本論文中其三篇論文分別探討下列議題：美國政治黨性與景氣循環之關係、
經濟合作暨發展組織之政治黨性與國際貿易、東協國家全球化探討。第一篇論文
發現美國政黨之黨性對於美國跨州之景氣循環，扮演極為重要的角色。本論文提
出政治黨性可視為對景氣循環的新類別衝擊，本論文在資料選取上，有其優勢與
特質，因為美國為一單一整合市場，並無語言與移民上的限制，在於從事政治景
氣循環議題探討上，已經自然地排除了可能隱藏偏誤估計。
第二篇論文探討著名的議題「是否左翼政黨比右翼政黨在國際貿易政策上更
為保守」，本論文使用OECD 13 國數據，左翼政黨在1980-2011 年之間，在國際
貿易政策上，的確更採取保護主義。但是此保守態度，僅存在於當國內每人平均
資本存量未超過「門檻值」之際。本篇論文有別於現存論文，政黨黨性之於國際
貿易並不是亙久不變，而是視情況而定。
論文第三篇在於東協國家之全球化調查，全球化是一涵蓋資本、人力、資訊
跨國移動之議題。為了更為聚焦，本論文分解全球化中之政治全球化對經濟全球
化的影響，本文發現當東協國家之民主化越高之際，經濟全球化程度也隨之提
高。

This dissertation contains three essays involving the issues of political ideology on
business cycles on the state level of the United States, political ideology on trade policy
for developed countries, and the determinants of globalization in ASEAN countries. The
first essay finds that political ideology has played a vital role explaining output
fluctuation or synchronization of states of the US. The findings of this essay provide
new perspective of shocks – political ideology into the field of international business
cycles. The origin of this essay using state level data has an advantage, since the United
States is an integrated market without language and immigration barriers. It is naturally
isolated all hidden biases between determinants and disturbances for political business
cycles research.
The second essay extends the popular study “left wing parties tend to be more
protective than right wing parties in trade.” In thirteen OECD countries from 1980 to
2011, we found that left wing parties tend to be more protective than right wing parties
on the condition of capital per capita. Moreover, the ideology of political parties is
contingently changeable not fixed permanently. This essay provides relatively clear
answers of threshold values of capitals per capita for possible changing ideology in
developed countries.
The third essay investigates the determinants of globalization. Since globalization
is an opened realm including movements between capitals, labors and information. To
be more precise, we decompose the relationship between political and social
globalization on economic globalization for ASEAN countries in a relative more focal
angle. Using data for ASEAN countries from 1970 to 2008, panel co-integration
indicates that political globalization does positively influences economic globalization.

Contents
Chapter 1 The Impact of State Politics on Business Cycle
Correlations Across U.S. States
1.1 Abstract………………………………………………………..…………….…1
1.2 Introduction………………………………………………………………...….2
1.3 Methodology and Data………………………………………………………..6
1.3.1 The Econometric Model……………………………………..…….…..6
1.3.2 Explanatory Variables………...…………………………...…………...7
1.3.3 Data………………………………………………………………...…11
1.4 Results and Implications…………………………………………………….12
1.5 Conclusions……………………………………………………………...........17
1.6 References…………………………………………………………………….18
Chapter 2 Do Political Ideologies Promote or Suppress
International Trade?
2.1 Abstract………………………………………………………………...……26
2.2 Introduction…………………………………………………………...…….27
2.3 Data Descriptions……………………………………………………………31
2.4 Economic Methodology and Applications………………………….……...32
2.4.1 Construction of The Dependent Variables for Trade Policy………....32
2.4.2 Determinants to Trade Policy and Independent Variables………..….32
2.4.3 Estimation Strategy…………………………………………….……..37
2.5 Empirical Results…………………………………………….……………...39
2.6 Conclusions and Remarks………………………………..…………………43
2.7 References…………………………………………………..………………..48
Chapter 3 Impact of Political and Social Globalization on
Economic Globalization
3.1 Abstract…………………………………………………………..………….53
3.2 Introduction………………………………………………………...………..54
3.3 Data………………………………………………………………..…………55
3.4 Methodology and Empirical Results……………….………….……..…….58
3.4.1 Individual and Panel Unit Root Tests…………………………..…….58
3.4.2 Panel Cointegration Tests………………………………..…………...62
3.4.3 Results of Panel Cointegration Tests……….…………………..……66
3.4.4 Results of Panel FMOLS and Panel DOLS Tests……………….…...67
3.5 Conclusions……………………………………………….………..………..70
3.6 References……………………………………………………...……………71

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