Title page for etd-0512116-230934


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URN etd-0512116-230934
Author Yu-ju Chan
Author's Email Address No Public.
Statistics This thesis had been viewed 5587 times. Download 293 times.
Department Finance
Year 2015
Semester 2
Degree Master
Type of Document
Language English
Title Executive Job-hopping and Compensation
Date of Defense 2016-06-02
Page Count 58
Keyword
  • Executive
  • Compensation
  • Job-hopping
  • Managerial ability
  • Incentives
  • Abstract This research analyzes the incentives that induce the executives to hop to the other firms and serve as the Chief Executive Officers (CEOs). We find that the most critical incentives come from the increase in total pay after job-hopping, instead of firm risk or the connections to the board members of the firm the executive hops to. Job-hopping leads to an increase in the proportion of stock pay and a decrease in the proportion of less-risky pay. We do not find evidence that the increase in total pay is related to managerial ability.
    Advisory Committee
  • Anlin Chen - chair
  • Chia-fen Tsai - co-chair
  • Chun-Hua Tang - advisor
  • Files
  • etd-0512116-230934.pdf
  • Indicate in-campus at 1 year and off-campus access at 1 year.
    Date of Submission 2016-06-14

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