本研究即在探討政府職能政策制定時，經濟體系之活動所受到的政治性因素之影響，以理論模型推導並分析政府行為及經濟活動之均衡結果。本研究發現，當考量政治影響時，政府政策的變動對私部門的決策變數有直接的效果；同時政策的衝擊大小除了視政府對私部門政治影響的主觀評價外，尚必須視私部門其消費、生產、價格等參數之影響。當政府行為內生化後，政府制定政策時，考量經濟社會中不同群體之政治影響程度考慮，所得到的均衡結果雖亦可滿足未將政府行為內生化之經濟體系均衡條件；但是，當政府政策發生改變時，本研究所得到的結果與傳統經濟體系一般均衡模型，將政府政策視為外生，未考慮政治影響時所得到的結果並不相同，這也說明了未考量政治影響之經濟均衡模型在政策變動時其預測能力的限制。本研究亦發現，當某一群體政治影響程度增加時，並不必然會使該群體之效用增加，這說明了當政府制定政策時，雖主觀上給予某一群體較高的政治傾向評價，試圖提高該群體之效用，以獲得更多的支持；但是，在經濟體系均衡條件的運作結果，並無法達到政府原先的目標；除非政策制定前能對所有受影響之個人或群體之個別決策行為內涵予以精確的測度，否則政府制定政策時，仍應以尊重市場機制為宜。
中央對地方補助款的議題而言，其補助款的分配是絕對具有政治功能目的的。根據本研究的分析可知，當政府對地方之補助並未受到政治考量之影響時，中央政府對不同地方政府之最適補助款水準必須考量當地商品對其商品消費稅率之稅率彈性。當中央政府的目標函數納入自身政治利益考量時，其對地方的誘發性補助依據視其目標函數中之社會福利與政治利益權重而定。若重視社會福利，則不會以增加對地方之補助來促進地方之政治貢獻投入以增加自身之政治利益；反之，若中央政府較重視政治利益時，在政治性投入對政治利益之邊際貢獻大於中央政府對地方所提供的邊際補助傾向時，則會以增加對地方的補助來獲取更高的政治利益。補助款之分配，除受到自發性補助款對地區政治貢獻投入之彈性的影響外，亦受到地區政治貢獻投入之邊際補助傾向係數彈性之影響。若中央政府觀察到對地方的補助款能鼓勵該地提供更多的政治貢獻投入時，其策略是支援更多的補助款，反之，較佳的策略則是減少補助款的提供。
本研究的亦應用公共選擇理論中「多數決」方式的中位選民理論，呈現租稅決定的政治決定程序。本研究發現，均衡存在的一個必要條件是，必須是對所有的租稅方案而言，毛所得與工作能力與納稅能力的等級必須一樣；另一個充份條件是在此條件下，個人對消費與休閑的分配為常態的單峰分配。所得分配之離散程度較大時，高生產能力的人數佔全體人數的比例相對較小，所以多數決下的關鍵中位者，可藉由選擇一個較低的邊際稅率與一個較高累進程度的租稅方案，在不減少其可能得自預算移轉的情況下，減少自己的租稅負擔。不論中位者是否工作，造成邊際稅率累進的因素均相同；換言之，當生產能力的變異程度愈大，能力分配的右偏程度愈大，以及累進程度增加對工作的負誘因效果愈小時，一個多數決所決定的租稅方案就愈有可能為邊際稅率累進的租稅制度。

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目 錄
第壹章 緒論 1- 1
第一節 研究緣起與目的 1- 1
第二節 研究架構與內容 1- 2
第貳章 政府行為內生化之經濟政治分析 2- 1
第一節 前言 2- 1
第二節 基本模型的建立 2- 5
第三節 納入政治影響考量之均衡分析 2-13
第四節 小結 2-20
註釋 2-22
附錄 2-23
第參章 補助款分配之經濟政治分析 3- 1
第一節 前言 3- 1
第二節 基本模型的建立 3- 6
第三節 具政治功能之補助款分配分析 3- 9
第四節 小結 3-16
註釋 3-19
附錄 3-21
第肆章 多數決之租稅方案分析 4- 1
第一節 前言 4- 1
第二節 基本模型的建立 4- 11
第三節 多數決均衡下之租稅決定 4- 14
第四節 小結 4-32
註釋 4-35
附錄 4-36
第伍章 結論 5- 1
第一節 主要結果與政策意涵 5- 1
第二節 未來研究方向 5- 7
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