市場的全球化根基於自由市場，因此，如何進行全球化的思維，對有
意進軍國際的公司來說是非常重要的。畢竟，全球的市場也代表著無限的
商機，也代表著無限的獲利及降低的風險機率。
首先，本文試圖分析公司治理與資訊平衡的關係，並著重此關係對公
司股價的影響。為了解答此問題，本文建立了兩個研究問題：第一個是公
司環境中，資訊究竟能有多透明及平衡的傳遞；第二，本文轉向分析公司
的價值，並分析公司在影響之下，會採用何種策略。為了對這種關係有更
深刻的了解，我會將研究著重在名單的建立和公民導向的公司研究。藉由
研究不同型態的公司治理，本文試圖提供此問題更明確的答案及建議。

Market globalization has favored market liberation. Thinking global is a
real asset for firms aiming to gain market shares over their national-focused
competitors. A globalized market thanks to an easier access to markets, means a
better opportunity for investors to find new profitable businesses and letting
down risky and unprofitable projects.
The main goal of this master thesis is first, to analyze the relationship
between information asymmetry and corporate governance, and then to focus on
the influence of this relationship on the company’s share value. To answer to
this problem I set up two research questions. One is focusing on information
asymmetry in a corporate environment. The second one is more turned toward
firm value. I plan to study the consequences of this relationship on the firm
share value by analyzing their impact on firm’s strategy. To get a more precise
idea of this relationship, I will focus my study on the area of listed-building and
civil engineering companies. The analysis of different corporate governances, in
a context of economic uncertainty with a focus on Internal auditing department
and Corporate Social Responsibility department, will allow me to provide a
more accurate answer to my problem, and provide recommendations which will
be targeted to the objectives and structure of these kind of companies.

Table of Contents
Thesis Appoval Form ........................................................................................... i
Acknowledgments ................................................................................................ii
中文摘要 ........................................................................................................... iii
Abstract ..............................................................................................................iv
Introduction.......................................................................................................... 3
I. Theoretical Framework........................................................................................ 6
Chapter 1 Information asymmetry and corporate governance ..................................... 6
Chapter 2. The influence of this relationship on the firm ........................................... 31
II. Empiric framework ............................................................................................51
Chapter 1 Research methodology.......................................................................... 51
Chapter 2 Results ............................................................................................... 57
Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 79
Bibliography........................................................................................................ 82
Appendixes..........................................................................................................89

Bibliography
- ABURAYA.R.K (2012): “The Relationship Between Corporate Governance And
Environmental Disclosure: UK Evidence, Durham theses, Durham University”. Available at
Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/3456/. Accessed on 10/10/2012
- ABOWDJ. M: “Does Performance-Based Managerial Compensation Affect Corporate
Performance?” Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 43, No. 3, Special Issue: Do
Compensation Policies Matter? (February 1990), pp. 52S-73S
- ADAMS.R, HERMALIN. B.E, WEISBACH.M.S : “The role of boards of directors in
corporate governance, a conceptual framework and survey”. Working paper 14486 available at:
http://www.nber.org/papers/w14486, accessed on 11/06/2012
- AKERLOFF. G, (1970), "The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84, August1970, pp. 488-500.
