這篇文章主要在測試併購對於主併公司的影響，以及影響主併公司進行併購的因素。我們發現主併公司的管理階層會因為本身負債比率偏高，以及股市大盤有較好的表現時，傾向進行股票併購。此外在衡量異常報酬方面，發現使用股票併購的主併公司會有正的異常報酬產生，而且有資訊外溢的情形出現。進一步研究股票併購，我們發現主併公司的資訊不對稱程度越高，股票併購產生的異常報酬會越少；被錯誤定價程度越高的主併公司，使用股票併購會有越高的異常報酬產生。

This thesis analyzes the factors which affect acquirers’ decisions to take over target companies. We find that acquirers are more likely to use stock offers when the liquidity increases and the stock market is booming. In addition, bidders in stock offers experience a positive abnormal return, and the information spill-over occurs in these mergers. Furthermore, acquirers’ abnormal returns decrease as a proxy for information asymmetry increases. Finally, acquirers are more likely to use stock offers if the mis-valuation of acquirers’ stock is more severe.

論文審定書 i
誌謝辭 ii
摘要 iii
Abstract iv
目錄 v
圖次 vi
表次 vii
第一章 導論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 2
第二節 研究目的 2
第二章 文獻回顧 5
第一節 併購相關文獻 5
第二節 股票併購與異常報酬 6
第三章 資料與研究方法 8
第一節 資料來源與分析 8
第二節 研究方法 12
第四章 實證結果 15
第一節 併購方式的取決 15
第二節 合併收購與異常報酬 19
第三節 股票併購累積異常報酬與資訊不對稱 32
第五章 結論 40
參考文獻 41

G. Alexandridis, D. Petmezas, N.G. Travlos,2010. Gains from Mergers and Acquisitions Around the World: New Evidence. Financial Management 37, 1671–1695.
G. Andrade, M. Mitchell, E. Stafford, 2001. New evidence and perspectives on mergers. Journal of Economic Perspectives 15, 103–120 .
E. Berkovitch, M.P. Narayanan, 1993. Motives for takeovers: An empirical investigation. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 28, 347-362.
M. Bradley, A. Desai, E.H. Kim, 1988. Synergistic gains from corporate acquisitions and their division between the stockholders of target and acquiring firms. Journal of Financial Economics 21, 3–40.
H.J. Chang, 1998. Interpreting the Korean crisis: financial liberalisation, industrial policy and corporate governance. Cambridge Journal of Economics 22, 735-746.
E. Devos, P.R. Kadapakkam, S. Krishnamurthy, 2009. How do mergers create value? A comparison of taxes, market power, and efficiency improvements as explanations for synergies. Review of Financial Studies 22, 1179-1211.
E. Devos, A. Prevost, J. Puthenpurackal, 2009. Are Interlocked Directors Effective Monitors? Financial Management 38, 861–887.
P. Dodd, J.B. Warner, 1983. On corporate governance: A study of proxy contests. Journal of Financial Economics 11, 401–438
M. Dong, D. Hirshleifer, S. Richardson, S.H. Teoh, 2005. Does investor misvaluation drive the takeover market? Journal of Finance 61, 725–762.
E.F. Fama, 1980. Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm. Journal of Political Economy 88, 288–307.
E.F. Fama, K. French, 1992. The cross‐section of expected stock returns. Journal of Finance 47, 427–465.
D. Galai, R.W. Masulis, 1976. The option pricing model and the risk factor of stock. Journal of Financial Economics 3, 53–81.
P.M. Healy, K.G. Palepu, R.S. Ruback, 1992. Does corporate performance improve after mergers? Journal of FinancialEconomics 31, 135–175.
R. Heron, E. Lie, 2002. Operating performance and the method of payment in takeovers. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 37, 137–155.
M. Hertzel, R.L. Smith, 1993. Market discounts and shareholder gains for placing equity privately. Journal of Finance 48, 459–485.
R.C. Higgins, L.D. Schall, 1975. CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY AND CONGLOMERATE MERGER. Journal of Finance 30, 93–113.
P. Jensen, 1986. Feeding ecology of free-living aquatic nematodes. Marine Ecology Progress Series 35, 187–196.
M.C. Jensen, W.H. Meckling, 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305–360.
E.H. Kim, J.J. McConnell, 1977. CORPORATE MERGERS AND THE CO-INSURANCE OF CORPORATE DEBT. Journal of Finance 32, 349–365.
M.R. Kropf, D.T. Robinson, S. Viswanathan, 2005. Valuation waves and merger activity:The empirical evidence. Journal of Financial Economics 77, 561–603.
M.R. Kropf, S. Viswanathan, 2004. Market valuation and merger waves. Journal of Finance 59,2685–2718.
S.C. Linn, J.A. Switzer, 2001. Are cash acquisitions associated with better postcombination operating performance than stock acquisitions? Journal of Banking & Finance 25, 1113–1138.
T. Loughran, A.M. Vijh, 1997. Do long‐term shareholders benefit from corporate acquisitions? Journal of Finance 52, 1765–1790.
K.J. Martin, 1996. The method of payment in corporate acquisitions, investment opportunities, andmanagerial ownership. Journal of Finance 51, 1227–1246.
M. Mitchell, T. Pulvino, E. Stafford, 2004. Price pressure around mergers. Journal of Finance 59, 31–63.
S.C. Myers, N.S. Majluf, 1984. CORPORATE FINANCING AND INVESTMENT DECISIONS WHEN FIRMS HAVE INFORMATION THAT INVESTORS DO NOT HAVE. Journal of Financial Economics13, 187–221.
C. Polk, P. Sapienza, 2009. The Stock Market and CorporateInvestment: A Test of Catering Theory. Review of Financial Studies22, 187–217.
R. Powell, A.W. Stark, 2005. Does operating performance increase post-takeover for UK takeovers? A comparison of performance measures and benchmarks. Journal of Corporate Finance 11, 293–317.
R. Roll, 1986. Economic Forces and the Stock Market. Journal of Business 59, 383-403.
A. Shleifer, R.W. Vishny, 2003. Stock market driven acquisitions. Journal of Financial Economics 70,295–311.
N,G, Travlos, 1987. Corporate Takeover Bids, Methods of Payment, and Bidding Firms' Stock Returns. Journal of Finance 42,943–963.
K.H. Wruck, 1989. Equity ownership concentration and firm value: Evidence from private equity financings. Journal of Financial Economics 23, 3–28.