本篇論文主要探討在類似歐盟執委會的環境下，利用次高價拍賣的方式，發展出一個合理分配公共財數量的模型。研究的過程如下：首先證明在兩人時的均衡策略；此均衡策略中，成員會以自己和對方的政策利潤差距進行出價。在給定成本函數後，聯邦政府可以依照成員對公共財的偏好比例設定成本的權重，使整體效用達到極大；而且這樣設定公共財負擔成本權重的方式，無論是兩人或n人的次高價拍賣下皆可適用。最後討論在兩人的次高價拍賣下，政府也能設定權重各一半的比例，使自己得到的標金達到極大。

This thesis aims to explore a reasonable model for allocating the quantity of public goods in a confederate environment close to European Union by means of the second-price auction. The development process is as follows: first of all, when two members engage in an auction, each member’s bid is the benefit difference between his own and opponent's optimal public good allocations. Confederate authority can set different weights for different members regarding the cost sharing on public good provision. The individual weight is determined by the intensity of member country's preference on the provided public good level. Such an action makes the public good to be provided at the optimal level for the confederate. Lastly, in a two-member confederation, the central authority can assign an equal cost-sharing weight to each member on the public good provision and maximize the winning bid.

論文審定書………………………………………………….….…..………i
謝辭…………………………………………………….….…..…………...ii
摘要………………………………………………………….….……....…iii
Abstract…………………………………...……………………….………iv
第一章　緒論…………….………………………..………………………1
第一節　研究動機……………………………………….…………...1
第二節　研究目的……………………………………………………2
第三節　研究方法……………………………………………………2
第二章　文獻回顧…………….………………………..…………………3
第三章　模型假設…………….…………………..………………………6
第四章　模型分析…………….…………..………………………………8
小結…………….……………………………………………………15
第五章　結論與建議…………….………..………………..……………16
參考文獻…………………………………………….……………………17

中文部分
1. 蔡秋如(2007)，“俄羅斯政黨政治的發展與特質--國家杜馬選舉之分析”，《展望與探索》，5(2)，頁60-78。
2. 蘇子喬與王業立(2010)，“為何廢棄混合式選舉制度?－義大利、俄羅斯與泰國選制改革之研究”，《東吳政治學報》，28(3)，頁1-81。

英文部分
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3. Jehiel, P. and Moldovanu, B. (1996), “Strategic nonparticipation,” Rand Journal of Economics, 27, 84-98.
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