- BARTOV.E, (1993): “The Timing of Asset Sales and Earnings Manipulation”, The Accounting
Review, Vol. 68, No. 4, pp. 840-855. October 1993
- BARTOV. E & BODNAR.G.M, (1996): “Alternative accounting methods, information
asymmetry and liquidity: theory and evidence”, The Accounting Review, Vol. 71, No 3, July
1996 pp. 397-418
- BEBCHUK.L & NEEMAN.Z (2005): “A Political Economy Model of Investor Protection”
Incomplete Working Draft: Available at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/pdfs/Political Economy Model_03-06-
06_B103.pdf
- BEBCHUK.L.A & FRIED.J.M (2003) : “Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem”,
Journal of Economic Perspectives. Vol.17, No.3, pp. 71–92. Summer 2003
- BEBCHUK.L, LUCIAN.A, FRIED.J.M (2004): “ Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled
Promise of Executive Compensation”, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, M
- BESSIRE D., CHATELIN C., ONNÉE S., (2007): “Comptabilité et environnement, qu’est ce
qu’une bonne gouvernance?” Conference, 28ème congress de l’AFC, May 2007
- BLOCK, P. (1996) Stewardship: Choosing Service Over Self-interest, Berrett- Koehler
Publishers, San Francisco
- BUFFET.W: Berkshire Hathaway corporate performance vs. the S&P 500. Available at :
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2008ltr.pdf. Accessed on 11/08/2012
- Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO), Enterprise Risk
82
Management – Integrated Framework, Executive Summary, September 2004, p. 4. Accessible at:
http://www.coso.org/documents/COSO_ERM_ExecutiveSummary.pdf - COSO,InternalControl–
IntegratedFramework,1992. Accessed on 09/30/2012
- CORE, J., R. HOLTHAUSEN, AND D. LARCKER. (1999) “Corporate governance, chief
executive officer compensation, and firm performance”, Journal of Financial Economics 51:
371-406.
- Corporate governance codes publications, European Corporate Governance institute: Available
at: http://www.ecgi.org/codes/all_codes.php. Accessed on 11/08/2012
- DAMODARAN ONLINE (2006) “Market efficiency - definition and tests”, Available
at: http://www.e-m-h.org/Damo.pdf
- DAMODARAN.A : “The Weekend Effect in Information: A Study of Earnings and Dividend
Announcements”, Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 4, 607-623, 1989.
- DAVIDSON, P. AND R. W. GRIFFIN (2000),: “Management: Australia in a Global Context”
(Wiley, Brisbane)
- DAVIS.JH, SCHOORMAN.FD & DONALDSON.L (1997): “Towards a Stewardship Theory
of Management”, Academy of Management Review, vol. 22, pp. 20-47.
- DELLAVIGNA.S & POLLET.J.M (2009): « Investor inattention and Friday earnings
announcements », Journal of Finance, Vol. 74, 709-749.
- DIMSON.E & MUSSAVIAN.M (2000): “Market efficiency”, The current state of business
disciplines, Vol.3 pp. 959-970
- DYBVIG P.H, WARACHKA.M: “Tobin’s q does not measur firm performance: theory
empirics, and alternative measures”. Document Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1562444.
Accessed on 10/15/2012
- DYBVIG.P.H & ZENDER.J.F (1991): "Capital Structure and Dividend Irrelevance with
Asymmetric Information," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol.
4(1), pages 201-19
- EBONDO WA MANDZILA.E (2007), “Internal Audit and Corporate Governance: Theoretical
Readings and Practical Issues (Audit Interne Et Gouvernance D'Entreprise: Lectures
Théoriques Et Enjeux Pratiques)”, Euromed Marseille Working Paper No. 17-2007, July 2007
- EISENHARDT.K.M, (1989): “Agency Theory: An assessment and review”, The academy of
management review, Vol.14, No.1. January 1989
- FAMA.E, (1970): “Efficient capital markets: a review of theory and empirical work”, Journal
of Finance, 25, 2, 383–417
83
- FAMA, F. & FRENCH, R. (2005). “Finance Decisions: Who issues stock”, Journal of financial
Economics, 76, 549-582, June 2005
- FISHER.J (2004): “Social Responsibility and ethics: clarifying the concepts”, Journal of
Business Ethics, Vol. 52, No.4, pp. 391-400. July 2004
- FREEMAN R.E & WICKES.A.C & PARMAR.B (2004): “Stakeholder theory and the
corporate objective revisited” Organization Science Vol. 15, No. 3, May–June 2004, pp. 364–
369
- FREEMAN.R. E. & MCVEA.J. (2001): “A stakeholder approach to strategic management”,
Darden Business School Working Paper No. 01-02.
- FREEMAN.RE (1984), “Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach”, Pitman Publishing,
Boston, MA.
