Responsive image
博碩士論文 etd-0614105-121810 詳細資訊
Title page for etd-0614105-121810
論文名稱
Title
通路獎勵金之會計研究--應用實質選擇權
Accounting Research for Channel Rebates—Application of the Concepts of the Options
系所名稱
Department
畢業學年期
Year, semester
語文別
Language
學位類別
Degree
頁數
Number of pages
54
研究生
Author
指導教授
Advisor
召集委員
Convenor
口試委員
Advisory Committee
口試日期
Date of Exam
2005-05-16
繳交日期
Date of Submission
2005-06-14
關鍵字
Keywords
製造商、蒙地卡羅模擬、零售商、權利金制度、選擇權、代理理論、員工認股權、通路獎勵金、會計方法
options, accounting, franchise, agency theory, manufacture, Monte Carlo simulation, retailer, channel rebates, ESO
統計
Statistics
本論文已被瀏覽 5670 次,被下載 0
The thesis/dissertation has been browsed 5670 times, has been downloaded 0 times.
中文摘要
none
Abstract
A channel rebate is a payment from a manufacturer to a retailer based on retailer sales to end consumers. The widespread use of rebates by manufactures is being met with growing retailer and consumer acceptance. Channel rebates are especially significant in the consumer industries. This kind of sales force compensation method involves the agency relationship between manufactures and retailers. Manufactures often make a specified contract, which rewards retailers when retailing sales exceeds the specified level in a certain period, to minimize the agency cost effectively and align the interests of manufactures and retailers.
Since the employ stock option (ESO) transaction involves the exchange of labor inputs for a contingent equity claim on the firm, the economic intuition of ESO and channel rebates is such similar. However, the accounting treatments of channel rebates are often not recorded exactly in the period in which they are incurred. It is important to employ reasonable and correct methods for estimating the value of channel rebates. This article suggests that manufacturers should expense the channel rebates at the grant date.
In addition, adjustments for rebate expenses are necessary to recognize the different value of rebates between grant date and statement date. This article estimates channel rebates using the options model, which is a more flexible and useful method to value intangible assets, to make it possible to report on the balance sheet the appropriate assets, liabilities, and stockholders’ equity at the statement date and to report on the income statement the proper net income for the period. Because the analytical solution of our model is unknown, the numerical solution can be obtained by Monte Carlo simulation to determine the value of channel rebates reasonably and correctly. Thus, the financial statements of both manufactures and retailers will provide the most useful information to various user groups.
目次 Table of Contents
1. Introduction 1
2. Literature Review 4
2.1 Agency theory 4
2.1.1 Agency Relationships 4
2.1.2 The Assumptions of Agency Theory 5
2.1.3 Tow Types of Agency Problems 6
2.1.4 Agency Cost 7
2.1.5 Agency Relationships Pervade Marketing 8
2. 2 Channel Rebates 9
2.2.1 Franchising 9
2.2.2 The Development of Channel Rebates 10
2.2.3 Agency Relationships between Channel Coordination 10
2.2.4 Two Types of Channel Rebates 11
2.2.5 Related Research Regards Manufacture-Retailer Contractual Relationships 13
2.3 Comparisons between Channel Rebates and Employee stock options 14
2.3.1 Employee stock options 14
2.3.2 Why Should ESO Be Expensed? 15
2.3.3 Accounting Treatments for Stock-Based Compensation 16
2.3.4 Comparisons between Channel Rebates and Employee stock options 21
2.4 The Options Approach 23
3. Accounting Treatments of Channel Rebates 25
3.1 Channel Rebates Grants Are a Barter Transaction 25
3.2 Channel Rebates Issuance Involving Operating Activities 25
3.3 An Example of the Accounting Treatments of Channel Rebates 26
4. Valuation Model of Channel Rebates 28
4.1 Monte Carlo Simulation 28
4.2 Derivation of the Valuation Model of Channel Rebates 29
4.3 Granting Channel Rebates Combines Operating and Financing Activities 33
4.4 The Results of Monte Carlo simulation 33
4.5 Accounting for Channel Rebates 35
5. Conclusions 36
Appendix A: Wiener Processes 40
Appendix B: Lemma 42
Appendix C: VBA 43
參考文獻 References
Aboody, D., M. E. Barth and R. Kasznik, 2001, “SFAS 123 stock-based compensation expense and equity market values”, Working Paper, Stanford University, Stanford, CA.
Arrow, K. J., 1974, “The economics of agency”, in Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business, Pratt, J. and R. Zeckhauser, eds. Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 37-51.
Bergen, M., Dutta, S. and Orville C. Walker, Jr., 1992, “Agency relationship in marketing: A review of the implications and applications of agency and related theories”, Journal of Marketing 56, 1-24.
BFA/NatWest, 1999, The NatWest BGA Franchise Survey, British Franchise Association.
Bisby, A., 1999, “VARs stung by rebates”, Computer Dealer News 15, 1-6.
Black, F. and M. Scholes, 1973, “The pricing of options and corporate liabilities”, Journal of Political Economy 81, 637-659.
Brach, Marion A., 2003, Real Options in Practice (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., Hoboken, NJ).
Caborn, K., 2001, Private conversation with Intuit executive.
