本文利用Cournot異質雙佔模型建立一個二階段賽局，分析擁有高技術的下游廠商與低技術但可以提供便宜中間財的上下游合併廠商之間的合作關係。賽局又分成高技術外溢及低技術外溢狀況。高技術廠商必須考慮本身的技術外溢情況，在低成本與技術外溢之間做權衡。而本篇與過去文獻不同的地方在於：過去技術外溢相關文章中，技術外溢通常表現在成本的降低，而本篇文章中技術外溢展現在於使對手反需求線上升。因此，合作會使雙佔競爭更為激烈，但因為對手提供了便宜的中間財，所以廠商利潤未必會下降。我們發現，低技術外溢下，只要技術差距夠大，兩廠商存在很大的合作空間。高技術外溢下，技術差距太大或太小都不存在兩期皆合作的均衡解，而且若廠商決定合作一期，則一定會發生在第二期。

A two-stage Cournot dupoly game is implemented by competition with heterogeneous products to analyze the cooperation between a high technology downstream firm and low technology vertically integrated firm provide cheaper middle good. This game is discussed under two situations: one is high spillover and the other one is low spillover. The high technology firm has to consider the tradeoff between low cost and spillover according to its spillover level. The major difference of this thesis compared to literatures is that the spillover will cause the increasing of inverse demand function of the rival, not the decreasing of the cost. Therefore, competition will become fiercer when they cooperate, but the profits may not decrease necessarily since the rival provides cheaper middle good. We find that there is huge room for cooperation as long as the technological gap is large enough under low spillover. On the other hand, there is no full cooperate equilibrium no matter the technological gap is too large or too small under high spillover. Once they decide to cooperate, it must occur at stage two.

審定書i
謝辭 ii
摘要 iii
Abstract iv
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機與目的1
第二節研究方法與架構 3
第二章文獻回顧 4
第三章 理論模型 7
第一節 模型基本設定 7
第二節低技術外溢賽局9
第三節高技術外溢賽局 18
第四節以數值分析討論存在性22
第五節 高技術外溢下更一般化討論 24
第四章結論與展望 25
參考文獻 27

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