過去的相關政治景氣循環的研究，確認了執政者對於經濟政策的操縱與政治景氣循環之間的高度關連性。其中，多數的研究發現，在已開發國家中的政治景氣循環理論為屬「政黨論 (partisan theory)」的架構，亦即左翼政黨偏向以擴張性政策來爭取選民支持，然右翼政黨卻以控制通貨膨脹為使命。然而，以美國為例，由於80年代雷根政府時代，其大幅擴張性的財政政策，讓「政黨論」的現象在80年代的美國消失，導致了「政治景氣循環」理論逐漸從現今的總體教課書中退卻。然而，雷根的八年任期對於強調經濟發展係為長期現象的經濟學者而言實屬短期。
因此，本論文第二章試圖應用傳統的國際景氣循環 (international business cycles) 的架構，以相關系數的大小來衡量變數間是否存在景氣循環的現象。我們以美國 48 州過去 50 幾年的資料為實證樣本，利用黨派效果 (partisanship effect) 為分析主軸，強調政治人物在同一黨籍的背景下，其意識形態會對於特定經濟政策產生偏好。於是我們設計政治虛擬變數 (dummy variable)-「聯邦的總統與地方的州長為同黨籍 (PPARN)」及「高比例之同黨籍州長 (GPARN)」為二個主要影響州層面景氣循環的管道，來探究政黨因素是否會造成各州之間總體經濟變數 (每人可支配所得與每人政府支出) 出現亦步亦趨景氣循環的現象。根據全樣本期間的分析，初步的結論支持了「政黨論」的角色依然存在於美國。然而，我們也發現: 若單以 80 年代以後的資料為分析樣本，上述現象卻轉變為不明顯。因此，證據顯示，政治景氣循環的理論中，「政黨論」的現象只是暫時於80年代消失，惟在長期下仍是成立的。透過此一實證研究架構，我們試圖提醒經濟學家，在研究美國的景氣循環議題時，政黨的角色是不可忽略的一環。而更深入的政策涵義為:政治人物對於經濟政策的態度，往往會是導致一國景氣循環的原因之ㄧ。
其次，既然「政黨論」在美國是成立的，那選民如何利用這些訊息來做為其投票依據? 又政黨可根據此發現以作為其施政決策支參考嗎? 同樣的以美國為例，第三章的追蹤資料分析法中共整合 (panel cointegration and causality tests) 的實證發現，若政黨以高成長與高支出為其施政的目標變數，這些目標變數與州長是否同黨籍的比率之間呈現顯著的共整合，其意為變數間存在著長期的穩定關係。再來，根據這些長期穩定關係，我們繼續以誤差修正模型 (panel error correction model) 來討論變數間的長、短期因果方向。我們發現: 在長期，不同樣本期間的實證結果顯示，高比率的民主黨籍的州長通常會帶來較高的經濟成長與較高的政府支出；反之，愈多的共和黨籍的州長時，則會存在著相反的效果。同時，在全樣本及1951-1980年期間，我們也在短期的因果關係中我們也找到了證據證明了當經濟成長的表現愈好時，會導致有較高比率的民主黨黨籍的州長出現。一方面，在某種程度上，結論支持上述「政黨論」的的概念，而這樣的發現也同時提供選民在投票過程中的決策依據。
最後，政治景氣循環理論所倡導的概念即是: 政府的總體經濟政策總是會討好選民來獲取更多得支持，以獲取其連任的機會。即便在於當現任者面臨連選連任之限制時，由於該執政者所屬的政黨亦會推出候選人參與競選活動，來持續其政權。因此，寬鬆與刺激性的政策即會不斷在決策者手中推出，來提醒選民其執政經濟表現，並獲取更高的政府歡迎程度 (government popularity index, GPI)。如此我們便可觀察到一個現象，當二個國家的執政當局愈受到選民歡迎與愛戴時，此種現象定本於該國良好的經濟表現，如同時存在著較高的經濟成長率與較低的失業率等。換句話說，二國的此時的景氣循環的同步性 (synchronization) 愈高。於是，類似的經濟與政治交錯的情況即會不斷的在各國選舉運作模式中出現。然而，我們也認為，過去的政治經濟學者通常以總體經濟變數如失業率及通貨膨脹率等指標為解釋變數來檢測政府的受歡迎與否，而被解釋變數 (歡迎程度) 的衡量，大多立基於民調資料 (polls data) 或是選舉時執政黨所獲之得票率 (voting shares) 為校標。但利用民意調查的資料卻存在著一些限制: 如僅有少數國家，如英、美等國家具備著完整的時間序列資料，使得學者在進行相關議題之研究時，易受到樣本缺乏之困擾。又如，僅以少數的總體經濟指標來推斷政府的受歡迎與否，恐會出現「遺漏變數」之缺憾。
延續第二章的「開放經濟」的研究設計，第四章便根據前述學者研究成果，但在實證過程中，我們應用了不同研究方法試圖彌補其不足。首先我們選取了九種具代表性的總體經濟變數來建構 GPI 的指標。其次，我們應用迭代相關係數分析 (rolling correlation coefficient) 方式期望此中分析方式能抓住經濟變數在隨著時間過程中，可能受到外在衝擊而改變其序列本質的特性，以期降低估計誤差。最後，模型中控制了傳統上的貿易開放程度為國際景氣循環的重要傳導機制後，我們探討了當二國政府受歡迎程度愈接近及執政者之意識型態愈雷同時，是否會導致更緊密的景氣循環的情況出現。在15個歐洲國家的實證發現，這種透過經濟政策的推動來換取更多的選民支持，來影響執政者的受選民歡迎程度的高低，也是導致歐洲景氣循環的原因之ㄧ。