Cachon, G. and M. A. Lariviere, 2000, “Supply chain coordination with revenue-sharing contracts: Strengths and limitations”, Working paper, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA.
Castrogiovanni, G. and R. Justis, 1998, “Franchising configurations and transitions”, Journal of Consumer Marketing 15, 170-90.
Chen, M. L., 1997, Vertical Restraint and Advertising Effects (Hakuto-Shobo Publishing Company, Tokyo).
Core, J. and W. Guay, 1999, “The Use of Equity Grants to Manage Optimal Equity Incentive Levels”, Journal of Accounting and Economics 28, 151-84.
Coughlan, A. T., E. Anderson, L. W. Stern and A. I. El-Ansary, 2001, Markertng Channels, 6th Edition (Prentice Hall International, Inc., NJ).
Cox, J. C., S. A. Ross and M. Rubinstein, 1979, “Option pricing: A simplified approach”, Journal of Accounting and Economics 15, 119-142.
Dana, J. D. and K. E. Spier, 2000, “Revenue sharing, demand uncertainty, and vertical control of competing firms”, Working paper, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL.
Eisenhardt, K. M., 1989, “Agency theory: an assessment and review”, Academy of Management Review 14, 57-74.
FASB: http://www.fasb.org/news/nr121604_ebc.shtml.
Foster, T. W. HL., P. R. Koogler and D. Vickrey, 1991, “Valuation of executive stock options and the FASB proposal”, Accounting Review 66, 595-610.
Gerchak, Y. and Y. Wang, 2000, “Revenue-sharing vs. wholesale-price contracts in assembly systems with random demand”, Working paper, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, OH.
Guay, W., S. P. Kothari and R. Sloan, 2003, “Accounting for Employee Stock Options”, American Economic Review 93, 405-409.
Hopkinson, G. C. and S. Hogarth-Scott, 1999, “Franchising relationship quality: micro-economic explanations”, European Journal of Marketing 33, 827-43.
Huddart, S. and M. Lang, 1996, “Employee stock option exercises: an empirical analysis”, Journal of Accounting and Economics 21, 5-43.
Hull, John C., 2003, Options, Futures, and Other Derivatives, 5 Edition (Prentice Hall, NJ).
Jensen, M. and W. Meckling, 1976, “Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure”, Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305-60.
Kanellos, M., 1996, “Novell regroups,” Computer Reseller News (Sep 9), 127.
Lafontaine, F. and M. E. Slade, 1997, “Retail contracting: Theory and Practice”, The Journal of Industrial Economics 65, 1-25.
Lessard, D. and R. Miller, 2001, “Understanding and managing risks in large engineering projects”, Working Paper, MIT Sloan School of Management, Cambridge, MA.
Merton, R. C., 1973, ‘The theory of rational option pricing”, Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 4, 141-183.
Murphy, K. J., 1999, “Equity Stock Options”, Journal of Accounting and Economics 18, 207-31.
Noreen, E. and M. Wolfson, 1981, “Equilibrium warrant pricing models and accounting for executive stock options”, Journal of Accounting Research 19, 384-398.
Pasternack, B. A., 1999, “Using revenue sharing to achieve channel coordination for a newsboy type inventory model”, Working paper, California State University, Fullerton, CA.
Pratt, J. W., 1964, “Risk aversion in the small and the large firm”, Econometrica 32, 122-36.
Pratt, J. W. and R. J. Zeckhauser, 1985, “Principals and agents: an overview,” in Pratt, J. W. and R. J. Zeckhauser (Eds), Principals and agents: The Structure of Business, Harvard Business School Press, Boston, MA.
Roberts, J., 1998, “Reseller’s profits rise, but so do salary costs”, Computer Reseller News (October 26), 46–48.
Robertson, J., 2001, “Intel readies less-expensive 1.3-GHz Pentium for mainstream market”, Electronic Buyers’ News (January 1), 3.
Taylor, T. A., 2002, “Supply Chain Coordination under Channel Rebates with Sales Effort Effects”, Management Science 48, 992-1007.
Timothy B. Bell, R. L. Wayne, L. M. Bruce and S. Yeh, 2002, “The Valuation Implications of Employ Stock Option Accounting for Profitable Computer Software Firms”, The Accounting Review 77, 971-996.
Thomas, H., 1993, “Risk-free incentive contracts: Eliminating agency cost using option-based compensation schemes”, Journal of Accounting and Economics 16, 447-473.
Watson, A., D. Kirby and J. Egan, 2002, “Franchising, retailing and the development of e-commerce”, International Journal of Retail & Distribution Management 30, 228-37.
Wild, J. J., K. R. Subramanyam and R. F. Halsey, 2003, Financial Statement Analysis, 8 Edition (McGraw-Hill International, Inc., Singapore).
Zarley, C., 1997, “Vendors’ volume-based incentives”, Computer Reseller News (June 16), 333.
Zarley, C., 1998, “HP expands rebates”, Informationweek (February 2), 93.
電子全文 Fulltext
本電子全文僅授權使用者為學術研究之目的,進行個人非營利性質之檢索、閱讀、列印。請遵守中華民國著作權法之相關規定,切勿任意重製、散佈、改作、轉貼、播送,以免觸法。
論文使用權限 Thesis access permission:校內校外均不公開 not available
開放時間 Available:
校內 Campus:永不公開 not available
校外 Off-campus:永不公開 not available

您的 IP(校外) 位址是 3.137.174.216
論文開放下載的時間是 校外不公開

Your IP address is 3.137.174.216
This thesis will be available to you on Indicate off-campus access is not available.

紙本論文 Printed copies
紙本論文的公開資訊在102學年度以後相對較為完整。如果需要查詢101學年度以前的紙本論文公開資訊,請聯繫圖資處紙本論文服務櫃台。如有不便之處敬請見諒。
開放時間 available 已公開 available

QR Code