本文從控制權配置的角度分析不完全契約 (incomplete contract) 的設計，以提高企業的融資效率。其特色是從投資人立場考慮企業融資中潛在於借貸雙方的雙向要脅問題 (hold-up problems)，繼而分析用以搭配控制權的均衡報酬規則，並進行最優契約選擇。在給定控制權的均衡狀態下，本文發現與 Yerramilli (2011) 相同，只有條件控制 (contingent control) 與投資人控制 (investor control) 具有優勢。然而 Yerramilli 從經理人立場出發，在分析要脅下的再談判 (renegotiation) 問題時須假設相當嚴格的條件；本文不但無此之弊，並且在推導最適契約的條件時更為精準而一般化，足以改良、補充 Yerramilli 模型，並修正一些謬誤。

The thesis analyzes the design of incomplete contract from the perspective of control right allocation to improve the efficiency of enterprise financing. It considers hold-up problems between manager and investor in enterprise financing from the standpoint of investor, analyzes the payoff rules of equilibrium with control right and chooses the optimal contract. In the equilibrium of a given control right, the thesis discovers that only two control allocations are optimal in equilibrium: either exclusive investor control or a contingent control allocation, which is the same as Yerramilli (2011). However, Yerramilli must make strict assumptions to analyze hold-up or renegotiation problems from the standpoint of manager. This thesis not only has no such disadvantages, but also makes the conditions of optimal contract more accurate and general. It is sufficient to improve and supplement Yerramilli’s model and fix some errors.

論文審定書 i
誌謝 ii
摘要 iii
Abstract iv
第一章 緒論 1
第二章 Yerramilli (2011) 之模型結構 4
2.1 符號與設定 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2 資訊結構 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.3 契約形態 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.4 T1 期的要脅問題 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.5 Yerramilli (2011) 模型之均衡分析 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.6 Yerramilli (2011) 模型之最適契約 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
第三章 投資人立場主導下的均衡分析 14
3.1 基本模型 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.2 基本特性 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
第四章 投資人立場主導下的最適契約 21
4.1 條件控制（Φ = CC）的情形 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.2 投資人控制（Φ = IC）的情形 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.3 「條件控制」與「投資人控制」的比較 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4.4 θ，pR，µ，L 和 ψ 對臨界值 ˆ β 的影響 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.5 β 與 µ 對投資人最適 (淨) 報酬的影響 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
第五章 結論 35
附錄：數學證明與數學符號對照表 37
參考文獻 41

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