- FROOT.K.A, SCHARFSTEIN.D, STEIN.J, (1993): “Risk Management: Coordinating
Corporate Investment and Financing Policies”, Journal of Finance 48, 1629-1658. December
1993
- GLASER.B.G & STRAUSS.A.L, (1967): “The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for
Qualitative Research”, Chicago, Aldine Publishing Company
- GILLESPIE.A (2007): “Foundations of economics-Additional chapter on business strategy”,
Oxford press. Accessible from:
http://www.oup.com/uk/orc/bin/9780199296378/01student/additional/page_12.htm. Accessed
on 10/13/2012
- GILLETTE.A.B, NOE.T.H, REBELLO.M.J, (2008) “Board Structures: an Experimental
Investigation,” Review of Finance, 2008, 12, 93–140.
- GORDON.M.J & SHAPIRO.E (1956), "Capital equipment analysis: The required rate of
Profit," Management Science, Vol.3, No.1, pp.102-10. October 1956
- GORDON.G & KAHL.M (1999): “Blockholder identity, equity ownership structures and
hostile takeovers”, Wharton financial institutions center, May 1999.
- GRAMLING A. A, MALETTA.M.J, SCHNEIDER.A, CHURCH.B.K, (2004), “Role of the
internal function in corporate governance: a synthesis of the extant internal auditing literature
and directions for future research”, Journal of Accounting Literature, 23, pp. 194-244.
- GRAY.R, OWEN.D.L, ADAMS.C (1996): “Accounting and Accountability: Changes And
Challenges In Corporate and Social Reporting”, London: Prentice-Hall Europe.
- GROSSMAN S., HART O. (1982), " Corporate Financial Structure and Managerial
Incentives", in McCall J. (ed): The Economics of Information and Uncertainty, University of
Chicago Press, Chicago, pp. 107-140.
- HALE.T.N (2008): “ Transparency, accountability and global governance”, Global governance
14, pp. 73-94.
84
- HEIDER. F, (2001): “Signalling with Debt and Equity: A Unifying Approach and its
Implications for the Pecking Order Hypothesis and Competitive Credit Rationing”, discussion
paper 387, financial markets group, London School of Economics and Political Science. July
2001
- HERMALIN.B.E ANS WEISBACH.M.S (2007): “Transparency and corporate governance”,
NBER Working Paper No. 12875, July 2007. Available at:
http://www.nber.org/papers/w12875. Accessed on 11/01/2012
- ISO 3001, 2009 standards: http://www.praxiom.com/iso-31000-terms.htm, Accessed on
09/10/2012
- JENSEN.M.C & MECKLING.W.H (1976): “Theory of the Firm: Managerial behavior, agency
costs and ownership structure”. Journal of Financial Economics, October 1976, V.3, No.4, pp.
305-360
- JENSEN M. (1986), "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers",
American Economic Review, 76(2), No.2, pp. 323-329. May 1986
- KIEL.G.C & NICHOLSON.G.J, (2003), “Boards that work: A new guide for directors”,
Sydney: McGraw Hill
- KIMBALL.R.C, (2000): “Failure in risk management”, New England Economic
Review, January/February 2000. Accessible from:
http://www.bostonfed.org/economic/neer/neer2000/neer100a.pdf. Accessed on 11/03/2012
- LA PORTA.R, RAFAEL, LOPEZ-DE-SILANES.F, SHLEIFER.A, VISHNY.R,
(2000), “Agency problems and dividend policies around the world”, Journal of Finance Vol.
55, pp. 1-33
- LANG.L, STULZ.R, AND WALKLING.R.A, (1989): “Managerial performance, Tobin's q and
the gains from successful tender offers”. Journal of Financial Economics 24, 137-154. June
1989
- LEARY.M.T AND ROBERTS.M.R (2008): “The pecking order, debt capacity, and
information asymmetry”, Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=555805. Accessed on
10/03/2012
- MARKOWITZ.H, (1959): “Portfolio Selection”, New Haven, Yale University Press.
- MARD.Y (2005): “Vers une information comptable plus transparente: l’apport des recherches
portant sur la gestion des résultats comptables”: Revue, comptabilité et connaissances,France,
May 2005
- MAYS.N. & POPE.C, (1996). “Qualitative research in health care”, London, British Medical
Journal (BMJ) Publishing Group.
