本文以賽局理論的思維方式討論兩個分別生產具有完全替代性商品的廠商進行專利權競賽的最適決策。模型設定為兩個廠商相互進行佈署專利地雷，在彼此互為侵權的情況下，任一參與者必須同時考慮雙方決策對本身報酬的影響，並在既有條件下尋求利潤最大化的選擇。
本文分析結果，當訴訟成本大於訴訟報酬時，廠商的最適選擇為「訴訟上和解」；而訴訟報酬大於訴訟成本時，默許為廠商的嚴格劣策略，但和解與爭訟到底之間不存在混合策略均衡，端視廠商間「訴訟報酬」與「和解代價加上辯護成本」的大小關係，存在唯一純策略那許均衡。

This study investigated the optimal strategy for patent competition from two firms on the similar marketing based on the game theory. The model was set to be that two firms deploy patent trap for infringing upon each other. In the case of infringement, the participants have to consider their own payoff influenced by mutual decision; as well as seek for maximize profits in the existing conditions.
The result indicated that “settlement” is the optimal strategy for manufactures when the cost is more than the payoff of litigation. By contrast, if the payoff is more than the cost, acquiesces will be manufacturers’ strictly dominated strategy.
However, no mixed strategy equilibrium does exist from settlement to litigation. It only depends on the relationship between "reward of litigation" and "cost of settlement with defense." It exists unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium.

目錄
第一章　緒論 1
第一節　研究動機與目的 1
第二節　本文架構 2
第二章　文獻回顧 3
第三章　基本模型 5
第一節　模型架構 6
第二節　策略償付說明 7
第三節　報酬分析 8
第四節　延伸討論 21
第四章　結論與建議 23
第一節　結論 23
第二節　建議 25
參考文獻 26

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