This dissertation includes three different topics concerning the political business cycles in developed countries. In the first section, we use annual data for 48 states from 1951 to 2004 by the method of instrumental variables estimation. We find that the partisan theory created in statewide via two channels including the partisanship effect which include the interactive relationships between president and governors or among governors, and the partisan ideology including the policy preferences are both potential shocks to a real business cycle.
Next, we investigate the theory of partisan cycles using panel cointegration and fully modified OLS techniques based on the same data as earlier. We propose the long-run co-movement and the causal relationships between partisan target and cycle variables. Meanwhile, the panel error correction model shows evidence of long-run unidirectional causality running from partisan variables to target variables. This shows that, in the long run, statewide economic performance must be directly based on politicians’ concerns for policies and outcomes, as well as on exhibiting strong ideological differences in those preferences across parties in the United States. Overall, we contribute an essential reference to the voters.
Finally, a new government popularity index (GPI) is constructed and using variables that include real GDP, industrial production, the unemployment rate and the inflation rate as measures of bilateral activity correlation beginning in 1981Q1 and ending in 2005Q4 for 15 European countries. The estimation procedure is developed by rolling the correlation of bilateral activity every twenty quarters and running it on partisan variables, namely, as a kind of government popularity index and the difference between partisan ideologies combined with traditional bilateral trade intensity variables. Overall, a strong and striking empirical finding is uncovered: countries with closer popular governments, incumbent ideologies as well as trade links, tend to have more closely correlated business cycles.

中文摘要 1
Abstract 3
Contents 4
1. Overview 6

2. Intranational Political Business Cycle in the United States. 9
2.1 Introduction 10
2.2 The Econometric Methodology and Data Description 17
2. 2. 1 Econometric Methodology 17
2. 2. 2 Data Description 18
2. 3. Discussion for Partisan Cycle Hypothesis 21
2.3.1 Benchmark Equations 21
2.3.2 Instrumental Variables Used for Estimation on Intranational Political Business Cycles 24
2.3.3 Empirical Results 27
2.3.4 The Sub-Period Analysis 31
2.3.5 Evidence on the Unemployment Rate 33
2.4. Conclusions 34

3. Can public choose the better living standard based on partisan ideology? A statewide panel investigation 50
3.1. Introduction 51
3.2. Partisan Ideology and Economic Performance: Innovations and Contributions 55
3.3. Data Description 58
3.4. Discussion of the Empirical Results 59
3.4.1 An intersting experiment 59
3.4.2 The Panel Cointegration and Causality Tests 62
3.4.3 More Evidence in relation to Partisan Theory 68
3.5. Conclusions 70

4. Government Popularity in economic and Business Cycle Synchronization: A New Discovery in European Countries 81
4.1. Introduction 82
4.2. Definition and discussion of GPI 88
4.3 Methodology and Description of the Data 91
4.3.1 The data set 91
4.3.2. Defining the differences in government popularity, the political party’s preferences and bilateral trade intensity 92
4.3.2.1 Similarities in government popularity 92
4.3.2.2 Political party preferences 93
4.3.2.3 Bilateral trade intensity 94
4.4. Reporting the Empirical Findings 94
4.4.1 Our strategy 94
4.4.2 Estimation results 95
4.4.3 The system’s estimation 97
4.5. Conclusions 100

5. Conclusion 116

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