本文是延續Akerlof(1970)所設定的存在逆選擇問題的二手車交易市場環境，在這樣的交易環境之下本文加入了多期的動態觀念，並且將新車市場也一併放進模型裡討論，在這樣延伸的模型架構底下我們可以發現到不同於Akerlof的模型中所得到的結論：二手車市場的交易是存在的且新車的價格會間接受到二手車市場逆選擇問題的影響。

This paper examines the properties of the perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium or equilibria in a model where the new car market coexists with the lemon market which has adverse selection problems. Under such a setting, it is shown that the price of a new car will be affected indirectly by the problems of adverse selection in the lemon market.

第一章 緒論…………………………………………………………………………1
第一節 背景........................................................................................................1
第二節 研究動機與目的………………………………………………………2
第二章 文獻回顧……………………………………………………………………4
第一節 文獻探討………………………………………………………………4
第二節 分析架構………………………………………………………………8
第三章 理論模型……………………………………………………………………9
第一節 模型的設定與分析……………………………………………………9
第二節 逆選擇問題對車輛價格的影響……………………………………..16
第三節 動態均衡……………………………………………………………..22
第四章 結論與建議………………………………………………………………..28
第一節 結論......................................................................................................28
第二節 建議......................................................................................................30
參考文獻……………………………………………………………………………..31

中文部分:

1、王駿傑、劉楚俊(2007)，「多期二手車市場與新車市場並存的動態賽局模型」高雄：2007年海峽兩岸經濟、產業、環境與管理青年論壇。
2、張維迎著、劉楚俊編校(1999)，『賽局理論與信息經濟學』，台北：茂昌圖書有限公司。

英文部分:

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