85
- MERRIAM.S.B (2009),”Qualitative research : A guide to design and implementation”, San
Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass
- MERRIAM.S.B (1988), “Case study in education: a qualitative approach”, San Francisco, CA:
Jossey-Bass
- MESSIER.W.J, SCHNEIDER.A, (1988): “A hierarchical approach to the external auditor’s
evaluation of the internal auditing function”, Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol. 4 Issue
2, pp. 337-353. Spring 1988.
- MICHAELY.R, RUBIN.A, VEDRASHKO.A, (2011): “Corporate governance and timing of
earnings announcements”, AFA 2012 Chicago Meetings Paper. Available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1786159 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1786159. Accessed on
11/01/2012
- MILLER M. & ROCK K. (1985), "Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Information", The
Journal of Finance, Vol.40, pp.1031-51. September 1985
- MITCHELL.R.K, AGLE.B.R, WOOD.D.J, (1997) “Toward a theory of stakeholder
identification and salience: Defining the principle of who and what really counts”, Academy of
Management Review, Vol. 22 No. 4, pp. 853-886. October 1997
- MODIGLIANI F. AND MILLER M, (1958), "The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and
the Theory of Investment", American Economic Review, Vol.53, pp.261-97. June 1958
- MOELLER.S.B, SCHLINGEMANN.F.P, STULZ.R.M, (2007): “How do diversity of opinion
and information asymmetry affect acquirer returns?”, The review of Financial Studies, Vol.20,
No.6, pp. 2047-2078. November 2007
- MORCK.R, A. SHLEIFER, VISHNY.R, (1988):“Characteristics of targets of hostile and
friendly takeovers”, in Auerbach, ed.: Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences, The
University of Chicago Press (Chicago).
- MYERS.S.C & MAJLUF.N.S (1984): “Corporate financing and investment decisions when
firms have information that investors do not have”, Journal of Financial Economics, No 13,
pp. 187-221. July 1984
- NARAYANAN M, (1988), “Debt versus Equity Under Asymmetric Information”, Journal of
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol.23, No.1, pp.39-51. March 1988.
- VERRECCHIA.N, ROBERT.E, WEBER.J.P, (2009), “Firm Performance Measures and
Adverse Selection”. September 2009. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1324874 or
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1324874. Accessed on 11/10/2012
- OECD: “Corporate governance and the financial crisis: key findings and main messages”, June
2009
- PEARCE.J.A & ROBINSON.R.B, (2004): “Hostile Takeover Defenses That Maximize
Shareholders Wealth”. “Business Horizons”47/5, pp. 15-24, September /October 2004.
86
- PERROW.C (1986): “Complex organizations: A critical essay”. New york: random house.
- PINKOWITZ.L, STILZ.R, WILLIAMSON.R (2006): “Does the contribution of corporate cash
holdings and dividends to firm value depend on governance? A cross-country analysis”. The
Journal of Finance, Vol.61, pp. 2725-275, December 2006,
- POCHET.C & YEO. H (2004), “Comment interpréter la diffusion des standards anglo-saxons
de gouvernance au sein des entreprises françaises cotées? L’exemple des comités de
surveillance”, Association Francophone de Comptabilité (AFC).
- PORTER.M.E, KRAMER.M.R (2006): “Strategy and Society: The Link Between Competitive
Advantage and Corporate Social Responsibility”, Harvard business review, December 2006
- RENDERS.A, GAEREMYNCK.A, SERCU.P (2010): “Corporate-governance ratings and
company performance: a cross-European study”, Corporate Governance: An International
Review, Vol.18. No2, pp.87–106. March 2010
- ROBERTS, HARRY (1967): “Statistical Versus Clinical Prediction of the Stock Market”.
Unpublished manuscript, CRSP, University of Chicago. May 1967
- ROSS.A.S, (1977): “The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive-Signaling
Approach”, Bell Journal of Economics, Vol.8, No.1. Spring 1977
- RUBINSTEIN. M (2002): « Le débat sur le gouvernement d’entreprise en France : état des
lieux », Revue d’économie industrielle, Vol 98.
