本研究利用2011-2015共五年期間的美國上市保險公司為研究樣本，實證2011年美國薪酬話語權投票制度(Say on pay votes, SOP)實施後對保險公司執行長(Chief Executive Officer, CEO)薪酬影響。實證發現：SOP投票並不會使CEO總薪酬及異常薪酬有顯著變化；SOP投票反對比率較高的公司，未必會立即調降異常薪酬，符合SOP投票無強制性之特性。若控制前一年異常薪酬作為自變數，前一年SOP投票結果不會影響當年度CEO異常薪酬，且發現前一年與當年異常薪酬間具正向顯著關係，顯示CEO異常薪酬高低可能取決於公司本身薪酬政策的習慣。

We examine the impact of the Say-On-Pay (SOP) provision implemented in the United States in 2011 and the change in CEO compensation for insurance companies listed from 2011 to 2015. We find that SOP legislation affects neither CEO compensation nor excess pay. Firms receiving low approval do not reduce excess pay immediately. These findings support the non-binding feature of say-on-pay votes. Moreover, controlling CEO excess pay in the previous year, we find the positive relationship in excess pay between the previous and current year, and the results of SOP votes do not affect CEO excess pay in the current year. We therefore conclude that excess pay may depend on the compensation policy of firms.

論文審定書 i
摘 要 ii
Abstract iii
表 次 v
第一章、 研究背景與動機 1
第二章、 文獻探討 3
第一節、 SOP制度與經理人薪酬之關聯性探討 3
第二節、 SOP制度與市場反應之關聯性探討 3
第三節、 SOP制度與其他因素之關聯性探討 4
第三章、 研究方法 5
第一節、 樣本說明 5
第二節、 CEO薪酬資料敘述統計量 9
第三節、 投票結果敘述統計量 13
第四章、 實證模型與結果 18
第一節、 CEO異常薪酬之估計 18
第二節、 前一年CEO異常薪酬與當年SOP投票結果之關聯性 21
第三節、 前一年SOP投票結果與當年CEO薪酬之關聯性 23
第四節、 SOP投票結果與CEO薪酬關聯性之強化實證 25
第五章、 結論與建議 32
第六章、 參考文獻 34

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