本文是承襲 Auriol and Brilon (2014)之模型，探究員工具有內在動機是如何影響部門間提供的最適勞動契約。多數模型假定內在動機為非純粹利他動機，但事實上，員工具有的內在動機可能面對不同的組織，而產生純粹或非純粹利他的內在動機。因此，本文假設員工是具有純粹利他內在動機。再者，本文引入反社會行為者且其行為是具有而破壞性會使部門產生損失，而此破壞性行為也是由內在動機所引起的。本文利用委託-代理模型來探討當員工具有正向或破壞性內在動機時的最適勞動契約。本文發現當沒有反社會行為者時，在非利潤導向部門比起利潤導向部門而言可以提供較低的最適的薪資水準和獎金報酬，是由於利他動機的員工存在，但監督水準是相同。其次，若有反社會行為者存在時，非利潤導向部門和利潤導向部門只能夠提高監督水準來防止反社會行為者造成的損失，而對反社會行為者來說在利潤導向部門下工作意願較高。也因此，利潤導向部門相較非利潤導向部門必須有更高的監督水準來嚇阻反社會行為者。

We adopt the model of Auriol and Brilon (2014) to discuss how the workers with intrinsic motivation affect the optimal labor contracts in nonprofit and profit sectors. Most of the models suppose that the intrinsic motivation of workers was impure altruism, but in fact, both the pure and impure altruism may arise when workers face different organizations. We assume that the workers are pure altruism if they are good workers. There are also some workers with anti-social behavior such that they can obtain pleasure from this destructive behavior. This paper applies principal-agent model by involving intrinsic motivation to determine the optimal contract. We find that without anti-social behavior, the nonprofit sector with the pure altruism of workers can offer lower wage and bonus payments than the profit sector does whereas monitoring is at the same level as in the profit sector. With the presence of anti-social behavior, both sectors only can employ higher monitoring to avoid the damage caused by such behavior. Furthermore, the profit sector is more attractive to the workers with anti-social behavior so it has to impose a higher monitoring level to deter these workers from entering the sector.

目錄
論文審定書 i
授權書 ii
誌謝 iii
摘要 iv
Abstract v
目錄 vi
1 緒論 1
1.1研究動機與目的……………………………………………………………. . 1
1.2研究方法與本文架構………………………………………………………. . 3
2. 文獻回顧 4
3. 模型設定 7
3.1命題1在利潤導向部門(profit sector)中的含義…………………………… 12
3.2命題2在非利潤導向部門(nonprofit sector)中的含義…………………….. 12
4. 壞員工的加入 14
4.1 自動嚇阻(Automatic deterrence)壞員工…………………………………… 15
4.2完全嚇阻(Full deterrence)壞員工：使壞造成巨大的損失(large damage) 16
4.3完全嚇阻下均衡討論………………………………………………………… 21
4.3部分嚇阻(Partial deterrence)壞員工：使壞造成巨大的損失(low damage) 23
4.5部分嚇阻下均衡討論………………………………………………………… 27
5. 結論 32
參考文獻…………………………………………………………………………… . 35

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