中文摘要
本論文主要由三個模型所構成，其共同點為均在資訊不對稱的環境之下，推論經理人的個人因素，對投資的影響。第一個模型將內部人解釋成廣義的經理人，透過其持股比例，結合Myers and Majluf (1984)的資訊不對稱假說與Jensen(1986)的自由現金流量假說，建立一新模型，說明企業現金流量與資本支出成正相關的原因。本模型論證出，在內部人持股比例低的環境下，自由現金流量假說比較適合解釋現金流量與資本支出的正向關係，會有過度投資的現象，而當內部人持股比例增高時，資訊不對稱假說比較適合解釋此種關係，過少投資現象發生。

而在如Myers and Majluf資訊不對稱假說的環境下，讓經理人即為舊股東代表公司，擁有私有的資訊，而外部投資者會利用聲譽來評價公司的情況下，建立了結合了聲譽的效果與資訊不對稱假說的模型，建構出論文的第二個主題。本模型推論出：低聲譽好公司會出現過少投資的現象；而高聲譽壞公司則會出現過度投資的現象。另外，利用公司與外部投資者的衝突關係，可以解釋過度投資與過少投資發生的原因。最後本模型推論在聲譽的作用下，對好公司在融通工具的選擇上，會產生影響；然而對壞公司則否。本研究已提出全新的模型，同時解釋公司過度投資和過少投資的兩種不同現象。

本論文的最後一個模型是將經理人分成兩類，一是與公司利益一致的高層企業首長擁有偏見，另一類則為下層的經理人會有聲譽的考量，建立了結合偏見與聲譽的模型，討論偏見對經理人投資建議的影響。該模型推論出：偏見會使經理人的投資建議產生扭曲，其中以無能力的經理人扭曲行為較為嚴重，過度投資與過少投資的現象皆可能發生，但非必然往偏見的方向傾斜。另外，本研究利用Myers and Majluf的資訊不對稱模型架構，推論出在適當的情境下，偏見會有緩和過少投資的效果，論證了偏見並非一定對投資效率是一負面因子。

Abstract

This thesis is composed of three models that imply the impact of managers’ characteristics on investment under asymmetric information. The first one regards insider as managers and formulates a model to explain the positive relationship between cash flow and capital expenditure of a firm, and tries to synthesize the “asymmetric information hypothesis”(Myers and Majluf, 1984) and the “free cash flow hypothesis”(Jensen, 1986) by insider ownership. The finding demonstrates that in instances with low percentage of insider ownership, the free cash flow hypothesis will better explain the positive relationship between cash flow and capital expenditure and will have the phenomenon of over-investment. On the other hand, when the percentage of insider ownership is high, the asymmetric information hypothesis is better suited to explain this relationship and will have the phenomenon of the under-investment.

The second one formulates a model to synthesize the “reputation effect” and “asymmetric information hypothesis” through considering the outsider investors’ evaluation of the firms in terms of firms’ reputation and firms’ private information. This study concludes that the good type firms with low reputation will show the behavior of under-investment and the bad type firms with high reputation will have the phenomenon of over-investment. Moreover, the model demonstrates that both the phenomena of under-investment and of over-investment are caused by the conflict between the firms and the outsider investors. At last, this study implies that the effect of reputation has an influence on the choice of financial tools for the good type firms but does not have an influence on that of the bad ones. This study presents a general model to explain two types of investment inefficiency under the effect of reputation in a
reasonable mode.

The last one formulates a model to synthesize the “bias effect” and “reputation effect” through considering the fact that the CEO in the interest of firm is in favor of a certain project and that junior managers concern their reputation. This study concludes that the CEO’s bias will influence the project that the managers suggest and does not necessarily lead to the direction of bias. The untalented managers will be affected more seriously than talented managers. Moreover, the model combines “bias effect” with “asymmetric information hypothesis” and implies that the bias can alleviate the problem of under-investment under certain circumstances. This finding shows that the bias is not always a negative factor of investment efficiency.

目錄
Contents
中文摘要………………………………………………………………...I
Abstract …………………………………………………………………II
致謝………………………………………………………………….... IV
目錄……………………………………………………………………..V
表次…………………………………………………………………….VII
圖次………………………………………………………...…………VIII
第壹章 緒論
第一節 前言………………………………………………………1
第二節 研究動機與目的………………………………………....7
第三節 論文邏輯流程…………………………………………...9
第四節 本文結構………………………………………………..10
第貳章 文獻探討
第一節 經理人持股比例與投資的相關文獻……………12
第二節 聲譽與投資的相關文獻…………………………17
第三節 偏見與投資的相關文獻…………………………25
第參章 經理人持股比例與投資模型
第一節 基本假設…………………………………………28
第二節 模型的推導………………………………………31
第三節 模型的討論與分析………………………………35
第肆章 資訊不對稱下的聲譽與投資模型
第一節 基本模型…………………………………….…..37
第二節 命題與推論……….………………………..……41
第三節 模型的推廣………….…..…………..…………..56
第四節 模型之實證……………………………………...61
第五節 分析與討論……………………………….……..66
第伍章 偏見與投資模型
第一節 基本模型………………………………………..69
第二節 模型的推導與命題……………………..………73
第三節 模型的推廣…………..…………..……………..87
第四節 分析與討論……………………………………..91
本章證明………………………………………………….100
第陸章 結論與建議
第一節 結論…..………………………………………..104
第二節 對後續研究的建議………………………..…...107

參考文獻………………………………………………….. 109

參考文獻
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