現金卡講求的是快速核卡及方便借款者可以馬上借到借款，故其審核程序較寬鬆。且現金卡審核的依據大部分都是延用信用卡的制式書面信用評分表，這對借款者潛在信用風險的評估效果與能力是很有限。因此，如何做好信用風險的評估，正確的辨別借款者的風險程度，此為本研究的重心。而本研究主要著重分析在獨占與完全競爭的市場結構下，銀行如何訂定最適的現金卡借貸契約來避免逆選擇問題的產生，使得該借貸契約能夠滿足雙方最大的期望利益。
本研究得出的結論如下：
當市場結構為獨占時，銀行不會用擔保品來區分兩種不同類型的借款者。若在完全訊息時，能力較高的借款者支付的利率與手續費較高，且此時銀行不會對高、低能力的借款者實施信用配給。若在訊息不對稱時，會有兩種可能的結論：第一種同於完全訊息的情況，但銀行會對能力較低的借款者實施信用配給；第二種為所有借款者均付相同的利率與手續費，但銀行不會對借款者實施信用配給。
當市場結構為完全競爭且完全訊息時，銀行不要求借款者提供擔保品，也不會對其實施信用配給，但是能力較高的借款者所付的利率與手續費較低。若是在訊息不對稱時，銀行會要求能力較高的借款者提出擔保品，利用擔保品來區分借款者類型，此時的借貸契可以區分出不同風險程度的借款者，是一個分離均衡。

The cash card emphasizes is the fast nuclear card facilitates the loan to be allowed to borrow the loan immediately, therefore its verification procedure is more loose. Also the cash card verification basis majority of all is extends with the credit card service pattern written credit comments the chronometer, this to the loan latent
credit risk appraisal effect and the ability is very limited.Therefore, how completes the credit risk the appraisal, correct distinguishes the loan risk degree, this for this research center of gravity. But this research mainly emphatically analyzes in monopolizes with under the market mechanism which completely competes, how does the bank subscribe decides the most suitable cash card to lend money the contract to avoid the counter choice question the production, causes to be supposed to lend money the contract to be able to satisfy the bilateral biggest expectation benefit.

When market mechanism for monopolizes, the bank cannot use collaterals to come the loan which the area weight plants the different type. If in perfect information, low risk type loan payment interest rate and handling charge higher risk for high, also this time bank cannot to be high, the low risk loan implementation credit ration. If in asymmetry information, can have two kind of possibilities the conclusions: First kind with to perfect information situation, but silver guild to high risk loan implementation credit ration; The second kind pays the same interest rate and the handling charge for all loans, but the bank cannot to the loan implementation credit ration.

When the market mechanism for completely competes also the perfect information, the bank does not request the loan to provide collaterals, also cannot to its implementation credit ration, but the low risk loan pays interest rate and the handling charge higher risk loan comes low. If when asymmetry information, the bank can request the low risk type the loan proposes collaterals, the use collaterals differentiates the loan type, this time the loan which lends money the agreement to be allowed to differentiate the different risk degree, is a separation is balanced (Separating Equilibrium).

誌謝 Ⅰ
摘要 Ⅱ
目錄 Ⅲ
表次 Ⅴ
圖次 VI
第一章 緒論 1
第一節　台灣現金卡市場的現況 1
第二節　研究動機與目的 4
第三節 研究方法、範圍與流程 5
第二章 文獻回顧 7
第一節 信用配給理論 7
第二節 相關文獻 8
第三章 獨占市場之分析 15
第一節 模型基本假設 15
第二節 完全訊息 16
2-1 模型 16
2-2 比較靜態 20
第三節　訊息不對稱 21
3-1 模型 21
3-2 比較靜態 27
第四章 完全競爭市場之分析 30
第一節 完全訊息 30
1-1 模型 30
1-2 比較靜態 32
第二節　訊息不對稱 34
2-1 模型 34
2-2 比較靜態 44
第五章 結論與建議 46
第一節 結論 46
第二節 建議 47

附錄一 48
附錄二 49
參考文獻 50
表 次
表1 現金卡發卡機構重要業務及財務資訊 3
表2 現金卡發卡銀行收取利息及各項費用項目及其利(費)率調查表 3

一、中文部分
1.王瑜琳(1998)，『抵押品、利率與借貸市場的一般均衡分析』，行政院國家科學委員會專題研究計劃成果報告。
2.林培州(1982)，『銀行放款市場之失衡計量分析』，國立台灣大學經濟研究所。
3.姜堯民(1990)，『不對稱訊息下銀行放款契約訂定之研究』，國立政治大學企業管理研究所碩士論文。
4.曾貝莉(1993)，『以信號賽局理論分析銀行放款之決策』，國立政治大學國際貿易研究所碩士論文。
5.張維迎(1996)著，劉楚俊編校，賽局理論與訊息經濟學，台北市：茂昌圖書有限公司。
6.薛舜仁(1993)，『訊息不對稱下銀行之放款策略-信號賽局理論之應用』，國立政治大學國際貿易研究所碩士論文。

二、英文部分
1.Berger A. N. and G. F. Udell(1992),“Some Evidence on the Empirical Significance of Credit Rationing,”The Journal of Political Economy,100,5,pp.1047-1077.
2.Besanko,D. and A. V. Thakor(1987),“Collateral and Rationing：Sorting Equilibria in Monopolistic and Competitive Credit Markets,” International Economic Review,28,pp.671-689.
3.Bester, H. (1985),“Screening vs. Rationing in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information,” The American Economic Review,75,pp. 850-855.
4.Bester, H. (1987),“The Role of Collateral in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information,” European Economic Review,31,pp.887-899.
5.Boot A. W. A., A. V. Thakor and G. F. Udell (1987),“Competition , risk neutrality and loan commitments,” Journal of Banking and Finance ,11 ,pp. 449-471
6.Boot A. W. A., A. V. Thakor and G. F. Udell (1991),“Secured Lending and Default Risk：Equilibrium Analysis﹐Policy Implications
and Empirical Results,” The Economic Journal, 101,406﹐pp.458-472
7.Engers M.(1987), “Signalling with Many Signals,” Econometrica , 55, 3, pp.663-674.
8.Milde H. and J. G. Riley (1988) ,“Signaling in Credit Markets,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 103, 1,pp.101-129.
9.Stiglitz , J. E. and A. Weiss ( 1981),“Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information,” The American Economic Review, 71, 3 pp.393-410.
10.Villas-Boas M. J. and U. Schmidt-Mohr (1999),“Oligopoly with Asymmetric Information：Differentiation in Credit Markets,” The RAND Journal of Economics,30,3,pp.375-396.