本文探討執政者在進行反貪決策時，如何在同時考慮民眾及既得利益者之利益的狀態下，最大化自身的支持度，研究得出當執政者本身清廉自持，其在決定反貪努力水準時，心中會較偏袒民眾；但當執政者本身擁有屬於自己的既得利益集團，其在決定反貪努力水準時，則會有三種可能情況：（1）較偏袒既得利益者；（2）會先偏袒與本身同一陣營的既得利益者，再來考量民眾，最後才是考量非屬同一陣營的其他既得利益者；（3）先偏袒非屬同一陣營的其他既得利益者，再來考量民眾，最後才是考量與本身同一陣營的既得利益者。
再者，當媒體越自由（即民眾會主動要求執政者進行反貪及提升政府職能的努力水準時），執政者在決定反貪努力水準時，心中會較偏袒既得利益者。
最後，既得利益者之利益受執政者反貪活動影響，雖可動用政治資源對執政者的反貪決策造成一定影響，但既得利益者本身亦要付出不少代價，故當既得利益者知悉執政者在進行反貪決策時，會對其較偏袒，就不會動用政治資源；惟若執政者在決定反貪行動時，會較偏袒民眾，在此種狀態下，既得利益者的既有權力有被執政者透過反貪行動收回的危險，故其有動機去動用政治資源來影響執政者的反貪行動。

This paper discusses the rulers during the next anti-corruption decisions, taking into account how people with vested interests and the interests of the state, to maximize their support, come when the rulers themselves are clean, its anti-corruption efforts in determining the level hearts of the people would be more biased; But when the rulers themselves have their own vested interests, its anti-corruption efforts in determining the level, then there are three possible situations: (1) Representing favoring vested interests;(2) Will first favoritism and vested interest itself in the same camp, again consider the people, and finally considerations are not the same camp other vested interests;(3) First favoritism are not the same camp other vested interests, consider again the people, and finally consider itself in the same camp with vested interests.
Furthermore, when the media more freedom (that is, people will offer to those in power and enhance anti-corruption efforts at the level of government functions), those in power in determining the level anti-corruption efforts, the heart would be more favoring vested interests.
Finally, the anti-corruption activities affect the interests of those in power vested interests of the subject, although the use of political resources may cause some impact on the anti-corruption decisions of those in power, but vested interests themselves have to pay a lot, so it knows when the vested interests of those in power during the anti-corruption decisions will favor when comparing to it, it will not use its political resources; but if those in power in deciding anti-corruption action would be more people favor, in this state, the vested interests of both there is a risk of power through anti-corruption action to recover those in power, and therefore have an incentive to use their resources to influence the political rulers of anti-corruption action.

審定書+i
謝辭+ii
摘要+iii
Abstract+iv
目錄+v
表次+vi
第一章 緒論+1
第一節 研究動機與目的+1
第二節 研究方法與研究架構+2
第二章 文獻回顧 +4
第三章 理論模型 +8
第一節 基本模型 +8
第二節 一丘之貉 +10
第三節 民眾主動 +13
第四節 針鋒相對 +14
第四章 結論與建議+17
第一節 結論+17
第二節 未來延伸與建議+18
參考文獻+20

一、 網路資料
1.維基百科，網址：https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/中共十八大以來的反腐敗工作（2016/06/30瀏覽）。
2.辜樹仁，2014，〈打「大老虎」周永康 習近平反貪玩真的？〉，天下雜誌，網址：http://www.cw.com.tw/article/article.action?id=5060146（2016/06/30瀏覽）。
3.朱易，2014，〈藉反腐搞權鬥 習近平下一刀揮向江澤民？〉，新新聞，網址：http://www.new7.com.tw/NewsView.aspx?t=&i=TXT20141210161811IJQ（2016/06/30瀏覽）。
4.媒體自由程度的定義，資料來源：維基百科，網址：https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/新聞自由指數（2016/07/09瀏覽）。
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