本研究的主要目的在使用台灣的上市公司資料，探討多重大股東及最終控制股東控制權與現金流量請求偏離程度對公司價值及負債結構的影響。過去文獻在探討負債結構時，分別以負債到期期限與銀行貸款比例來做為分析企業負債結構之變數，不同的，本文同時將兩項負債變數皆納入迴歸式分析，並討論其是否可做為公司治理優劣之指標。研究樣本以2008-2016年台灣上市公司且擁有一位以上之大股東做為研究對象。本文採用Panel data model加入固定效果進行分析，並以兩階段最小平方法來解決模型的可能內生性問題。
本研究結果顯示，為當大股東人數愈多會積極扮演監理公司的角色；最終控制股東控制權與現金流量請求偏離程度對公司價值無顯著影響，此結果可能與在大股東積極監管下，使最終控制股東謀取私利的機會大幅下降；股權分散程度與公司價值成顯著正相關，此結論與過去文獻相左，其原因可能與台灣企業結構有關；提高短期負債比例可消除代理問題並提高資訊透明度。整體而言，企業若想加強內部監理，可以增加大股東人數、提高短期限負債。另外，若投資人想藉由企業所揭露之負債訊息來判定該企業公司治理的優劣時，還須將其他因素納入考量，例如：大股東人數、最終控制股東控制權與現金流量請求偏離程度等因素。

This study investigates the relation between the governance role of large shareholder and the structure of corporate debt using data of Taiwan listed firms from 2008 to 2016. The results show that the number of large shareholder has a significant negative impact on long-maturity debt and bank loans, and largest ultimate owner with excess control rights has no relation with debt maturity structure. In addition, we found that short-maturity debt mitigates agency problem and enhances corporate performance. Overall, our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that multiple large shareholders aggressively play the governance role. According to this study, decision-makers can increase firm value by adding the number of large shareholders, and investors can pay more attention on the ratio of short-maturity debt and the number of large shareholders.

論文審定書 i
中文摘要 ii
英文摘要 iii
第壹章 緒論 1
第貳章 文獻探討 3
第一節 公司治理對公司之影響 3
第二節 多重大股東對公司之影響 4
第三節 最終控制股東對公司之影響 5
第四節 負債到期期限與籌資對象 7
第參章 研究方法與設計 10
第一節 研究假說 10
第二節 研究方法 12
第三節 樣本資料 26
第肆章 實證結果與分析 28
第一節 敘述統計分析 28
第二節 多重大股東與最終控制股東控制權與現金流量請求偏離程度對公司價值之影響 34
第三節 多重大股東與最終控制股東控制權與現金流量請求偏離程度對負債結構之影響 37
第四節 穩健性檢定 44
第伍章 結論與建議 48
參考文獻 50

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