Title page for etd-0613100-163632


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URN etd-0613100-163632
Author Chih-Hsiung Chan
Author's Email Address No Public.
Statistics This thesis had been viewed 4623 times. Download 1431 times.
Department Business Management
Year 1999
Semester 2
Degree Master
Type of Document
Language zh-TW.Big5 Chinese
Title Analysis of Two-Part Tariff and Consumer's Welfare
Date of Defense 2000-06-01
Page Count 43
Keyword
  • Two-part tarriff
  • Oligopoly
  • ISP
  • Abstract THESIS ABSTRACT
    The bulk of Internet Service Providers adopt two-part tariff. Two-part tariff means users should pay a fixed rental every month, and pay a varied fee base on their connecting hours.
    Internet Service Provider group their customers by analyzing customer’s demand level, and provides different group different Pay-Rating. We call this situation Multiple Pay-Rating. If Internet Service Provider provide their customers single Pay-Rating. We call this situation Single Pay-Rating. People always analyze two-part tariff in monopoly market. In this thesis I will analyze two-part tariff in oligopoly market.Then compare with the former, and we will know whether two-part tariff erode customer’s welfare.
    I will create a differentiate-product demand function base on Logit model, and build two-part tariff oligopoly competition model. Analyze the equilibrium in Single Pay-rating and in Multiple Pay-rating. And I drew several conclusions from the analysis.
    1. In oligopoly market structure two-part tariff not necessarily deprive of customer’s welfare. On the contrary if ISP group their customers, customer’s welfare will improve.
    2. If there are no differentiation between customers’ utilities, nonlinear pricing will degraded to linear pricing. If customers’ utilities are different, ISP will set up the unit connect fee equal to the unit cost, and the month rental will raised with the increasing differentiation between customers’ utilities.
    3. If Internet service provider group their customer and provide them different Pay-rating, the final equilibrium will be symmetrical equilibrium or non-symmetrical equilibrium.
    Advisory Committee
  • Z.J.Liu - chair
  • Z.H.Wu - co-chair
  • J.H.Chan - advisor
  • F.S.Wang - advisor
  • Files
  • ISP兩段定價與消費者福利之研究.pdf
  • indicate access worldwide
    Date of Submission 2000-06-13

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