本文研究將員工的風險態度與偷懶的同儕效果（peer group effect of shirking）納入考量，再結合社會規範標準而設定一個偷懶模型，試圖找出員工的風險態度與公司內工作士氣之間的關係。由本文理論發現，若員工風險態度普遍趨於保守的確會降低員工偷懶的比例，提升公司內的工作士氣。之後進一步探討當薪資水準與監督投入強度有所變動時，對於公司內工作士氣有何影響。由本文推論得知，適當的提高薪資水準配合良好的監督投入對於公司內的工作士氣是有正向的效果。

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第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機與目的 1
第二節 研究架構 4
第二章 文獻回顧 5
第三章 理論模型 8
第一節 定義重要名詞 8
第二節 模型設定 11
第三節 圖形分析 18
3.1 風險態度 對偷懶的同儕效果 的影響 21
3.2 薪資水準 對偷懶的同儕效果 的影響 22
3.2.1 調整薪資水準的短期影響 22
3.2.2 調整薪資水準的長期影響 24
3.3 監督機制 對偷懶的同儕效果 的影響 25
第四節 平均努力水準 27
第四章 結論與未來研究方向 28
第一節 結論 28
第二節 未來發展方向 29
附圖 30
參考文獻 37

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