本篇論文主要分析當政府選擇利用沒收仿冒品作為打擊仿冒的策略時，當政府為先行動者或後行動者時，仿冒廠商的最適結盟結構為何。本文發現，當政府為後行動者時，仿冒廠商會組成一大聯盟，共同生產仿冒品，且此均衡為一穩定的防勾結納許均衡。而當政府為先行動者時，仿冒廠商的最適結盟結構會隨著市場需求大小及邊際生產成本不同而改變，亦即結盟結構內生化。不僅如此，當市場需求相對大時，政府傾向作為先行動者，僅作口頭上的取締宣告，但實際上不取締任何仿冒品。

This article will discuss which form the gang structures will take when the government tries to reach the maximum potential for social welfare through either confiscating or pretending to confiscate couterfeit goods. The article shows when the government works as a successor, the gang structure will entail a grand gang and all the criminal members of the grand gang will work together to produce counterfeit goods. On the other hand, when the government works as a predecessor, the form of the gang structure depends on two factors: the market demand and marginal production cost. When the market demand is relatively large, the government will be inclined to be a predecessor. However, this predecessor government will announce to the public that they plan to confiscate the counterfeit goods but in reality they may only confiscate a small amount of goods.

摘要 i
Abstract ii
目錄 iii
表次 iiii
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機與目的 1
第二節 研究流程與架構 2
第二章 文獻探討 3
第一節 智慧財產權定義及相關法規釋義 3
第二節 仿冒品的需求與供給 4
第三節 組織的結盟與裂解 6
第三章 理論模型 9
第一節 模型假設 9
第二節 不同政府形態下之延展性賽局模型 11
第四章 結論與建議 36
參考文獻 38

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