本文根據委託代理人模型，探討代理人在委託人具有不同經營目標時所產生之不同併購決策。委託人之目標參考 Besley 與 Ghatak (2005) 以及 Auriol 與Brilon (2014) 的模型有三種類型。在目標為營利組織利潤極大之下，當代理人經外在認定的能力夠高時，就會有更高的意願去執行併購任務並且得到較高的單位報酬獎金。在目標為非營利組織利潤極大或成本極小之下，當代理人有了利他意識的良好動時，就會相對地減少對於獎金的需求。並且得出利他意識與獎金為抵換關係，因此當吸引來的代理人的利他意識足夠大時，即使獎金為零代理人也會執行併購行動。最後，當公部門提供低薪所以吸引到較高利他動機的代理人時，會產生過度併購及可能提供超額公共財。

This paper discusses managers’ decisions on mergers and acquisitions (M&A) according to the principal-agent model. Extended from Besley and Ghatak (2005) and Auriol and Brilon (2014), principal’s objective is categorized into three different types；purely for profit；for profit with altruism and cost minimization with minimal required output. In profit maximization organizations, when the agent is considered with high ability, there will be high motivation to perform the acquisition and with a higher bonus. In profit maximization organizations with altruism or cost minimization organizations, when the agent has altruism, the bonus he receives for increasing output will be smaller compared to that received under purely for profit organization. When the agent’s altruism is large enough, even if the bonus is zero agents will perform M&A action. Finally, when public organizations offer relatively lower wages and if such actions lead to attracting people with higher altruism, to be employed as managers, public goods can be overproduced by carrying out M&A projects excessively.

目錄
　審定書 ................................................................................................................................ i
　授權書 ............................................................................................................................... ii
　中文摘要 ........................................................................................................................... iii
　英文摘要 ........................................................................................................................... iv
　目錄 ................................................................................................................................... v
　圖次 .................................................................................................................................. vi
　表次 ................................................................................................................................. vii
　第一章 緒論 ....................................................................................................................... 1
　　　1.1 研究動機與目的 .................................................................................................... 1
　　　1.2 研究方法與本文架構 ............................................................................................. 2
　　　1.3 文獻回顧 ............................................................................................................... 2
　第二章 基本模型 ................................................................................................................ 7
　第三章 利他動機模型 ....................................................................................................... 15
　第四章 成本極小化模型 .................................................................................................... 26
　第五章 結論 ...................................................................................................................... 34
　參考文獻 ........................................................................................................................... 36
　附錄 .................................................................................................................................. 37

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