本研究研究修改 Salop (1979) 模型的基本假設去分析雙頭寡占的廠商如何策略性的運用商店的區位及說服性的廣告去競爭，其中說服性廣告的功能為影響消費者的效用。與一般文獻不同，本研究競爭方式為同時選擇區位與廣告競爭，及廠商建立單一商店的限制改為領導廠商可以建立兩家商店(分為領導品牌與副品牌) 並在不同廣告成本的環境下進行分析。
本研究發現，在廣告成本低的環境下廣告的競爭會趨於激烈，建立第二家商店(副品牌)反而會影響到第一家商店(領導品牌)市場需求量，最後兩家廠商會各建立一家商店於市場上。而在高廣告成本的環境中下廣告的競爭較為緩和，在不影響第一家商店(領導品牌)的市場需求量下，領導廠商會建立第二家商店(副品牌)並對跟隨廠商做出阻擋進入市場的動作，因此最後市場上只剩領導廠商的兩家商店。
最後在高廣告成本的環境中回歸單一品牌限制下，去探討兩廠商的廣告互動情形。

This study modifies the Salop (1979) research hypothesis to analyze duopoly competition, how firms strategically use the location and persuasive advertisement to compete.Particularly, the persuasive advertisement are used to influence the consumer's utility. Unlike other existing literature, this study simultaneously decide the store’s location and advertisement cost, and the single brand assumption will be modified to allow the leading firm can establish two brands at the different time, one as leading brand, another one as subsidiary brand respectively, to perform analysis under various cost of advertisement.
This study found that under assumption of the low advertisement cost, the competition tends to be aggressive, the establishment of second store or subsidiary brand actually damages the first store or leading brand’s market demand,ultimately, the two firms will each establish only one store on the market to compete. Nevertheless, under high advertisement cost, the competition will be relatively passive, without affecting first store’s market demand, leading firm will establish second store or subsidiary brand, and try to block the following firm from entering the market, therefore, ultimately, there will only left two leading store on the market.
In the least, under high advertisement cost with single the brand restriction as an original hypothesis, we discuss how will the two firm's advertisement interact with one another.

審定書 i
謝辭 ii
摘要 iii
Abstract iv
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景 1
第二節 研究目的與架構 3
第二章 文獻回顧 5
第三章 模型設定與分析 9
第一節 模型設定 9
第二節 多品牌策略於低廣告成本競爭分析 14
第三節 多品牌策略於高廣告成本競爭分析 25
第四節 單一品牌策略於高廣告成本競爭分析 28
第四章 結論與建議 31
第一節 結論 31
第二節 研究建議 32
參考文獻 33

中文部分
陳正倉、林惠玲、陳忠榮、莊春發 (2007), 「廣告與競爭」, 《產業經濟學 第二版》，466-468。
英文部分
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