本文將壓力函數分成兩類簡單解釋日常生活的現象,得出有些人深愛壓力而 感到樂此不疲,而大部份的人會選擇遠離壓力。另外,探討每一個夥伴成本相同 的情況之下,不論感受度是否相同,都會回到 Cournot-Nash 均衡解;而在每一個 夥伴成本不同,並且感受度相同的情況下,當對方邊際成本越高,則自身投入的 努力越多。
夥伴成本不相同的情況之下,利用模擬數據得出兩個推論,第一個論點,夥 伴之間感受差異越大,越能激勵更高的努力值。第二個論點,夥伴之間有相同的 感受度,在低感受度的夥伴群體之間,則夥伴之間努力值差距越大;在高感受度 的夥伴群體之間,則夥伴之間努力值差距越小。

In this paper we divide pressure function to two types to explain everyday life in an easy way, proving that some people do enjoy the stress, while the most others choose to stay away. Besides, when everyone is facing the same partnership cost, there must be a Cournot-Nash equilibrium no matter whether they have the same sensitivity. Also, while facing different costs with the same level of perceiving, one may work harder when the higher the other’s marginal is.
On the other hand, conclusions are derived from simulated data due to different partner cost: first, the motivation will be stronger with more difference received by each other. Second, if all participants have the same sensitivity, the level of diligence differs more in less-sensitive partnership group but less in more-sensitive one.

論文審定書 i
謝辭 ii
摘要 iii
Abstract iv
目錄 v
表次 vii
圖次 viii
第一章 緒論 1
第一節研究動機與目的 1
第二節研究方法與研究架構 2
第二章文獻回顧 3
第三章理論模型 6
第一節模型架構 6
第二節不同類型壓力函數對努力的影響 7
一、第一類壓力型態 7
二、第二類壓力型態 10
三、第一類與第二類壓力型態之討論 15
第三節感受度對努力的影響 16
一、基本模型討論 16
二、情境模擬推論 19
第四章結論與建議 22
第一節結論 22
第二節未來延伸與建議 23
參考文獻 24

一、網路資料
1. 感受(feeling)的定義。
資料來源:維基百科，網址:zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/感受
2. 知覺或感知(Perception)的定義。
資料來源:維基百科，網址:zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/知觉

二、中文部份
1. 李伶珠(2009)“在不同工作相依性之下，競賽誘因對組織績效之影響:實地實證研究”，管理學報，26卷，第3期，頁333-351。

二、英文文獻
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7. Giebe, T. and Gürtler,O. (2012), “Optimal contracts for lenient supervisors” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization , pp.403-420
8. Indjejikian, R. and Nanda, D. (1999 ), “Dynamic incentives and responsibility accounting”Journal of Accounting and Economics, pp.177-201
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10. Kaarbøe, O. M. and Olsen,T. E. (2006), “Career Concerns, Monetary Incentives andJob Design”The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Vol. 108, No. 2 , pp.299-316
11. Kräkel, M.and Steiner,G.,(2000), “Equal sharing in partmerships?” Journal of Economics Letters, pp.105-109.
12. Mohnen,A.,Pokorny,K. andSliwka, D. (2008), “Transparency, Inequity Aversion, and the Dynamics of Peer Pressure in Teams: Theory andEvidence”Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 26, No. 4, pp.693-720
13. Wageman,R. and Baker, G. (1997),“Incentives and Cooperation: The Joint Effects of Task and Reward Interdependence on Group Performance”Journal of Organizational Behavior, Vol. 18, No. 2, pp.139-158.