本研究以公司治理變數檢視其對金控公司經營績效表現關係及後續購併行為影響。其中在績效表現分析，發現呆帳因素對於績效表現有扭曲情況發生，因此使用回復呆帳費用後之績效代替。本文利用多元迴歸分析與獨立樣本t檢定的方法，檢視欲驗證的假說，經實證結果的檢驗發現如下：

（1）治理變數對公司績效表現關係
機構法人持股比例、董事會規模達顯著且為負向關係，與Pound (1988)的策略協力假說主張及Jensen (1993); Lipton and Lorsch (1992)的看法一致。
然而內部管理者股權結構、政府持股、監察人人數未達顯著水準。其中，政府持股比例變數在以金控成立後績效較優的7家公司樣本分析中，為顯著且負向關係，可說明股權在多為政府機構持有的情況下，會因具有穩定金融的政策使命而以穩健保守為經營原則，對經營績效有負面影響。

（2）治理變數對後續購併行為的影響
有後續購併他銀行之金控公司其在內部管理者、機構法人持股比例上明顯高於無後續購併他銀行之金控公司，但董、監事人數項目少於無後續購併他銀行之金控公司；而政府機構持股兩者沒有顯著差異。此結果符合Amihud and Lev (1981)、Roll (1986)的主張，管理者基於自利而從事購併，機構投資者會因自身利益與管理當局合作，彼此互蒙其利而犧牲其他股東之利益。

In this paper we investigate the relation between corporate governance mechanisms and performance of financial holding companies (FHCs). We find that irrecoverable loans will affect the accuracy of FHCs’ performance. So we remove the factor of bad debts and use this new performance proxy. In addition, we investigate the difference of corporate governance mechanisms between the FHCs that have subsequently merged other banking firms and those that haven’t. The results are as following.

(1)The financial performance of FHCs and corporate governance mechanisms
We find that the coefficients for the institutional investor ownership and board size are negative and statistically significant. This result is consistent with Pound’s (1999) strategic alignment hypothesis and with Jensen (1993), Lipton and Lorsch (1992).
However, the coefficients for the managerial, governmental ownership, and supervisor size are not statistically significant. When we investigate the 7 better FHCs as another samples. The coefficient for the governmental ownership is negative and statistically significant. We believe that the governmental ownership will make the firms conservative and is not good for company.

(2)The subsequent mergers and corporate governance mechanisms
The FHCs that have subsequently merged other banking firms have higher level of the managerial and institutional investor ownership, but less number of board size and supervisor size than those that haven’t. But there is no difference in the governmental ownership.
The findings are consistent with Amihud and Lev (1981) and Roll (1986). They believed that mangers will make money or non-money profit during merging and institutional investors will cooperate with managers to avoid the conflict of interest between them.

第一章 緒論…………………………………………………1

第一節 研究動機……………………………………………1
第二節 研究目的……………………………………………3
第三節 研究架構……………………………………………5

第二章 文獻探討……………………………………………6

第一節 治理機制與經營積效………………………………6
第二節 治理機制與購併行為………………………………13

第三章 研究背景與市場概況………………………………19

第一節 國外控股公司制度…………………………………19
第二節 台灣金控市場現況…………………………………22
第三節 台灣金融業購併……………………………………28

第四章 研究設計與方法……………………………………31

第一節 研究假說……………………………………………31
第二節 研究設計……………………………………………37
第三節 研究方法……………………………………………41
第四節 樣本資料……………………………………………48

第五章 實證分析與結果……………………………………50

第一節 績效表現與治理變數的關係………………………50
第二節 回復呆帳後之金控績效表現與治理變數的關係…63
第三節 治理變數與後續購併行為的關係…………………76

第六章 結論與建議…………………………………………81

第一節 研究結論……………………………………………81
第二節 研究限制與建議……………………………………85

參考文獻………………………………………………………87

附錄……………………………………………………………94

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