研究貢獻在於，嘗試整合量化實證與比較法學分析，回應國內外就此全球公司治理議題之討論，促進跨領域研究與對話之呈現。於政策的意涵，在於可事前預測未來能影響市場的良好制度，進而調整政策修改之方向；也可給予公司法及證交法制其條文具體的事後修訂建議，重新檢討應如何協助平衡市場發展與少數股東之間的保障與價值。

This study mainly discusses the effect, in country level, of minority shareholder protection on shareholder wealth during mergers and acquisitions (M&A). In particular, based on the index of anti-director rights (ADRI) developed by LLSV (1998) and the index of shareholder protection index (SPI) by John Armour et al.(2009), I empirically examine the linkage between M&A activities and indexes as well as the components of these indexes. This study expects the result may show some relevance between of indices and M&A activities, and the legal value of this relevance. The purpose is to show whether minority shareholder protection is workable in M&A activities, and whether it can facilitate M&A markets.
To begin with, this paper discusses LLSV’s uniqueness in corporate law study – using empirical method to value whether corporate law matters or not around the world. Then, I analyze LLSV’s possible defects, review criticisms and effects they had incurred. Secondly, we design a study to compare the revised LLSV methodology developed by the Harvard scholar Spamann with SPI index through stock market and M&A market. I also code China’s and Taiwan’s data to make up the lack of samples of cross level variation, and take this as the basis for corporate institutional comparison.
This study reports that each of sub-indexes from ADRI and SPI has different relevance to M&A activities: three are positive, five are negative, three are insignificant, and two are valueless of discussion (definition or design defect). Thus we may see the importance of law quantification. We appreciate further research and authorities’ consideration following our work in Taiwan.
Finally, the contribution of this study is to attempt to integrate empirical and comparative legal analysis, in response to global corporate governance issues of promoting cross research. On policy implications is that it can predict some investor protection mattes, direct the way of policy adjustment. Besides, this study can also suggest specific amendment for Company Law and Securities law to re-examine how to balance between market development and the protection of minority shareholders.

論文審定書…………………………………i
中文摘要………………………………… .iii
英文摘要…………………………… .iv
第 一 章 緒 論……………………………………......1
第一節 研究背景…………………………..………...1
第二節 研究目的與問題…………………….. …...3
第三節 研究架構……………………..…………...4
第 二 章 文 獻 探 討………………………………7
第一節 法律量化方法論與LLSV方的定位說.. …….10
第二節 LLSV 研究觀點與反駁之論證….…………..10
第三節 LLSV 學術地圖的整理與具體影響………...16
第四節 保障少數股東之量化指標之比較…………...24
第五節 併購市場與少數股東權利保障之法律與實證關係…37
第 三 章 研 究 設 計… …………………………......53
第一節 研究假設與架構 .53
第二節 變數說明…... ……............54
第三節 研究方法………………… ………..…… …68
第 四 章 實 證 結 果 與 法 律 分 析…… ………... 69
第一節 股東保障指標之實證結果比較與分析……...71
第二節 指標實證研究之困境與補充分析……………90
第三節 實證內容之法律分析—以兩岸上市公司法制於企業併購時之股東保障指標為核心…………………………..96
第四節 小結……………………………………….. ....123
第 五 章 研 究 結 論 與 建 議……………………. …127
第一節 研究結論與意涵…………………………… .127
第二節 研究限制………………… …………131
第三節 後續研究建議…………… ……… 133

參考文獻……………………………………138

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