- SANDERS.G.W, CARPENTER.M.A, (2003): “Strategic Satisficing? A behavioral-agency
theory perspective on stock repurchase program announcements”, The Academy of
Management Journal, Vol. 46, No. 2, pp. 160-178. April 2003
- SCHEDLER.A, (1999), "Conceptualizing Accountability" The Self-Restraining State: Power
and Accountability in New Democracies. Editions Andreas Schedler, Larry Diamond, and
Marc F. Plattner. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999
- SHLEIFER.A, (2003): “Inefficient markets, an introduction to behavioral finance” Oxford
University Press, Nov 1, 2003
- SHLEIFER, A., AND R. VISHNY, (1997): “The limits of arbitrage”, Journal of Finance
Vol.52, No 1, pp. 35-55. March 1997
- SCHERMERHORN.J.R (2002):“Management”, Wiley
- SOEDERBERG.S, (2003): “The promotion of 'Anglo-American' corporate governance in the
South: Who benefits from the new international standard?” Third World Quarterly Vol.24, N.1.
pp.7-27. February 2003
- SMIRLOCK.M, GILLIGAN.T, MARSHALL.W (1984): “Tobin's q and the Structure-
Performance Relationship”, The American Economic Review, Vol. 74, No. 5, pp. 1051-1060.
December 1984
87
- STIGLITZJ. E. (2000): “The Contribution of Economics of Information to Twentieth Century
Economics”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.115, No.4, pp. 1441-1478.
- STIGLITZ.J.E, (2003): “Information and the change in the paradigm in economics part 1”,
Nobel Prize Lecture, The American Economist, Vol.47 No 2, pp. 6-26. Fall 2003
- SUCHMAN.M, (1995): “Managing Legitimacy: Strategic Approaches and Institutional
Approaches”, Academy of Management Review, Vol.20, No.3, pp. 571 – 610. July 1995
- SUNDARAM.A.K, INKPEN.A.C, (2004):“ The corporate objective revisited”. Thunderbird
School of Management Working Paper. Available: http://ssrn.com/abstract=293219. Accessed
on 10/09/2012
- The Institute of Internal Auditors (IAA): http://www.theiia.org/theiia/about-theprofession/
internal-audit-faqs/?i=1077. Accessed on 11/12/2012
- TOSI.H.L, GOMEZ-MEIJA.L 2005, WERNER.S (2005): “Organizational Governance and
Employee Pay: How Ownership Structure Affects the Firm's Compensation Strategy”,
Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 26, No. 4, pp. 377-384. April 2005
- TRUCKER.M.L, (1994): “Stewardship: Choosing Service over Self-Interest by Peter Block”,
The Academy of Management Review, Vol. 19, No. 3, Special Issue: "Total Quality". July 1994
- VAN DER LAAN (2009): “The Role of Theory in Explaining Motivation for Corporate Social
Disclosures: Voluntary Disclosures vs ‘Solicited’ Disclosures”, Australasian Accounting
Business and Finance Journal, Vol.3, No.4, article 2.
- VISHNY.R, MORCK.R, SHLEIFER.A (1986): “Management ownership and corporate
performance: an empirical analysis”. Working paper no. 2055 October 1986. Available at:
http://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/2055.html. Accessed on 10/04/2012
- VIVES.X (2001): “Corporate finance, does it matter?”, Cambridge University Press. June
2012
- WASSERMAN N. (2006): “Stewards, agents, and the founder discount: executive
compensation in new ventures”, The Academy of Management Journal, Vol.49, No.5, pp.
960 – 976.
- WACHEUX.F (1996), “Méthodes qualitatives et recherche en gestion”, Economica, Paris
- WEISBACH.M.S (2006): “Optimal Executive Compensation vs. Managerial Power: A Review
of Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried's "Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of
Executive Compensation” December 2006. Nber working paper n°12798 Available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w12798. Accessed on 11/07/2012
- YIN.R.K, “Applications of case study research”, Design and methods, 1994
88