本文延伸自Cartwright and Patel (2013)，探討類別報告下的預期捐獻是否優於精確捐款報告的捐獻值，透過證明，在兩種類型單一門檻的模型下我們可以得出肯定的答案，高低門檻之間的比較也有較簡明的結論。而本文拓展至三種捐款類型並從單一門檻討論至雙門檻，嘗試接近實際情況下的模型分析，觀察到包含類別捐款報告與精確捐款報告的比較，以及各類別捐款報告之間，欲維持原本的結論需增加若干條件限制，如變數之間的大小關係或是變數的範圍。我們得到的結論：第一為除了中門檻以外的單一門檻類別捐款皆有條件才能使得預期捐款高於精確捐款報告之捐款；第二為雙門檻類別捐款報告之預期捐款一定高於精確捐款報告；第三為雙門檻類別報告之情況二捐款期望值一定優於單一高門檻之預期捐款期望值，但是單一中或低門檻則不一定較雙門檻之捐款期望值為差。

This study extends the signaling model developed by Cartwright and Patel (2013), and attempts to investigate whether category reporting can improve fundraising. The original model obtained simple, positive results under two types of donors and one threshold. This study extends to three types of donors and analyzes the issues including one and two thresholds. The results differ from the ones obtained in the previous study. First, except for middle threshold, either high or low threshold requires additional conditions to improve fundraising from exact reporting if single threshold method is employed. Second, if two thresholds are reported, category reporting surely can improve fundraising from exact reporting. Third, one of the two-threshold reporting can raise more funds than single high threshold, but the results are ambiguous if comparing single middle or single low threshold to the two-threshold reporting.

審定書 -------------------------------------------------- ------------i
授權書 --------------------------------------------------------------ii
誌謝 --------------------------------------------------------------iii
中文摘要-------------------------------------------------------------iv
英文摘要--------------------------------------------------------------v
1.緒論------------------------------------------------------------------1
1.1研究動機與目的----------------------------------------------1
1.2研究方法與本文架構----------------------------------------2
1.3文獻回顧--------------------------------------------------------2
2.模型及精確捐款報告--------------------------------------------5
2.1基本模型--------------------------------------------------------5
2.2精確捐款報告--------------------------------------------------6
3.類別捐款報告----------------------------------------------------11
3.1單門檻類別捐款報告---------------------------------------11
3.2雙門檻類別捐款---------------------------------------------24
4.結論-----------------------------------------------------------------35
附錄--------------------------------------------------------------------36
參考文獻-------------------------------------------------------------42

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