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博碩士論文 etd-0614103-105325 詳細資訊
Title page for etd-0614103-105325
論文名稱
Title
高階經理人報酬、公司治理與經營績效之研究
CEO compensation, Corporate Governance, and Firm performance
系所名稱
Department
畢業學年期
Year, semester
語文別
Language
學位類別
Degree
頁數
Number of pages
75
研究生
Author
指導教授
Advisor
召集委員
Convenor
口試委員
Advisory Committee
口試日期
Date of Exam
2003-05-28
繳交日期
Date of Submission
2003-06-14
關鍵字
Keywords
所有權結構、董事會結構、公司績效、公司治理、高階經理人報酬
Firm performance, Corporate Governance, ownership structure, Board controk, CEO compensation
統計
Statistics
本論文已被瀏覽 5804 次,被下載 5356
The thesis/dissertation has been browsed 5804 times, has been downloaded 5356 times.
中文摘要
探討台灣上市公司高階經理人報酬、公司績效與公司治理間之相關性。由於全文採英文寫作,詳細摘要請見英文摘要內容。
Abstract
Abstract
Chief executive officer (CEO) compensation is a potent instrument through which people and investors can improve their understanding of organization substance and symbol. Good compensation package can not only improve the performance of worker but also lift employees’ commitment to work. However, we are not so sure about the positive association between CEO compensation and firm performance because of the existing of “agency theory”. The degrees of alignment of interests with those of the agents in the firm who control the major decisions in the firm are also different. This gives rise to potential conflicts among the stakeholders, and these incentive conflicts have now come to know as “agency (principal-agent) problem”. Being desirous of the problem, this thesis reviews and integrates the literature on CEO compensation, focusing on both determinants and consequences of this complex, often controversial phenomenon. Thus, a model of the determinants of CEO compensation is presented and investigated.
Based on a sample of 422 from Taiwan listed companies, I investigated the data both from Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) and the annual report of each listed company to combine in order to examine the compensation model. The definition of CEO in this thesis is one of the following three identities: chairmen of the board, general managers, and people who serve as both positions, that is, CEO duality. Hypotheses are tested and the study finds that CEO compensation has complex links to several factors: firm sizes, performance, stock return, and board stock ownership. The main factors for deciding CEO compensation are economic determinants and the only significant board control variable is board stock ownership. Contrary to some foreign literature, the index of duality is not significant at all since that people who serve as both chairmen and general manager obtain below average compensation level than others.
In summary, the thesis provides the different results of a matrix of different identities and industries, and hopes to have some contribution to following research.

目次 Table of Contents
Content
Chap 1 Introduction.................................................................. 1
1-1 Motivation and background ................................................ 1
1-2 Objective ................................................................ 3
1-3 Contribution ............................................................. 5
1-4 Researchprocess........................................................... 7
Chap 2 Literature review...................................................... 9
2-1 Agency theory and compensation contract .................................. 9
2.2 Determinants of CEO compensation..........................................12
I. Firm specifications .......................................................12
II. Firm performance..........................................................14
III. Board control............................................................15
IV. Ownership structure ......................................................18
Chap 3 Research design....................................................... 21
3-1 Testable hypotheses................................................................... 21
I. Firm specification ........................................................22
II. Firm performance..........................................................22
III. Board control............................................................23
IV. Ownership structure ......................................................24
3-2 Samples and restrictions ................................................ 26
3-3 Variable definitions and regression model................................ 28
I. Variables definition ......................................................28
II. Regression model..........................................................31
3-4 Statistic method......................................................... 32
Chap 4 Results and discussion................................................ 34
4-1 Descriptive statistics analysis ......................................... 36
4-2 Correlation analysis..................................................... 39
4-3 Regression analysis ..................................................... 41
I. The association between CEO compensation and Firm specification............43
II. The association between CEO compensation and Firm performance ............43
III. The association between CEO compensation and Board control...............43
IV. The association between CEO compensation and ownership structure .........45
V. Different regression analysis towards three different identities...........45
VI. Industry specification analysis ..........................................50
Chap 5 Conclusion and suggestion .............................................57
5-1 Summary and conclusion ...................................................57
5-2 Research limitation.......................................................60
5-3 Recommendation ...........................................................61
Reference.....................................................................66
參考文獻 References
Reference
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