通常上市公司的董事會有銀行代表（Banker on the Board）時，可增加監督功能與降低資訊不對稱的程度，因此公司通常可拿到較優惠的貸款條件。但另一方面也會產生銀行與公司間的利益衝突，因為當一個人同時對公司和銀行負有責任的時候，在利益上便會分歧而有所衝突，不過多數學者多主張：其降低資訊不對稱所帶來的利益大過於利益衝突所產生的成本，也就是說金融機構介入公司的董事會對公司是有所幫助的。
本論文便探討我國上市公司的公司特性會吸引金融機構介入其董監事會中，以供企業在營運時參考。本論文並探討我國金融機構的放款行為和金融機構進入公司董監事會間的關係。
結果發現，金融機構會選擇信用風險良好的公司，擔任其董事或監察人。而在金融機構的放款條件部分，當一公司的借款期間較長時，金融機構可能擔心所借出的款項無法監督保管，所以較會進入其公司的董監事會中擔任董事或監察人，其中可能也隱含著當一企業有金融機構進入其董監事會時，可以藉由種種管道監督了解公司狀況，資訊不對稱的程度明顯降低，才會進一步願意給企業較長的還款時間。

This study is to discuss the correlation between financial firms and non-financial firms through board linkages and the relationship between these connections and lending and borrowing behavior. Although a board linkage may provide the benefit of better information flows between the lender and borrower, a person on the board of both a bank and a borrowing firm board linkage may face a conflict of interest: the person has a fiduciary duty to both the bank and the firm and these interests may diverge. Many studies suggest that the information benefits of connections outweigh the costs of conflicts. In this way, the study is to find out what kind of firms will attract banker on the board, and the relationship between these connections and lending and borrowing behavior.
The conclusions of this study are presented as the following. On firm characteristics, financial firms will choose companies with better credit risk to be the directors. In addition, on the lending and borrowing behavior, the bankers will be the directors of the companies that have longer borrowing terms. The purpose is to monitor these companies. It also can be implied that non-financial firms with banker on the board will have longer borrowing terms than the financial firms.

目錄
第一章 緒論 6
第一節 研究動機與目的 6
第二節 論文架構與內容 8
第二章 文獻探討 10
第一節 金融機構放款 10
第二節 代理理論、公司治理與董監事會 19
第三節 金融機構放款與董監事會之關聯 28
第三章 實證分析與結果 31
第一節 研究變數與研究方法 31
第二節 實證結果 40
第四章 結論與建議 46
第一節 結論 46
第二節 研究限制與未來研究方向 48
參考文獻 49
中文部分 49
英文部分 50
附錄一 樣本公司 54
附錄二 金融機構進入公司董監事會名單 57

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