目前大部分有關創業投資的研究多針對創業者的道德危險提出解決方式，卻忽略了創投公司可能的投機行為。因此本研究即以雙重道德危險的觀點出發，期望能找出創投公司與創業者間有效率的解決機制。透過本研究的分析結果，可獲得以下三項結論：
一、若僅考慮可轉換特別股，雖然能夠有效約束創投公司的投機行為，但對於創業者的行為卻僅有激勵效果而缺乏良好的監督能力。
二、多階段融資契約在解決雙重道德危險的效果上，與可轉換特別股相反。多階段融資契約能夠有效避免創業者的投機行為，但卻無法避免創投公司可能發生的道德危險問題。
三、同時考慮可轉換特別股以及多階段融資契約時，便可相互彌補其產生的缺點。因此整合可轉換特別股以及多階段融資契約，雖然仍無法完全解決雙重道德危險的問題，但相較於單獨使用任一契約，可發現整合後的契約可為雙方帶來更高的效用。

The literatures on venture financing mainly focus on proposing resolutions of entrepreneurial moral hazard. However, those researches ignore the fact that venture capital firms might behave opportunistically as well. Hence, this paper offers an effective mechanism to resolve the double moral hazard raised between venture capital firms and entrepreneurs. Three main conclusions are drawn as follow:
It is shown that although convertible preferred stock could prevent venture capital firms from opportunistic behavior, it has poor efficiency in dealing with entrepreneurial moral hazard.
On the other hand, staged financing, as opposed to convertible preferred stock, could effectively mitigate entrepreneurial moral hazard, but hardly avert from moral hazard raised from venture capital firms.
In its conclusion, this study illustrates that both convertible preferred stock and staged financing act as an effective complementary mechanism for each other. Compared with any single approach, this joint mechanism could relatively resolve a certain extent of double moral hazard.

第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機與目的……………………………………………… 1
第二節 論文架構……………………………………………………… 3
第二章 文獻探討 7
第一節 創業者所產生的道德危險之相關文獻探討………………… 7
第二節 創投公司所產生的道德危險之相關文獻探討………… 18
第三節 雙重道德危險之相關文獻探討……………………………… 19
第三章 可轉換特別股融資契約模型 23
第一節 基本假設……………………………………………………… 23
第二節 模型分析……………………………………………………… 26
第三節 小結…………………………………………………………… 41
第四章 多階段融資契約模型 43
第一節 基本假設修正………………………………………………… 43
第二節 模型分析……………………………………………………… 45
第三節 小結…………………………………………………………… 58
第五章 整合可轉換特別股及多階段融資契約模型 60
第一節 模型分析……………………………………………………… 60
第二節 小結…………………………………………………………… 72
第六章 結論與研究建議 74
第一節 研究結論……………………………………………………… 74
第二節 研究建議……………………………………………………… 76
參考文獻 77
附錄一 債券、普通股與可轉換特別股之可能報酬 79
附錄二 單期融資與多階段融資契約之可能報酬 82
附錄三 整合契約之可能報酬 84

一、 中文部份
蔡志明，1993，「台灣創業投資事業之代理問題與投資績效」，中山大學財務管理研究所碩士論文。
簡夢崢，2002，「公司監督誘因、企業家努力動機與最適創投契約之設計」，台灣大學財務金融學研究所碩士論文。
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