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博碩士論文 etd-0529110-114754 詳細資訊
Title page for etd-0529110-114754
論文名稱
Title
銀行擔任一般企業董事對於投資現金流量敏感度與股利政策之影響
The Impact of Bankers on the Board on Corporate Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity and Dividend Policy
系所名稱
Department
畢業學年期
Year, semester
語文別
Language
學位類別
Degree
頁數
Number of pages
102
研究生
Author
指導教授
Advisor
召集委員
Convenor
口試委員
Advisory Committee
口試日期
Date of Exam
2010-05-28
繳交日期
Date of Submission
2010-05-29
關鍵字
Keywords
銀行、董事會、投資現金流量敏感度、股利政策
board of directors, bank, dividend policy, investment-cash flow sensitivity
統計
Statistics
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中文摘要
投資、融資及股利政策是公司的三大財務決策,而這三者的性質或許會受到銀行擔任一般公司董事所影響。之前雖然已有研究探究融資決策與銀行擔任一般公司董事之間的關聯性。然而,迄今仍未有研究討論銀行擔任一般公司董事時,對於公司投資政策與股利政策的影響為何,因此,本研究針對此一相關議題做進一步的探討。
本研究以2003-2007年間存有銀行董事之台灣上市櫃公司為研究樣本,採用配對樣本來驗證本研究所提出之假說,實證所需資料係來自台灣經濟新報社 (Taiwan Economic Journal, TEJ) 資料庫。研究結果發現銀行擔任一般公司的董事及銀行董事席次比例愈多時,會增加該公司之投資對現金流量敏感度。本研究亦發現當銀行擔任一般公司董事時,公司愈不傾向發放股利; 另外,隨著銀行進入一般公司擔任董事的席次比例增加,公司愈有可能不發放股利或是減少股利支付比率。
Abstract
Investment, financing and dividend policies are critical for firms. The natures of these three policies may be significantly influenced by bankers on the board. Previous studies have examined the relationship between financing policy and bankers on the board. However, the influence of bankers on the board on corporate investment and dividend policies remains unexamined. Therefore, this paper tries to shed further light on whether bankers on the board affect corporate investment-cash flow sensitivity and dividend policy.
This study collects data from Taiwan publicly traded corporations that have banker directors between 2003 and 2007, together with a matching sample consisting of firms without banker directors. Variables used to construct empirical analyses are from the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) database. The results show that the presence of bankers appointed to corporate directors and the percentage of banker directors positively affect the firm’s investment-cash flow sensitivity positively. This study also finds a negative relationship between the presence of banker directors and the likelihood of dividend payment. The percentage of banker directors has negative impacts on the likelihood of dividend payment and corporate dividend payout ratio.
目次 Table of Contents
摘要 I
Abstract II
Contents III
List of Tables V
List of Figures VII
Chapter 1 Introduction 1
1.1 Background and Motivation 1
1.2 Objectives 6
1.3 Research Contribution 8
1.4 Organization of this Dissertation 9
Chapter 2 Literature Review 11
2.1 Taiwanese Features 11
2.2 Bankers on the Board 13
2.3 Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity 18
2.4 Dividend Policy 23
Chapter 3 Research Methodology 29
3.1 Research Framework 29
3.2 Hypothesis Development 30
3.3 The Empirical Specification 33
3.4 Sample Selection and Data Source 41
Chapter 4 Empirical Results 45
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 45
4.2 Univariate Tests 51
4.3 Multivariate Results 53
4.4 Sensitivity Analysis 60
Chapter 5 Conclusions 85
5.1 Conclusions 85
5.2 Contributions 87
5.3 The Limitations of this Study and Suggestions for Future Research 88
Reference 89
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