本論文應用實質選擇權分析法討論合併、股票收購與現金收購等三種購併形式下的最適決策問題。我們利用兩階段的方式來探討購併的決策問題，第一階段考慮購併發生的原因包括規模經濟、目標公司經營不善、研發技術的取得與市場競爭力等因素，依據購併所產生最大綜效價值來決定最佳的目標公司；第二階段決定主併公司與目標公司最適的購併時點、換股比率或是購併金額等問題。本研究導出三種購併型態下的最適購併門檻、換股比率或購併金額，我們也發現規模經濟、績效改善、市場佔有率增加皆會降低購併門檻、加速購併活動。此外，購併型態會影響購併雙方的購併報酬與時點，其中現金收購發生的時點將晚於合併與股票收購。
本論文亦建構一模型來探討眾多廠商合併的最適決策，導出考慮眾多廠商合併下之綜效價值、合併時點與合併持股比率以及合併對市場結構的影響。文中討論廠商間的競爭程度、市場獨占力、固定成本與需求衝擊等因素，在合併過程中扮演何種角色。文中發現廠商間的競爭程度增加、市場獨占力提高、較高的固定成本及較低的需求衝擊，皆會增加合併的動機並促進合併的進行。

This paper applies a real option approach to analyze the optimal decisions of mergers, stock offers, and cash offers. We use the two-stage approach to investigate the optimal decisions of mergers and acquisitions. At the first stage, the merger company has to choose the target company to obtain the largest synergy, which comes from the increasing return to scale, improved performance, acquired R&D, and increased market power. At the second stage, the main work is to determine the takeover threshold (timing), exchange rate of stocks or bid premium under the three forms of mergers and acquisitions. We find that the increasing return to scale, improved performance, and increased market power will lower takeover threshold and speed up merger activity. Finally, the forms of mergers and acquisitions will affect the timing and the returns of the acquirer and acquiree. Cash offers will happen even later than mergers and stock offers.
This thesis also constructs a model to study the multi-firms’ merger strategies and derives the multi-firms’ synergy value, timing and terms of merges. In addition, we study the effect of firms’ competitive intensity, market power, fixed cost, and demand shocks on the decisions of merges. We find that the increased competitive intensity, increased market power, higher fixed cost, and lower demand shocks will enhance the motives of merges and accelerate merger activities.

第一章 緒論 …………………………………………………………….1
第一節 研究背景 …………………………………………………….1
第二節 研究動機與目的 …………………………………………….3
第三節 研究流程與架構 …………………………………………….6
第二章 文獻回顧 ……………………………………………………….8
第一節 購併活動 …………………………………………………….8
第二節 購併與實質選擇權 …………………………………………15
第三節 購併與賽局選擇權理論 ……………………………………18
第三章 購併之最適決策析 ……………………………………………24
第一節 基本假設與理論模型 ………………………………………24
第二節 最適的合併決策 ……………………………………………28
第三節 股票與現金收購決策 ………………………………………36
第四節 數值分析 ……………………………………………………43
第五節 結論 …………………………………………………………45
第四章 多數廠商合併下之最適決策 …………………………………46
第一節 基本模型 …………………………………………………..46
第二節 合併時點與條件 …………………………………………..50
第三節 合併下的市場結構 ………………………………………..57
第四節 結論 ………………………………………………………..64
第五章 總結與建議 ……………………………………………………65
第一節 總結 …………………………………………………………65
第二節 後續研究建議 ………………………………………………66
附錄 …………………………………………………………………….67
參考文獻 ……………………………………………………………….70

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