我國製酒廠商大部分的品牌力量很微小，價格競爭為其主要的銷售策略，而酒稅在其售價中佔了極大的成本，只要逃漏一部分，販售價格便可降低許多，在國內酒廠競相逃漏的環境下，個別廠商不得不逃，否則將無法面臨同業的低價競爭，進而造成整個酒品市場逃漏稅的氾濫，但除了增加人力積極查緝外，應該回頭從根本上省思，或許最基本的制度尚有缺漏。
　　本研究以代理理論討論政府、酒廠與稅務人員間的代理關係，此二代理關係中，稅務人員代理政府執行酒稅的稽徵與查核，酒廠則代理政府向消費者代徵酒稅，其中主代雙方因「目標衝突」與「資訊不對稱」的影響將產生代理問題，使代理人─酒廠與稅務人員的行為偏離主理人─政府的期待，而最終政府必須在制度上找出降低「目標衝突」與「資訊不對稱」兩個因子的方法，才能將目前的酒稅稽徵與酒品市場導向正軌，本文最後亦嘗試提出建議，作為制度改革之參考。

Most of the liquor manufacturers in our country have little brand power, using price competition as their main marketing strategy. Since the liquor tax accounts for a significant cost in the price, once they evade part of the tax, the selling prices can be much lower. When most domestic wineries are evading liquor tax, individual manufacturers have no choice but to evade the tax in order to face the price competition in the industry, thus causing the overflowing tax evasion in the whole liquor market. Yet, in addition to increase the manpower to arrest more actively, we should look back and think fundamentally that perhaps there are gaps and omissions in the basic system.
　　In this study, the principal-agency theory will be adapted into the discussion of the agency relationship between the government, wineries and tax officials. In these two agency relationships, the tax officials act for the government to implement the tax collection and check; the wineries act as agent for the government to collect the liquor tax from the consumers. To both the agent and the principle, due to “goal conflict” and “asymmetric information,” there might be agency problems, which make the behavior of the agent ─wineries and tax officials─ away from the expectation of the principle─ the government, and ultimately, it is necessary for the government to find a way to reduce “goal conflict” and “asymmetric information” in the system. Only in that way the current liquor tax collection and the winery market will be back on track. Finally, this study also tries to propose recommendations as a reference to system reform.

論文審定書 i
摘　　要 ii
Abstract iii
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 3
第二章 參考文獻 4
第一節 我國酒類管理制度 4
第二節 代理理論 16
第三節 其他文獻 26
第三章 研究方法 29
第一節 文獻分析 29
第二節 案例分析 32
第四章 案例分析 33
第一節 酒廠之代理 33
第二節 稅務人員之代理 37
第三節 案例分析 41
第五章 結論與建議 47
第一節 結論 47
第二節 建議 49
參考文獻 52

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