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博碩士論文 etd-0505113-231616 詳細資訊
Title page for etd-0505113-231616
論文名稱
Title
運用兩階段聯盟賽局分析南方黑鮪保育組織之結構穩定性
Using the coalition game theory to analyze the stability of CCSBT
系所名稱
Department
畢業學年期
Year, semester
語文別
Language
學位類別
Degree
頁數
Number of pages
50
研究生
Author
指導教授
Advisor
召集委員
Convenor
口試委員
Advisory Committee
口試日期
Date of Exam
2013-06-07
繳交日期
Date of Submission
2013-06-17
關鍵字
Keywords
聯盟賽局、管理組織、穩定性、聯盟利潤、外部性
regional fishery management organizations, profit, externality, stability, coalition game
統計
Statistics
本論文已被瀏覽 5789 次,被下載 706
The thesis/dissertation has been browsed 5789 times, has been downloaded 706 times.
中文摘要
資源管理組織為避免資源過度耗竭,鼓勵相關捕撈國家加入管理組織配合實施捕撈量之總量控制,而在組織實施捕撈減量同時,可能導致非合作國家之捕撈量相對增加並享有正外部性效益,當外部性效益高於成員合作利潤時可能使會員產生退出誘因,導致組織呈現非穩定狀態,因此本研究將以兩階段聯盟賽局為主軸,並於第一階段先行假設捕撈者皆採取合作聯盟策略,在參與條件等於利潤函數假設下根據不同聯盟利潤值進行第二階段賽局策略穩定性分析。
Abstract
Regional fishery management organizations encourage nation states to enter in regulatory agreements in order to avoid depleting the available resource stock. However in the case the organizations employ total allowable catch policy, non-cooperating countries do not suffer restrictions and can thus increase their catch. This can be viewed as a positive externality at the cost of faster stock deterioration. In the case the benefits from non-cooperation exceed the benefit of avoiding stock exhaustion a country will have incentives not to sign in to the organization.
This paper uses a two stages coalition game approach to analyze the stability of such organizations. In the first stage it is assumed that all nations cooperate in the policy. In the second the inquiry will consider how participation evolves as this becomes dependent on each nation’s profit function.
目次 Table of Contents
論文審定書i
中文摘要 ii
英文摘要 iii
第一章 緒論1
第一節 研究背景與動機1
第二節 研究目的 3
第三節 研究架構 3
第二章 資源介紹與文獻回顧5
第一節 南方黑鮪 5
第二節 文獻回顧 8
第三章 理論模型 11
第一節 賽局11
第二節 聯盟外部性與穩定性14
第三節 聯盟利潤 18
第四章 實證研究 20
第五章 結論與建議29
第一節 結論29
第二節 建議30
參考文獻31
附 錄 35
聯合國公約之管理組織相關規定36
生態模型推導41
參考文獻 References
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Munro, 1979. The Optimal Management of transboundary renewable resources. Canadian Economics Association, 3(12), pp. 355-376.
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Munro, 1999. An economic review of the United Nations Agreement for the implementation of the United Nations Convention on the law of the seas of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks. Fishiers Economics, Issue 38.
Munro, 2004. The conservation and management of shared fish stocks: legal and economic aspects. s.l.:Food & Agriculture Org., 2004.
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Polacheck, T., 2012. Assessment of IUU fishing for Southern Bluefin Tuna. Marine Policy, Issue 36, pp. 1150-1165.
Shiao, J.-C., Chang, S.-K., Lin, Y.-T., Tzeng, W.-N., 2008. Size and age Composition of Southern Bluefin Tuna in the Central Indian Ocean Inferred from Fisheries and Otolith Data. Zoological studies, 47(2), pp. 158-171.
Tahindro, A., 1999. Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stock: A Legal Review of the 1995 United Nations Fish Stock Agreement. Bergen, Norway, Conference on Management of Straddling Fish and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks and UN Agreement.
Vislie, J., 1987. On the optimal management of transboundary renewable resources: a comment on Munro's paper. The Canadian Journal of Economics, 20(4), pp. 870-875.
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參考網站:
1.Australian Government .Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry.
http://www.daff.gov.au/market-access-trade
2.Ministry for Primary Industries, Manatu Ahu Matua.
http://www.fish.govt.nz/en-nz/default.htm
3.Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries.
http://www.maff.go.jp/e/tokei/kikaku/monthly_e/index.html
4.United nations conversation on the law of the sea.
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm
5.Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, FAO.
http://www.fao.org/index_en.htm
6.Commission for the conservation of the southern bluefin tuna, CCSBT.
http://www.ccsbt.org/site/
7.Indian Ocean Tuna Commission, IOTC.
http://www.iotc.org/English/data.php
8.中華民國對外漁業合作發展協會
http://www.ofdc.org.tw/
9.中華民國行政院農業發展委員會
http://www.coa.gov.tw/view.php?catid=4044
10.台灣區鮪魚公會
http://www.tuna.org.tw/
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